Romanians see Europe as an ethical hazard, the Germans as (still) their best chance for national atonement; the Spaniards as the key to their democracy and the Italians as the guarantee of their unity; and so on. These may be but simplistic clichés, as each national debate in Europe about Europe pits schools of thought against schools of thought, ideology against ideology, national trope against national trope. Nevertheless, they belong to distinctly different national debates about the twenty-first-century project that is the European Union, its relationship to the history of its respective peoples, and the promises or threats that it may hold for their various national projects today.

This book is about the constellation of different ‘European stories’ woven by these national debates, and ultimately what their overlaps and divergence might tell us about Europe itself. It is not yet another study of the European or national public spheres, but rather an exploration of intellectual debates on the European Union in distinct national contexts. More precisely, it focuses on the visions and interpretations of European integration proposed since the early 1990s by so-called ‘public intellectuals’, i.e. political philosophers, scholars, editors, or writers whose opinions contribute to framing public attitudes.

The term ‘public intellectuals’ – though commonly used in the US – might sound like a pleonasm to many in Europe who consider that an ‘intellectual’ is by definition a public figure. Yet we believe that it remains useful, since in reality not all those who engage in ‘intellectual’ occupations seek to address a wider public. Put differently, we use ‘intellectual’ in the cultural sense, to identify those figures ‘regarded as possessing some kind of “cultural authority”, that is who deploy an acknowledged intellectual position or achievement in addressing a broader, non-specialist public’ (Collini 2006: 46). Consequently,

* We are grateful to all the participants in the European Stories workshop and especially to Timothy Garton Ash, Michael Freeden, and Ivan Krastev for their insightful comments on earlier drafts of this introduction. We would also like to thank Diana Pinto and two anonymous referees from Oxford University Press.
the ‘intellectual’ considered in this volume is a scholar who addresses a lay public either in a national or a transnational context, but is not necessarily politically active in the sense of the French intellectual engagé. As Michael Freeden points out in his chapter, this leaves the question open as to whether his object is to interpret or change the world.

Naturally, therefore, the book is also concerned with the reception of intellectuals’ debates and thus the source of their authority, to be found in the ways in which citizens listen to, are influenced by, or even in some cases defer to their ‘European stories’. Of course, the public may also ignore or reject these debates. While the very definition of intellectuals and their place in society varies greatly between European countries, national debates among these intellectuals all shape – and reflect, in more or less distorted ways – the dominant opinions of their fellow citizens. Moreover, intellectuals influence the way in which their country is perceived by other Europeans, and thus the evolving relationship between European peoples.

Ironically, perhaps, this also means that for the most part the intellectuals considered in this volume are not specialists of the European Union; and nor is this book a comparative study of the state of the art of ‘European studies’ across Europe. Paraphrasing Collini, we could say that the intellectual considered in this book is a person who deploys an acknowledged position in a certain field of research in order to address a different topic – in this case European integration. Thus, Jürgen Habermas was recognized as one of the most prominent thinkers of our time well before he turned to the subject of Europe in the early 1990s; Marcel Gauchet and Pierre Manent were well established as, respectively, a theorist of democracy and a historian of liberal political thought before they published their first articles on Europe in the mid-2000s. Inevitably, these intellectuals originate from a plurality of disciplines – from political theory to public law, philosophy, contemporary history, political sociology, and even literature. As a result, the chapters present different disciplinary emphases reflecting both national intellectual traditions and their authors’ own bias – political theory in the case of the chapter on France, law for Spain, or history for Britain.

However, it should be clear that this book is not a ‘who’s who’ of European intellectuals – a topic which has already given rise to an important literature, whether one considers the voluminous body of academic writings on the role of intellectuals at the European or the national level. Our objective is to compare and contrast intellectual debates on Europe rather than the role of intellectuals

We focus on the content of the discourses rather than their actors. Indeed, there is an almost complete lack of literature on the way in which European integration has been addressed by intellectuals since the birth of the European Union in 1992. In articulating the distinct European narratives that emerge from these debates, we hope to deepen understanding of the multi-faceted nature of the European process as a whole.

Moreover, this book does not aim to provide a comprehensive history of the intellectual debates on ‘Europe’ in the longue durée. Although this story remains to be written, we have chosen to focus on the ‘history of the present’ (Timothy Garton Ash) and the recent turning points at which intellectual debates on the EU have come to life. Of course, each country has its own initial ‘European moments’ – the 1992 ratification of the Maastricht Treaty in France, the 1993 Constitutional Court decision in Germany; and further back in time, the 1975 accession referendum in Britain or even the heydays of dissidence in the ex-Czechoslovakia or Poland. Consequently, even if each chapter embeds its story in the national intellectual tradition and its predominant ‘obsessions’, which usually indeed goes back several centuries, most of the debates analysed are predicated on the existence of the European Union.

‘European stories’ is a collective attempt at contrasting distinct visions of European integration across Europe, exploring differences not only in ultimate diagnosis, but also between the very terms of the debate in various national contexts. How is the European Union framed in different intellectual debates? How is the evolving European polity conceived? What do these differences in turn tell us about the European Union? Are the concerns raised and the assumptions made in these various historically bounded settings part and parcel of a shared problématique? Or are they irrelevant to one another? To what extent can we observe a cross-pollination between these national debates, or at least echoes from one arena to the other?

We are aware of no comparative study as yet addressing these issues and based on in-depth analysis of the national normative debates underpinning them. This volume stems from our conviction that the time is ripe to explore such a fascinating avenue of research and to take stock of recent convergences between political or legal theorists increasingly interested in the EU on one hand, and mainstream EU scholarship increasingly interested in normative matters on the other.

In this introductory chapter, we first provide a brief overview of debates over Europe in the longue durée, and then try to explain the (near) absence of

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3 On the latter question, see for instance Charles 1990; Lemayrie and Sirinelli 2003; Trebitsch and Granjon 1998.

4 There are very few recent books on the history of the idea of Europe before 1957. See Curcio 1958; Duchenne 2008; Duroselle 1963; or Renouvin 1949. For a philosophical point of view, see Cheneval 2005.
intellectual debates on European integration during the Cold War. In the third section, we suggest that the myriad of visions and positions on the EU in the last two decades can be clustered around three distinct normative models, so that variants of these models can be found across national contexts. Finally, we provide an outline of the volume as a whole through an overview of its various chapters.

**Europe invented: Post-war eras across centuries**

It might seem anachronistic to use the term ‘intellectual’ to encapsulate the various visions of Europe found in the literature before the nineteenth century, since the word itself was not used in avant-garde literary circles before the end of the 1890s (Jennings 1993). Some actually identify the decisive moment as the Dreyfus Affair, more precisely 1 February 1898 when Maurice Barrès mocked as a ‘protestation des intellectuels’ the text signed by some 1,200 scholars endorsing Emile Zola’s charges against the Dreyfus trial. So while the term entered common parlance with a pejorative connotation, ‘as often in such cases, those to whom it was applied came in time to claim it proudly as a self-description’ (Collini 2006: 21). However, even if the concept itself was not coined before the nineteenth century, one can – along with Francis Cheneval, who in the following chapter draws on both the sociological definition provided by Jacques Le Goff and the metaphysical theory of Alain de Libera – retrospectively consider as ‘intellectuals’ the various scholars who, since the end of the thirteenth century, have led a life of research independent from direct secular or ecclesiastic control.⁵

Accordingly, early thinking on ‘Europe’ can be traced back to the emergence of what Le Goff termed a *communauté de clercs*, whose profession lay in philosophy and the teaching of their thought. As recounted in the next chapter, historians have found no fewer than 182 European unification projects authored between 1306 and 1945 (Foerster 1967). We will not give a potted history of these ‘European visions’, but simply highlight three crucial moments in the story, namely the Enlightenment, the interwar years, and the immediate post-1945 era.

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⁵ European unification seems to have entered the history of ideas with Pierre Dubois (1255–1312). A student of Thomas Aquinas and Siger de Brabant at the University of Paris, Dubois outlines in his treatise *De Recuperatione Terrae Sanctae* what appears to be the oldest proposal for a confederation of kingdoms founded on the authority of international arbitrage, to be entrusted neither to papal nor imperial authority but to a secular council representing each member of the federation. Though this plan had no immediate impact, it seems to have influenced several later projects for European unification, as late as the mid-nineteenth century in the writings of Ernest Renan for instance (Voyenne 1954).
It is nothing new to say that Europe has been born and reborn from the ashes of wars. But we must be wary of reading pre-Enlightenment visions of Europe with hindsight and assuming that greater unity was always necessarily associated with progress. Indeed, before the Enlightenment, the idea of ‘Europe’ tended to be advocated as a way to resist change, in the context of a growing desire for strict state independence from imperial or papal power – ‘ideas that were infinitely more novel at the time than those of Dante or Dubois’ (Duroselle 1965: 73). It was the state which became the object of intellectuals’ attention in the century that culminated in the peace of Westphalia (1648), notably through the work of state sovereignty theorists such as Jean Bodin (1530–1596) or Hugo Grotius (1583–1645). Even the idea of federalism, which was to greatly influence Europeanism itself, was first developed (albeit inspired by Biblical covenant principles) by Johannes Althusius (1563–1638) to apply to emerging states and their constituent parts. In the ensuing struggle over the direction of European state-building, Althusius lost to Bodin and the statists who extolled the virtues of unified states, whether under a king or a ruling elite (Nicolaïdis and Howse 2001). In this spirit, Westphalia entrenched the emerging European system in a state-centric notion of peace between European rulers, predicated on the mutual (albeit conditional) respect for state sovereignty.

It was perhaps not an accident, therefore, that the ‘European crisis of conscience’, to quote a seminal work (Hazard 1953), came precisely in the wake of this consolidation of the nation-state system in Europe at the end of the seventeenth century. Let us call this phenomenon an intellectual contrapuntal, a balancing act in the realm of ideas. As political thinkers in this divided community of nations began to explore the promise of secularism and denounce the perils of absolute power, it became an embarrassment to be reminded that their common Christian identity was uniquely what united them. Instead, ‘Europe’ ‘filled the need for a designation with more neutral connotations’ (Davies 1996: 7). From this time onwards, we are no longer dealing with a few disparate mentions, a few dozen scattered references to Europe per century. Instead, ‘there will be hundreds, thousands, millions’ (Duroselle 1965: 105). At the same time as the Neapolitan thinker Giambattista Vico dedicated his magnum opus ‘To the Academy of Europe’, a proliferation of

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6 It is noteworthy that the idea of perpetual peace through deeper continental cooperation reappeared at the very beginning of the Thirty Years War which led to Westphalia in Le nouveau Cynéc ou Discours des Occasions et Moyens d’établir une Paix générale et la liberté de commerce pour tout le monde, a treatise published in 1623 by the cleric and mathematics master Emeric Cruce. This was not, however, a ‘European idea’, since Cruce had appealed to Louis XIII to promote the idea of a truly international organization that would extend not only to the Christian kingdoms but also to Turkey, China, Japan, or Persia. The Duc de Sully’s project (1620/1635), better known as the Grand dessein d’Henri IV, was more clearly centred on Europe and its equal partition between a certain number of powers, of which none would be permitted to take precedence over the others. Under this plan, a Christian Council would represent fifteen states and would be assisted by a permanent senate of sixty members (four for each state).
pamphlets referred to Europe in their title, whether in *L’Europe savante, L’Europa letteraria*, or *Histoire littéraire de l’Europe*.

Encapsulating the spirit of the times, the Pennsylvania legislator and English quaker William Penn, dubbed by Montesquieu as the ‘modern Lycurgus’, published his 1693 *Essays towards the present and future peace of Europe*. Like previous projects, this plan called for the creation of a body uniting the sovereign princes of Europe into a single and permanent contract, with a number of representatives per state according to the relative size of their populations and economies, a rotating presidency, and decisions taken by a three-quarters majority. More radically, Penn’s Diet – which, like that of Crucé, included Turkey and Russia – would have access to an army to enforce its decisions.\(^7\) Little wonder that such proposals were not considered seriously by the powers that be.

One that was taken seriously, in contrast, was the *Projet pour rendre la paix perpétuelle en Europe* (1713–17), formulated by Abbé Charles Irénée de Saint-Pierre and proposing a five-point plan founded on a permanent alliance between European sovereigns; the submission of all sovereigns to the decisions of a European senate; a contribution from all states to the shared costs of the alliance; collective action against any party violating the terms of the pact; and revision of the terms by simple majority, except on fundamental matters such as modification of borders. Criticized for its utopian tone – notably by Voltaire, who rebaptized its author the ‘Abbé Saint-Pierre d’Utopie’ – the project nonetheless introduced the notion of a collective security conditional on the sovereignty of law, as well as the idea that ‘an organised society of States must guarantee the rights of States’. Such innovations were praised by Leibniz, Rousseau, and Kant, to name only three of the authors who (without necessarily endorsing all elements of the Abbé’s analysis) praised and – in the case of Jean-Jacques Rousseau – commented prolifically on the project.

With hindsight, however, the Abbé de Saint-Pierre’s project (to be analysed in more depth in the next chapter) was eventually eclipsed by the final unification plan of the century, ‘the last milestone of 18th-century cosmopolitan utopias’ (Duroselle 1965), namely Immanuel Kant’s *Zum Ewigen Frieden* of 1795. As is well known, the Könisberg philosopher advocated a Federation of Free States, specifying that no state would be permitted to intervene by force in the constitution or government of another (Article 5). In other words, Kant positioned himself against any form of cosmopolitanism liable to lead to conflation of national characters through absorption of one state by another, and similarly against any merging of nation-states into a new polity (Raulet 1997: 123). Within the Federation of Free States envisioned by Kant, states could not be required to renounce sovereignty in order to merge into a ‘superstate’, a

\(^7\) In 1710, another quaker, John Bellens, would propose highly similar ideas to the British Parliament in a project entitled *Some Reasons for a European State.*
structure which in Kant’s view could not be republican and would inevitably take the form of an absolute monarchy.

To be sure, there is considerable controversy in the literature on the nature of Kant’s cosmopolitanism and the difference between what can be referred to as the first versus second Kant, or the statist versus cosmopolitan emphasis in his writings (Hurrell 1990). Yet, we can at least say safely here that the Kant of Perpetual Peace was searching for a third way between absolute state sovereignty and the absolute transcendence of such sovereignty. Kant thus identified a three-tier legislative structure applicable to political organization within and between states. State law would regulate relations between citizen and state, as well as amongst the citizenry. International law would regulate relations between sovereign and fully autonomous states. Cosmopolitan or transnational law would meanwhile set the parameters of a third dimension allowing for the establishment of juridical relations between foreigners and host states, as well as among foreigners themselves. In Kant’s thinking, this cosmopolitan law was confined to the single condition of universal hospitality: it allowed for the free circulation of people (and ideas) while excluding the right to take up permanent residence outside one’s own country (Cheneval 2005; Raulet 1997: 127). As we shall see below, the interpretation of Kant’s theory continues to animate a large swathe of the theoretical debate on Europe. What is clear is that 150 years after Westphalia, while the idea of Europe has come to prevail as a moral alternative to Christianity, it remains a complement to the idea of European nations.

It would take more than a century and the most bloody war in human history, however, to generate a second wind of intellectual passion for Europe. Indeed, bracketing the Enlightenment as pre-history, the interwar period has been described by some historians as the ‘first golden age’ of the European ideal among intellectuals (Lemayrie 2008), who across Europe quickly came to equate a united Europe with the cause of peace (Frank 2002: 315). Some estimate at over six hundred the number of articles (excluding those in the daily press) and academic works published on the question of European unity between 1919 and 1939, and principally between 1925 and the start of the 1930s (Chabot 2005). At the same time, numerous new ‘European movements’ were created from London to Denmark and Vienna, devoted to furthering the unification of the Continent.

8 Journals dedicated at least in part to Europe included: André Gide’s La Nouvelle Revue Française, focusing on Franco-German exchanges; Louise Weiss’ L’Europe nouvelle, which published a series of articles inter alia around the theme of international cultural cooperation; José Ortega y Gasset’s La Revista de l’Occidente; Revue Européenne; and Europe.

9 These include the European Unity League, founded in London in 1913; the Les Etats-Unis des Nations européennes or Scandinavian Initiative, instigated around 1924 in Roskilde (Denmark) by Dr Heerfordt; and the Comité Franco-Allemand d’Information et de Documentation established by the Luxembourgeois industrialist Emil Mayrisch in 1926. Another project, instigated by Prince Karl-Anton of Rohan, led to the creation in 1923 of the Vienna-based Kulturband as well as the Fédération des Unions intellectuelles in Paris.
Yet such newfound European fervour often needed more than the simple idea of peace to substantiate itself. Take, for instance, perhaps the most famous movement at the time: Paneuropa, founded in 1923 by the Czech Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi. The world order envisaged by the movement was organized around vast global empires – Panamerica, the British Empire, the Soviet Union, Panasia, and finally Paneurope – the latter noticeably excluding Russia and Great Britain. However, Coudenhove-Kalergi remained vague on how to implement his plan for European integration, merely calling for a political confederation modelled on the United States and based on an arbitration treaty and a customs union. More to the point, he shared with numerous other prophets of European unification in the interwar years the conviction that European political decline was due above all to a ‘crisis of conscience’ which could only be alleviated by a moral revolution. Indeed, this culturally pessimist vision of a united Europe fell little short of a brand of mystique in which European political integration was intimately bound up with the advent of a new spiritual direction (Chabot 2005).

The moral dimension of Europeanism is at the core of Julien Benda’s *Discours à la nation européenne* (a paraphrase of Fichte’s *Speeches to the German Nation*) of 1933. In this essay, largely forgotten today, the French thinker made a vibrant plea for a Europe of reason and universalism to stand up against the dangers of particularism embodied in the national ‘nettle’. For Benda, the unity of Europe would not grow out of economic or material interests, but rather out of education and ethics. Contrary to what the title of his book may suggest, the ethics in question dictated that Europe remain free of any nationalism on a larger scale, as European unity could only have moral value if ‘far from being an end in itself, it is but a moment in our quest for God, when all instincts, all marks of pride and selfishness have disappeared’ (Benda 1992: 126). Benda called on his fellow European intellectuals to drive home the point that nationalism as such was morally compromised (Müller 2006: 129), and that European unification would herald the victory of reason and abstraction over pragmatism and particularism.

The impact of this intellectual effervescence on Europe’s political life was not trivial. It contributed to and was stimulated by Aristide Briand’s project of a ‘European federation’ in his 5 September 1929 speech on the necessity of a ‘sort of federal link’, and the memorandum of May 1930 on the organization of a ‘European Federal Union’ further elaborated by Alexis Léger (the poet Saint-John Perse). The intellectual melting pot culminated in the interviews held in Paris between leading literary figures on 16–18 October 1933. Directed by Paul Valéry, the group brought together Georges Duhamel, Aldous Huxley, Hermann von Keyserling, Salvador de Madariaga, Jules Romains, and others. The atmosphere, however, had changed over the preceding years: the failure of Briand’s project against the backdrop of Hitler’s accession to power cast an ominous shadow over events, and indeed as of 1933 European unification projects
declined rapidly. Moreover, when Europe was invoked, it was increasingly not just as a reaction to nationalism in the abstract but against a particular incarnation thereof, for instance the social democracy of the Weimar Republic or of the popular front. To some extent, the very fact that so many intellectuals had seen in Europe the incarnation of ‘pure’ values, as opposed to the materialist values of mass production and consumption prevailing in the US and the USSR, muted their reaction to Hitler’s rise to power – even leading some to acquiesce. It is perhaps in part due to this tainted heritage that the first golden age of the European movement now represents a moment when ‘intellectuals appear to have played a role that they would never recover’ (Lemayrie 2008: 239).

Nevertheless, the initial effect of the Second World War appeared similar to the First, albeit unsurprisingly without the moral certitudes. The second ‘brief golden age of intellectuals’ commitment to European affairs’, in Lemayrie’s words, speaks of a desire to return to the pre-war brand of European humanism, but this time around with a much greater focus on political organization and polity-building. Indeed, the key idea of the immediate post-war era speaks to a collective desire to transcend nationalism along a path well trodden across the Atlantic, namely federalism. Altiero Spinelli symbolizes this trope, penning the first federalist manifesto for Europe in 1941 (along with his colleagues Ernesto Rossi, E. Colorni and Colorni’s wife Ursula Hirschman) and creating the Movimento Federalista Europeo in 1943. This would eventually become a pan-European federalist movement with the creation of the Union of European Federalists in 1946 (in collaboration with Alexandre Marc – previously founder of *La Fédération*, a pioneer interwar group).

But while the movement was able to draw on the aura of the Resistance to elicit significant ‘idealist’ following in the immediate post-war years, it failed to connect effectively with political realities of the time. As they grew in numbers, federalists ‘simply wrote . . . as if the mere recommendation by well meaning advocates unburdened by a reactionary political past, of a rational formula for the “sensible” reorganization of the continent’s political arrangements was all that was required given the postwar catharsis, to bring it about’ (O’Neill 1996: 27). Soon the movement would split between those embracing the pragmatism of Monnet’s methods and those who preferred to remain with the pure vision (although it would reunite in the post-Cold War years). But perhaps more notable than their disagreements was simply intellectuals’ rapid loss of interest in the European question. Hence the European intellectuals’ paradox: as the

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10 There were still representatives of this sensibility, such as Denis de Rougemont who organized a series of meetings in Geneva under the umbrella theme of ‘The European Spirit’; contributions were made by Karl Jaspers, Salvador de Madariaga, Albert Camus, Julien Benda, and others. Rougemont also directed the *Centre Européen de la culture* (1950) and presided over the *Congrès pour la liberté de la culture* (1951), the latter counting among its participants Hannah Arendt and Raymond Aron.
European project finally turned into reality, intellectuals turned away from it (Bachoud, Cuesta, and Trebitsch 2000: 11).

Europe ignored: Perversity, diversion, and disillusion

How can we explain this European intellectuals’ paradox? Why were intellectual and political activism so far apart during these Cold War decades? We see three categories of arguments.

*Perversity.* Firstly and obviously, for many of these intellectuals, especially former members of the Resistance, the very idea of European unity had been tainted beyond redemption by the most lethal plan yet for European unification, namely Hitler’s New European Order. ‘Many intellectuals and bureaucrats across the continent enthusiastically supported the project and a whole ideology – which was not simply identical with Nazism – built around ideas of peace and specific European values’ (Müller 2007; see also Case 2008). In short, the idea of a united Europe had only recently helped justify war, not peace, with the assent of many of the intellectuals who had taken up its cause in the interwar period. Even the term ‘Community’ had been tainted by its use under the Pétain regime.

*Diversion.* Secondly, at least from the late 1950s onwards Europe had become a diversion from the two great causes of the era: the Cold War and decolonization. In these two defining conflicts Europe was simply on the wrong side for significant parts of the left-leaning intelligentsia. How could one be against American domination and colonial oppression and for Europe? More specifically, the new geopolitical context marked the end of the natural equation between Europeanism and universalism (Bachoud, Cuesta, and Trebitsch, 2000: 12). In the interwar period, it was still possible to believe that Europe signified universalism because it prefigured the eventual construction of a lasting world peace. In spite of rising anti-colonialism, one could believe in the bright side of nineteenth-century universalism, the idea that other parts of humanity should have access to progress and modernity exemplified by Europe. After 1950, in contrast, as European states struggled with the aftermath of their civil war turned World War and their often bloody decolonization, it had become clear that Europe’s ‘Other’ could only be its own past. By all means let Europe look for ways to overcome such a past through economic cooperation, but this should be seen as a particularist cause, neither generous nor universal (Frank 2000).

This new cluster of associations with Europe (Hitler, Auschwitz, conquest, colonialism) might help to explain why so many intellectuals after 1945 were often indifferent or even opposed to the European Community (Müller 2007). André Rezler, director of the Centre européen de la culture created immediately after the Hague Congress of 1948, thus suggested that the ‘de-Europeanization’ of intellectuals in the 1950s and 1960s was first and foremost a result of their
‘bad conscience’ stemming from the violence perpetrated by or in the name of Europe (Rezler 1976, quoted by Frank 2000).

Disillusion. Thirdly and finally, many leading intellectual figures rejected the European cause out of disillusion with the actual project of European integration as it came to be. Even those who were ‘true Europeans’ did not like what they saw. The EEC was identified with a Europe of ‘tradesmen’ and technocracy, narrowly economic in nature, and devoid of the kind of commitment to values and spiritual uplifting with which they had identified Europe in the interwar period. Witness for instance the evolution of review Esprit in France. Led by figures such as Emmanuel Mounier, Joseph Rovan, or Alfred Grosser, it remained staunchly committed to Europe between 1945 and 1948, when the promotion of peace, federal Europe, and Franco-German reconciliation were the order of the day. But it progressively ‘de-Europeanized’ over the following years, calling the ECSC a ‘false Europe’ existing only on economic foundations (Frank 2000). And when the debate on the European Defence Community (1954) raged in the French parliament and other political forums, most intellectuals remained silent or came out against the project.

These stances and their motivations stand in stark contrast with the kinds of debates which emanated from the ‘other Europe’ during this period. Interestingly, during the first three decades of European integration, it was on the other side of the iron curtain that anti-totalitarian engagement contributed to reflections on European civilization – notably through the idea, found under various guises in the works of the Pole Czesław Miłosz, the Czech Jan Patočka, or the Hungarian István Bibó – that ‘European identity is consubstantial with the idea of liberty, and must be founded on an effort at critical reflection rather than simple subservience to a tradition’ (Laignel-Lavastine 2000: 30). The idea of a Europe grounded in the ethics of responsibility is at the heart of dissident thought. Against nationalism and ultraliberalism, intellectuals like Bibó or Patočka revisited the question of European universalism in light of their own dispossession of what they saw as European values. Bibó defined European civilization as emancipation of the weakest and legal restraint of the powerful, while Patočka, chief spokesman of Charter 77 alongside Václav Havel, associated European culture with the chance of providing a space for resistance both to totalitarianism and to an exclusively market-based economic rationality. Dissident reviews – Kultura in Poland, Svedectivi in Czechoslovakia, La Nouvelle alternative, Lettre internationale – all engaged in trans-European intellectual exchange. It could be argued that to this day the intellectual attitude on Europe in these countries remains ‘politicized’ by the fact that pro-European ideas were often carried by exiles and dissident circles.

To be sure, Europe started to make a timid comeback in Western intellectual circles in the mid-1970s as they belatedly picked up on the critique of totalitarianism long expounded by their Eastern counterparts. The shockwaves created by the publication of Alexander Solzhenitsyn’s Gulag Archipelago in 1974,
combined with the Helsinki process and the Cambodia tragedy which opened many eyes to the impasse of communism, led in 1978 to the creation of the Comité des intellectuels pour l’Europe des libertés. This marked the revival of a liberal intellectual thrust and its convergence with non-Marxist currents on the left, including on the part of converted ex-Marxists (Lemayrie 2008: 242). In this regard, the example of the French sociologist Edgar Morin is significant. A communist until 1951, fighting for decolonization and the ‘third world’ in the 1950s and 1960s, he remained opposed to European integration until the early 1970s when he understood that ‘Europe was a poor little dear thing. I became neo-European because I saw that Europe was ill’ (Morin 1987). Like him, with the decline of Marxism, many European intellectuals progressively came back to a more realistic (and democratic) cause in the form of European integration (Frank 2002: 324). To simplify greatly, in the three decades following the signing of the Treaty of Rome, the perversity school waned with the fading echoes of the war, except in some ultranationalist British circles; and the diversion school lost its relevance or at least its intensity as both decolonization and communism lost their mobilizing potential. The disillusion school certainly did not disappear to the same degree, and the anti-materialist, anti-capitalist, anti-globalization critique of the EC/EU has since remained alive and well. But, as in Edgar Morin’s case, a growing number of intellectuals came to see that it was precisely its anti-utopian quality that could be the grounds for embracing it, with eyes open and without illusions.

Nevertheless, from the signing of the Treaty of Rome to that of the Maastricht Treaty (1992), European integration attracted precious few ‘public intellectuals’, especially popular political philosophers. There were plenty of intellectuals in Europe but few intellectuals on Europe. The political scientists and other social scientists who remained engaged with the European project spoke and published in restricted circles disconnected from the public sphere. Only with the end of the Cold War, the project of reunifying the continent through the EU, and the dual launch of political and monetary union at Maastricht did the intellectual class as a whole finally wake up to a Europe which had undergone a profound metamorphosis since its inception.

What European polity? Three normative visions of the European Union

European intellectuals have had a lot of catching up to do over the past two decades. The European Union has continued to expand its remit to politically sensitive areas of action from money to migrants and defence, giving rise to public debates over its very nature as a polity. As pointed out by Kaelble, this politicization process was certainly heightened by intellectuals’ rediscovery of Europe as a topic of analysis. ‘This ended a long period of disinterest and disdain
with which intellectuals, for the most parts, had treated the area of the EU since
the 1950s – as a small, purely economic, technocratic, culturally unattractive,
and conservative project’ (Kaelble 2009: 194).

To be sure, before Maastricht and the end of the Cold War, academics focused
on the different dimensions of integration (legal, institutional, economic, soc-
ial, political) either descriptively, historically, or analytically – asking what
were the drivers of integration or the causes of resistance to it. However, they
very rarely delved into the normative questions attached to the process. But
since the early 1990s, the ‘question of Europe’ has emerged as a bone of
contention among major figures of contemporary political thought across the
continent. Intellectuals with no prior interest in the European Union have
come to recognize its relevance to larger philosophical problems, from the
relative merits of liberal, communitarian, or republican paradigms for democ-
archy within and beyond the state to the moral significance of political bound-
daries and geographical borders in cosmopolitan thinking. While some
intellectuals continue to embrace the EU as the promise of a polity beyond
nationalism, others have come to question a ‘Community model’ based on
technocracy, market power, and depoliticization, not least the former dissident
intellectuals in Central and Eastern Europe.

Whether or not difficult referenda reflect an erosion of the so-called ‘permis-
sive consensus’, it appears that the public debates associated with the ratifica-
tion of the Maastricht Treaty have at last opened the valves for theorizing on
the legitimacy of the European Union. As the story goes, the sheer volume and
impact of decision-making at the European level erodes the legitimacy of the
democracies that provide its foundations, without acquiring a generally recog-
nized democratic legitimacy in its own right. We may or may not agree with this
diagnosis, but what matters to us here is that this very perception has served as a
trigger. Now convinced that ‘the EU matters’, intellectuals across Europe have
increasingly come to debate the actual, potential, or desirable existence of a
European public sphere, a European identity, or a European people, and the
relationship between these and their national counterparts. Still, the debate
remains largely compartmentalized across member states, disciplines, and issue
areas. Debates over the advent of a transnational civil society or a European
public space, the question of the democratic deficit in the European Union, or
of constitutional patriotism and the like have almost become specific and
separated theoretical research subjects.

This volume attempts, however, to discern broad cross-national patterns
across member states. We argue that one can discern two main debates. The
first is the perennial debate between those who call for continent-wide unity
and those who defend European nations as the only legitimate political units.
Underlying this first debate have usually been historically contingent ideas on
the best way to secure progress or the public good, be it peace, prosperity,
morality, or the good life. In other words: does progress, whatever it may
mean, lie with more or less Europe? What is the promise or fear behind the cause of uniting the Continent?

The second debate builds on the first at a higher level of complexity, and could be termed the ‘search for a third way’, whereby certain thinkers seek to demarcate themselves from either side of the first debate, coming up instead with political designs which neither reify nor deny state-level sovereignty, seeking instead to tease out the conditions for upholding ‘unity in diversity’ (to borrow a contemporary phrase). This second debate leaves questions of substantive progress in the background in order to privilege the question of diversity and pluralism per se: can we have both Europe and its states, cooperation and sovereignty together? How can we preserve diversity while seeking to pursue common goals?

So, since Maastricht, a philosophical triangle which stems from two debates can be identified across member states, albeit under different variants. Even if not all the authors that have contributed to the framing of this conceptual map would qualify as ‘public intellectuals’, we believe that this triangle can help to locate the intellectual debates on Europe across various countries. This is summarized in Figure 1.1.

At one end of the first opposition, we find what we may call the ‘national civic’ or ‘statist’ school, who essentially criticize the EU in the name of the nation-state. At its most general, this school of thought is based on the idea that the cradle of both modern democracy and the welfare state is the nation-state, which arguably cannot be reproduced as such at the European level. As democracy presupposes a community with a common language and common representations which originates in a shared history and exists thanks to its very differences from other communities, and as Europe does not – or cannot – meet such prerequisites, the idea of a European democracy is an aporia. Similarly, the

![Figure 1.1 European Stories: The debates](image-url)
mutual sacrifices required by social justice suppose the kind of mutual trust and identification found within bound political communities.

Here, the European Union is not apprehended as a theoretical, political object per se, but rather as a label used to describe a process of de-compartmentalization of national markets and standardization of rules and regulations promoted by technocratic regulatory bodies. Consequently, European integration is not considered as progressive but rather as a threat to both collective self-determination and/or social justice – the two major achievements of the contemporary nation-state. This school of thought could itself be divided into two strands – a conservative strand which sees Europe as a threat to national identity and cultural values, and a progressive strand which insists on seeing the nation-state as the best way to guarantee self-government and social justice. As shown in this volume, many prominent thinkers from Norway to the United Kingdom, France, or the Czech Republic offer variations on this theme.

In contrast and at the other end of the spectrum are all those who equate more Europe with progress, what we may call the ‘supranational’ school. Europe is seen as the promise of economic, social, moral, and eventually political progress by virtue of its anti-nationalist and anti-hegemonic features, premised on the assumption that it constitutes a new territorial scale where democratic principles may spread. A federal Europe would also be the only way to ‘rescue’ the achievements of the national welfare state – achievements that are threatened by the pace of globalization. The advocates of this conception of Europe acknowledge the fact that a common language and shared values are necessary to consolidate a democratic political community, but they argue that these have been the result of a long historical process when unfolding at the nation-state level and that a similar process may take place at the European level. Clearly there are disagreements within this school itself, including on the necessary conditions for the emergence of a true continental democracy (whatever this may mean), or the development of a European public space underpinning and ultimately embodying European political identity. But all seem to agree that these developments are desirable to the furthering of the European cause. Conceived as a supranational project, the ideal-type Europe of this school of thought would potentially be a multinational federal state.

There are of course many intellectuals in Europe today who have taken up the flame of the European cause – as shown in this volume. Foremost among them, Jürgen Habermas has come to embrace this last vision in his later work (Habermas 2001b, 2006b; Habermas and Derrida 2005), inspiring *inter alia* an upsurge in intellectual support for an EU Constitution. For him, however, the concept of a permanent alliance between peoples envisioned by Kant in the *Perpetual Peace* was incompatible with Kant’s own presuppositions. Indeed, in the ‘Doctrine of Right’, the first part of the *The Metaphysics of Morals*, Kant grounded the general principles of law on human rights and should not logically have considered that individual liberty depended on state sovereignty (Habermas 1996). It was
Europe's intellectual landscape. Indeed, there are also those who oppose both sides in this first debate by advocating a third way between the two, or rather a way to transcend this age-old opposition. Here, the debate revolves more around the challenge of accommodating radical diversity within a polity in the making than around that of progress as such. If both sides of the first debate share a fundamentally state-centric outlook, the third way sees Europe as a new kind of polity.

This third school of thought may be called ‘transnational’, although one of its earlier variants was misleadingly referred to as ‘post-national’. It upholds the view that Europe is a body of regulations, procedures, rights, and norms destined to ‘tame’ national democracies, and shares with the champions of the ‘national civic’ approach the idea that democracy can only really exist – at least at this stage of history – within the framework of the nation. But this school also diverges from statist views in so far as it considers that the European ‘constraint’ is not the source of some form of dissolution of national democracies, but rather a potential means of perfecting them (Bellamy and Castiglione 1998 and 2003; Weiler 2001). Accordingly, the EU’s main asset is the constitutional discipline that it imposes on the member states, for example the ban on any form of discrimination based on nationality. For many of those identifying with the transnational vein, Europe is more a constitutional polity than an evolving democracy, and the mechanisms that allow citizens to take part in European decision-making processes are a means for the promotion of individual rights rather than the necessary condition for the emergence of a shared civic culture.

Though they belong to the same third ‘family’, some of these scholars do not content themselves with a vision of Europe in which democracy would be confined to the strict limits of national space. The EU is more than a confederation of states since its peoples are also connected through multi-faceted and deep forms of political and historical mutual recognition, what Nicolaidis refers to as a ‘demoi-cracy’ in the making (Nicolaidis 2004a: 101). This interpretation of the cosmopolitan paradigm is now supported notably by authors such as Jean-Marc Ferry (2000 and 2005), and is grounded on an alternative reading of Kant to that proposed by Habermas. For these authors, Habermas failed to see that the permanence of states and of their rights according to the principles of equal liberty was essential in the making of a cosmopolitan state ‘which cannot simply be buttressed on the universal constitutionalization of fundamental rights, but should stem from the constitutional recognition of the fundamental rights of the peoples’ (Ferry 1998: 11). The EU represents a ‘federalism of free
states’ or a federal union rather than a federal state as defined in the second article of Kant’s *Perpetual Peace*. A federation of states differs from a federal state in as much as it precisely allows for the persistence of the sovereignty principle for its constituent parts (Beaud 2007). In its original sense, a federation is defined as a durable union based on a free convention (*foedus*). Understood as a third way between a federal state system and a confederation, the federal union thus transcends the sacrosanct distinction between domestic public law and international law. According to these authors, cosmopolitanism would be some form of voluntary legal integration of free states based on regular and organized deliberation, and not on their subordination to a higher authority. The mutual recognition of European nations may pave the way for the emergence of a shared civic culture without necessarily heralding the advent of a federal Europe. The European polity should thus give birth to a federation of states and peoples.

In short, in the words of Francis Cheneval in the next chapter, we move from an incremental to a transformative logic, whereby a change of geographical level (from nation to Europe, or for that matter to the world) should not consist in simply reproducing the same pattern on a different scale. In this sense, the idea of Europe as a ‘third way’ between the national and supranational logics (as we present it here) chimes with Cheneval’s depiction of a Europe struggling to exist between the patriotic trope (which may be found in either) and the universal cosmopolitan one. In many aspects, the three models identified sit very well with the three Democratic Orders identified by Eriksen and Fossum in framing the RECON project, namely the ‘Audit Democracy’ – in which the union is derived from the member states; the ‘Federal Multinational Democracy’ – in which the union is recognized as a sovereign state, in accordance with international law; and the ‘Regional European Democracy’ – in which polity sovereignty is multi-dimensional and shared among levels (Eriksen and Fossum 2007).

These core debates over the nature of the European polity are not, of course, the only controversy that animates the national intellectual debates pertaining to the EU. Moreover, the aims and forms of national normative debates vary greatly since they reflect the core characteristics embedded in each national political culture. Intellectuals approach the topic of European integration equipped with a cultural repertoire that tends to vary along social, political, and national lines and includes values, knowledge, *habitus*, stories, memories, and worldviews upon which they draw more or less consciously. Put differently, concepts such as democracy, citizenship, or the republic as well as values, ethics, or norms are now at the core of debates that inextricably link the

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‘national’ and the ‘European’. This book explores some of the ways in which these different meanings come together to weave a mosaic of European stories.

A roadmap of the volume

The book proceeds in six parts. The introductory part lays out some general analytical building blocks on European intellectuals and European debates. The next three parts group countries according to the classic chronology: the ‘old’ founding member states (Part II); states who joined either in the first enlargement in 1973 or in the 1980s before the end of the Cold War (Part III); and three new members from Central and South-East Europe (Part IV). We group these two latter states under the label the ‘Returners’. This title might be misleading since the countries of the former Soviet bloc had never left Europe, although their leaders used the rhetoric of exclusion/return as a means of strengthening their case for early EU membership. To the extent that they were returning to Europe, so were Greece, Portugal, and Spain: all were returning from dictatorship to democracy. And yet, the title is still justified by the fact that the Mediterranean countries had not been isolated and cut off from Western Europe in the way that the countries of Central and Eastern Europe had been. Part V adds two non-members – Norway and Turkey. Finally, Part VI offers two concluding sets of remarks, one on the relation across Europe between the intellectual public sphere and public opinion across member states; the other a defence of narrative diversity in the EU through an elucidation of the various debates covered in the book.

Since we argue that these intellectual debates on Europe are country-specific, this book should ideally have included a chapter on each ‘European’ country. Even short of this ideal, one might regret the absence of a chapter on Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands among the ‘Founders’, on Denmark among the ‘Joiners’, or on Portugal among those Mediterranean states who joined between 1980 and 1986. It is also a great pity to do without the states who joined in 1995 – Austria, Finland, and Sweden – or Hungary among our ‘Returners’. We firmly believe that all the national intellectual debates around Europe deserve all our attention in a comparative perspective. They all contribute to the framing of our ‘European stories’, even though it would be naïve – albeit politically correct – to deny that some national debates are more influential than others.

This book does not aim to provide a comprehensive overview of all the national intellectual debates on Europe. More modestly, our ambition is to open the way for new research on this topic which will eventually cover the
many countries not considered here. Ours is an ongoing project – to be continued individually and collectively. The sample of countries chosen here is not necessarily representative. We did however try to cover as many as possible of the attributes we deemed important in discussing national stories about Europe. We therefore sought to discuss old and new EU members, members and non-members, Southern, Nordic, Western, and Eastern countries, large, medium, and small states, mainstream Catholic and non-Catholic cultures, periphery versus core, etc. Such a range we believe provides enough comparative leverage to convey the variety of European stories which can be found across Europe without overwhelming the reader.

Clearly, no simple grouping of European countries can be satisfactory when we consider the many strands, meanderings, and conflicts that characterize each national debate over time, as well as the many echoes and contrasts between these debates. Europe takes on many faces and elicits countless narratives in all these contexts. It can be invented and reinvented from the ashes of the past; it has been othered by those who still ‘go to Europe’ when they cross their borders, or conversely possessed by those who believe that they are at its core; it has long been imagined as a community to which one did not yet or quite belong, appropriated as a project of one’s own, enlisted at the service of various national projects, or seen as rightfully returned; it has been alternatively reified, revered, resented, or defied . . . Often, it is simply ignored. Sometimes, all of the above can be found in the same country. And so we try to convey this effervescence as best we can.

1 Themes

In Chapter 1, Francis Cheneval analyses the ambiguous status of the European intellectual in a European integration process understood as the attempt to overcome self-centred patriotism in the name of universal principles. He shows that European intellectuals adhering to universal principles find themselves caught between two rationales – the rationale of political particularity and closure on the one hand, and that of cosmopolitan integration on the other. The challenging question is thus how European intellectuals can defend European institution-building and political consolidation when the process is in strong tension with cosmopolitan ideals. Such a conceptual incertitude between Euro-patriotism and cosmopolitan tendencies is evident in the recent evolution of Jürgen Habermas, whose discrepancy between an initial plea for critical and rational identities and a more recent glorification of the European model might well illustrate a structural problem of European integration theory faced by many European intellectuals over time. Yet Cheneval admits that it is easier to criticize Habermas’ statist view of the EU than to conceive an alternative path of successful European integration. Ultimately, the productive tension
between particularity and universalism seems to remain the hallmark of (European) intellectualism.

However, as pointed out below, over the past two decades European integration has indeed undergone profound transformations, from an elite process conducive to progressive supranational sovereignty pooling to deeper processes of constructing a European polity and European society. The struggles between different ideological projects over national boundaries in elections and referenda have been conducive to politicization, and have replaced mass public ‘permissive consensus’ by ‘constraining dissensus’ (Hooghe and Marks 2009). Consequently, in Chapter 2, Ulrike Liebert analyses the dialectics of national intellectual discourses on Europe from the perspective of the controversial issue of democratic legitimacy in Europe. She scrutinizes the contents of national intellectual contributions to this debate during the most recent critical and contentious debate over European political development, from 2001 to 2009. She argues that European democracy debates oscillate between a communitarian vision that cherishes democracy in collectivist terms and a liberal vision that celebrates diversity, individual rights, and legal constitutionalism. Echoing the normative triangle presented in this introduction (although with a different focus), she then considers ‘European demo-cracy’ and ‘contestatory democracy’ as innovative proposals that aim to square the circle of unity and diversity. Here, the third way is not, as we suggest, between sovereigntists and supranationalists; rather, it is (similarly) between both of these seen as communitarians on one hand, and the liberal tradition on the other (which we would include in the third way, but which admittedly has not attempted to integrate the arguments of communitarians).

In Chapter 3, Michael Freeden begins by asking the question ‘What is an intellectual?’ He draws for this on Mannheim’s definition, according to which in every society there are social groups whose special task is to provide an interpretation of the world for that society. He argues that all social views might be contestable interpretations of a moving and fluctuating reality, rather than historically anchored truths. Moreover, he points that the recent ‘flashiness’ associated with being an intellectual, combined with lower barriers to entry, has somewhat undermined intellectuals’ authority in our liberal societies. From this analytical background, Freeden raises some doubts about considering ‘intellectuals’ as ‘story-tellers’, as we try to do in this book. He reminds us that telling stories is an act of imagination and interpretation, less of rational critique, whose authors are for the most part not intellectuals. He also sheds a new light on the overused concept of ‘democratic deficit’, pointing out that we would be hard pressed to imagine a democratic arrangement that would not produce such a deficit of one kind or another. Consequently, intellectuals need to ask which necessarily inadequate combination of political features has the most chances of durable implementation, given the main cultural features of European countries. In addition, intellectuals should remain modest by
recognizing that a common legal and political framework is never devoid of ideological content.

II *Founders*

In Chapter 4, Jan-Werner Müller discusses the peculiarities of the German debate on the EU. It is not surprising that most politicians and intellectuals in West Germany have long been favourably disposed towards the idea of European unification – to the extent that Euroscepticism remains almost a political taboo. The country was effectively a semi-sovereign polity until 1990; its national traditions had been thoroughly thrown into question by Nazism, to the extent that many intellectuals on the left actually equated National Socialism, nationalism, and nation-statehood. Yet it would be wrong to say, even given the absence of anything resembling a systematic Eurosceptical tradition, that German politicians and intellectuals have always been uniformly pro-European for the same reasons. It is often forgotten that the plans of the federalist movement were conclusively sidelined after 1945, or that proponents of a unified democratic-socialist Europe were thoroughly frustrated. Meanwhile politicians, while using idealistic pro-European rhetoric, often advanced German interests ‘in Europe’s name’ (to use Timothy Garton Ash’s formulation). In a less obvious way, German ideals of European unification have often been projections of the country’s own supposedly post-national trajectory after 1945. However, beginning in the mid-1990s, there has been a harsher tone among politicians regarding Europe, independent of party affiliation, while constitutional lawyers have also increasingly asserted the need to rein in the ECJ and affirm the nation-states as ultimate *Herren der Verträge* (masters of the treaties). Intellectual opinion, meanwhile – on the EU constitutional debate in particular – has increasingly split: on the one hand, there are those hoping for continuous supranational constitutionalization (which appears almost as a last utopia), on the other there has been a marked celebration of legal pluralism and fragmentation of international law. Müller argues that these correspond broadly to the theoretical legacies of Jürgen Habermas and Niklas Luhmann respectively.

In France, since the hard-won ratification of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, the European issue has emerged as a bone of contention among French intellectuals. In Chapter 5, Justine Lacroix argues that the current French controversy over Europe is embedded in an even more salient debate on the very nature of democracy. More specifically, the French debate over the EU’s democratic legitimacy has revolved around the connection between rights and boundaries, and around the appropriate locus for democracy. As to the meaning attached to ‘rights’ in democratic politics, Europe is either conceived as the symptom of a ‘religion of law’, which supposedly undermines democracy; or conversely blamed for its incapacity to implement the human rights it endlessly claims to represent. To be sure, the different perceptions of Europe, seen either as an
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‘undefined’ and ‘open’ space or an ‘exclusive’ entity centred on its own particularities, are in total contradiction. The chapter’s title, ‘Borderline Europe’, refers to an object that lends itself to such starkly contrasting representations. In spite of these differences, Lacroix shows that there is no equivalent in the French intellectual circles to the model of federal supranationalism advocated in Germany by Jürgen Habermas. French intellectuals writing on Europe almost all insist on the nation as the main locus for political socialization, but they disagree on whether the EU constitutes an unwelcome motor for the dissolution of national communities or a promise to move beyond the sole nation-state framework.

Chapter 6 on Italy by Mario Telò focuses on the intellectual impetus for and roots of the rise of the large domestic consensus in favour of a federal European Union achieved in Italy during the First Republic (1947–92), and addresses the role of intellectuals in explaining the continuities and discontinuities found in ideas about Europe between the First and the Second Republic (1992–2008). The main argument made is that the current normalization of a pro-European intellectual presence in Italy maintains national particularities and distinctive features which cannot be explained without what the French historian Fernand Braudel called a longue durée approach. The intellectual debate combined with sixty years of the process of Italian integration into Western Europe is understood as part of long term trends within national and cultural history. This historical construction is powerful enough to counterbalance both past and recent tendencies of discontinuity. More precisely, bipartisan centripetal convergences about EU Treaty ratification, the process of Europeanization of policies and institutions, and a certain decline of the classical Euro-federalist approach, are making the hypothesis of a normalization of the Italian debate about the idea of Europe quite realistic.

III Joiners

In Chapter 7, Georgios Varouxakis offers a critical account of debates on ‘the question of Europe’ in British intellectual life since the issue of membership of the EEC arose in earnest with Britain’s first application in 1961. Varouxakis starts with some reflections on the role that perceptions and representations of British and English history have played in shaping the peculiarities of British attitudes towards ‘Europe’ and Britain’s relation to it in the twentieth century. He then goes on to analyse the nature and major characteristics of British intellectuals’ debates on the EEC and the issue of British membership from the time of the first British application for entry, in 1961, to the time of the referendum that confirmed Britain’s continued membership in 1975. The rest of the chapter then focuses on contemporary intellectual debates on ‘Europe’ and the EC/EU and analyses both the specific contributions of individual thinkers/intellectuals’ and the major characteristics that can be identified as
peculiar to UK debates on the issue. Although British politicians and journalists have traditionally been categorized as being either ‘pro-European’ or ‘Eurosceptic’, the picture that emerges as far as ‘intellectuals’ are concerned is more complex than a simple binary distinction of ‘pro-’ and ‘anti-’. The peculiarities of Britain’s position due to its history, its post-imperial hangover, and its so-called ‘special relationship’ with the United States are discussed as major factors affecting British debates on Europe.

In Chapter 8, Katy Hayward argues that the Irish nation is the principal character in the ‘European stories’ recounted in Ireland and that their dominant theme is always nationalism – official, moderate, and progressive, but nationalism nevertheless. The ‘No’ results of the first referenda on the Treaty of Nice in 2001 and the Treaty of Lisbon in 2008 may be seen, therefore, as not merely consequences of the changing economic status of Ireland but also as signifiers of the need for a new conceptualization of the relationship between ‘nation’ and ‘Europe’ in the twenty-first century. The problem is not so much that of growing Euroscepticism – as indicated by the high opinion among the Irish public of EU membership and its benefits – but an absence of public reflection on the purpose and path of further European integration. Consequently, Hayward argues that there is an urgent need for a fresh vision of Ireland’s place in the future European Union, one which requires a depth and a boldness that can only be realized by a new wave of intellectual engagement in this national debate.

In Chapter 9, George Pagoulatos and Xenophon Yataganas argue that the prevalent European story among Greek public intellectuals has equated Europe with progress, identifying the country’s modernization challenge with catching up with Europe. Consequently, pro-European supranationalism has been the most vocal opposition pole of the debate, struggling against a long tradition of cultural gravitation towards Eastern Orthodoxy, ethnocentrism, a nostalgic communitarian vision of an unadulterated past, a ‘culture of the underdog’, or – to follow a more systematic typology – the statist/national school of thought. The independence versus integration, nationalism versus supranationalism divide has been the most salient one in the Greek public intellectual debate. Such ideological polarization, however, has been mitigated by the emergence of a ‘third pole’, a middle of the road ‘transnational’ school of thought. The independence versus integration, nationalism versus supranationalism divide has been the most salient one in the Greek public intellectual debate. Such ideological polarization, however, has been mitigated by the emergence of a ‘third pole’, a middle of the road ‘transnational’ school of thought, which was given impetus by the increasing complexity and mishaps of the European integration project, and especially the disenchantment following the rejection of the European Constitutional Treaty. This transnational school of thought is gathering pace among Greek intellectuals who are principally European scholars.

In Chapter 10, Carlos Closa and Antonio Barroso show that Spanish intellectuals have long shown a ‘benign neglect’ towards the EU and European integration. As a result of the link established between democratization and Europe, the latter occupied an almost totally uncontroversial position. This
provoked a vacuum which specialized intellectuals tried to fill. More precisely, public lawyers have assumed a central role in discussion on the EU and this has had the effect of turning it into a kind of arcane domain for specialists. Through a number of case studies, Closa and Barroso argue that it is the notion of constitutional tolerance as articulated by Joseph Weiler (2001) that best fit with Spanish intellectual debates on Europe. The insertion of Spain into the European constitutional architecture is broadly conceived as a way of perfecting national democracy.

IV Returners

In Chapter 11, Magdalena Góra and Zdzisław Mach aim to describe and understand the contemporary Polish debate about Europe against the background of the development of views on Europe in the twentieth century. The starting point for their analysis is the regaining of the state’s independence in 1918 and the accompanying debate about the place of the newly established country in interwar Europe. The continuity and change in Polish debate on Europe over the years are crucial to understanding how the perception of Europe in Poland is constructed nowadays. In the second part of the chapter, the problem of re-orientation of the place of Poland in a changing Europe is discussed. Moreover, the authors present the phenomenon of being ‘east of the West and west of the East’, as the country’s location is often described. The chapter concentrates on reconstruction of the major voices regarding the costs and benefits of integration processes, as well as the self-perception of Poles as Europeans.

In Chapter 12, Daniel Barbu deconstructs the transformations undergone by the language and the enactment of political and intellectual consent to the process of European integration by Romanian academia and public intellectuals. Drawing on a mainstream literature rooted in the works of two iconic figures of Romanian culture, Mircea Eliade and Constantin Noica, he argues that Europe was, and still is, almost canonically considered in Romania by those who speak out in the public space as both a convenience in terms of free trade and freedom of movement and as an ethical hazard. Barbu shows that Europe is chiefly conceived more as a source of regulations (acquis communautaire) than a new type of polity Romanians have to join, make theirs, and eventually help to build. Accession to the European Union was mainly described as a historical technique marshalled from above, as a political device of extracting consent – under the promise of promoting such social goods as welfare and political pluralism – from a national society characterized by an ahistorical identity unstained by either communism or liberalism. According to this line of thinking, shared also by the spokesmen of the culturally dominant and (semi-)established Church (Greek Orthodox), through the language of constitutionalism, democracy, and human rights Europe tends to sponsor the emergence of a standardized ‘recent man’,
exactly as the ideology of state socialism used to enforce the model of the ‘new man’.

In Chapter 13 on the Czech Republic, Muriel Blaive and Nicolas Maslowski start off by recalling that the past is like a toolbox, a heritage which can be used in political thinking according to its potential for thought and action. The Czech heritage has been mobilized in two opposite directions in relation to ‘Europe’: in an ethnic and isolationist, nationalist direction which rejects Europe as a danger (Václav Klaus) and in a humanist direction emphasizing individual responsibility, the heritage of the Enlightenment, and dissidence (Václav Havel). In particular, Blaive and Maslowski underline that ‘Central Europe’ can be considered as an ‘intellectual gate’ which predetermines attitudes on Europe as a whole. According to them, a pro-European stance is not only a political issue but is also closely linked to certain attitudes on the domestic front relating to decentralization and civil society. Central Europe, Europe, humanism, human rights, civil society, ecology were historically shaped as one and the same weapon against the communist regime and they still go hand in hand today. Conversely, the Klaus trend, despite its professed anti-communism, appears largely as the heir to pan-Slavism and former anti-Western propaganda. In many aspects, Klaus’ denunciation of ‘Europeism’ as a substitute ideology to socialism echoes some part of the Romanian debate.

V Outliers

In Chapter 14 on Norway, John Erik Fossum and Cathrine Holst examine how a select number of Norwegian academic intellectuals have conceived of Europe, the European integration process, and Norway’s relationship to the rest of Europe. More precisely, they discuss their approach in relation to three conceptions of the European Union: as a problem-solving entity; as a value community; and as a rights-based union. Echoing most of the other chapters in this book, Fossum and Holst’s findings suggest that the most important single dominant obsession could be said to boil down to ‘the national issue’. The great majority of Norwegian public intellectuals frown at the notion of Europe as a democratic anchor, and instead insist that the EU is a democratic curse, which Norway should stay away from. The European project and European governance are seen to have profoundly negative effects on the role of politics, autonomy, agency, sovereignty, and republican ideals. The same can be said of how Norwegian public intellectuals consider the relationship between Europe-as-values and Europe-as-prosperity. There is a strongly held conviction that Europe is a ‘rich man’s club’, a conviction that has remained unscathed throughout the last two bouts of EU enlargement because of a subtle shift to Europe-as-a-businessman’s club, and fountain of an all-permeating neoliberal economics.

Observers, both inside and outside Turkey, often assert that there is something exceptional about the country’s place in Europe. Assessing whether this is the
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Case, Nora Fisher Onar and Ahmet Evin trace, in Chapter 15, continuity and changes in several schools of thought on Europe from the inception of Ottoman Westernization to the present. They then turn to key moments in the 1999–2009 period during which debates on Turkey’s place in Europe were particularly intense in light of acquisition of EU candidate status in 1999. Fisher Onar and Evin argue that certain features of Turkish discourse are constant both over time and across the political spectrum at any given time. These include a tendency to see ‘Europe’ as a ubiquitous and monolithic actor, and the perception that the ‘European experience’ offers a menu for change from which some items may be ingested and others ignored. Other aspects of intellectuals’ engagement of Europe, however, appear contingent upon the proclivities of the individuals in question and the intellectual traditions to which they adhere, as well as on evolving domestic and international contexts. The interplay between the more constant and more contingent features of discourses on Europe means that views span from those who advocate a selective engagement to those who call for unequivocal convergence with that which they understand Europe to represent.

VI One story or many?

Finally, Part VI provides two contrasting chapters in conclusion. In Chapter 16, Juan Díez Medrano focuses on citizen representations and, more generally, on views on Europe expressed by actors in the public sphere. While occasionally these actors are intellectuals, they are more often than not politicians or representatives from interest groups. Their views on Europe are sometimes inspired by those of public and scholarly intellectuals, but only partially overlap with them. Either because European stories lose their national-specific narrative structure as they travel from intellectuals to public actors and citizens, or because public actors and citizens autonomously develop their representations of Europe, the fact is that national public spheres portray the European Union and the European integration process and imagine the future of the European Union in very similar ways. Therefore, Medrano argues that viewed from the public sphere and the citizens’ perspective, the most relevant story to be told about the European Union is one of similarity. However one uses the term ‘identity’ in connection with European integration and the European Union, what one sees is that public actors and citizens share very nearly the same ‘European story’, with similar cross-national representations of the European Union and a common political identity project.

Conversely, Janie Pélabay, Kalypso Nicolaïdis, and Justine Lacroix argue in the Conclusion that it is neither desirable nor possible to promote a unique, homogenized, and official vision of what it means to be European. As evidenced by the essays in this book, the EU polity is significantly marked, supported, or challenged by a great variety of diverging and competing – though
reasonable – stories about Europe. Hence the question of how to accommodate this mosaic of European stories: how could and should they participate in a public process of agreement on the European project? What is the epistemological status given to these competing candidates for European ‘story-telling’? Which normative constraints have to regulate their participation in such a process? How to engage in the narrative enterprise without eventually erasing the diversity on which it is entirely based? Based on an overview of European intellectual stories, their conclusion examines what is both theoretically and practically at stake in the very idea of ‘narrative diversity’ once applied to the EU.