Thinking Beyond the State: Emerging Perspectives On Global Justice

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A Demoicratic Conversation: An Interview with Kalypso Nicolaïdis

In thinking beyond the state, perhaps more thinking has been done on the European Union (EU) than any other non-state entity. It is the grand experiment upon which the hopes of many cosmopolitans lie, proof that institutions may one day transcend the nation-state to realize Immanuel Kant's dream of a "perpetual peace." To others, however, the EU is precisely the opposite. It is a failure, a disruptive Leviathan that has suppressed the capacity for nations and communities to live their lives and solve their problems in ways that reflect their particular circumstances. Among the former, we find cosmopolitans, federalists, constitutionalists, and other kinds of supranationalists; among the latter, we find communitarians, sovereigntists, nationalists, and multiple variants of Eurosceptic.

Yet there is another perspective that weaves its way through these currents of optimism and pessimism, energized by but opposed to both. *Demoi*-cracy takes its name from the plural of *demos*, originating from the idea that there is not, and never could be, a European people *simpliciter*. Rather, there are European peoples, each with their own unique polities, histories, cultures, languages, subjectivities, and challenges. In so far as it makes sense to talk of "being European," it is the relationships between these peoples—sometimes cooperative, sometimes conflictual—that reflects the fleeting essence of Europeanness. Indeed, it is from the more workable patterns of Europe's engagement with itself that demoicracy derives its core principles, most notably the principles of mutual recognition—a commitment to recognize and be recognized by the other at all political levels—and non-domination—a commitment not to subjugate others. Thus the complicated realities of Europe serve as a source of political imperative, a wellspring of normative guidance, so that Europe might walk backwards into the future, guided by the successes and failures of its own peculiar past.

One of demoicracy's most vital and eloquent defenders is Professor Kalypso Nicolaïdis, who introduced the concept in its present form.[1] She is a Faculty Fellow at St Antony's College, Director of the European Studies Centre (ESC) and the Centre for International Studies (CIS), and a long-time friend and supporter of *St Antony's International Review* (*STAIR*). For this special issue, we asked her to elaborate on her unique way of thinking beyond the state.

STAIR: Let's start with the thought that political theorists are never all that separate from the theories they endorse. In what way does the idea of demoicracy and its principles relate to your own life or history?

KN: I trace back my obsession with mutual recognition to the late 1980s when I was starting my doctorate at Harvard. The very idea of recognition and its philosophical lineage felt like a personal affair, as if I was myself somehow the product of multiple denials of recognition that had been overcome between peoples, between "intimate enemies."

As Greeks from Asia Minor, my father's parents were victims of a denial of recognition, thrown out of their homeland in 1922 along with a million others, an event referred to this day as "the Great Catastrophe" by Greeks and "the Great Miracle" by Turks. Although I was raised with the memory that eighteen members of our family died in these few months at the hands of Turks, I've spent much of the last twenty years working with Turkish friends on rapprochement and mutual understanding between our two countries and our compatriots.

My mother, on the other hand, had a French mother and German father who came to France as a worker to flee the Great Inflation of 1922. Because he forgot to take French nationality, they were deported during World War II and he became a resistor in his home town of Erfurt. But their post-war return as a French-German family was horrendous. They were abandoned by all sides and fell into the cracks of reconciliation.

Then, of course, I married a wonderful Englishman, so our kids are French and British—talk about intimate enemies!

These conflicts between intimate enemies and the negotiation of hybrid identities are what I was raised with. At school in France, I was always the other—and proud to be—and I have been the other in many different polities. I became comfortable with seeing myself from other points of view, as all of us who are multinational do.

The question, then, is how do you transcend or better live with these realities? How do you deal with your own multiplicity and that of the world? Some people, like my mother, say, "I'm European." But I came to see that being multiple does not require thriving to become one; I'm a rooted cosmopolitan, as Kwame Anthony Appiah would say, a multi-rooted cosmopolitan.[2] And these roots really matter, in and of themselves, not just as parts of a European tree. As I wrote once, why spin the rainbow white?[3] I'm not some amorphous European—except perhaps for when I'm abroad in the US, where for fifteen years I took on the role of Miss Europe. But even then there are all these tensions underneath: mutual hatreds that one hates to understand, reconciliations that feel

shallow, and inescapable contradictions. I *really* know what it means to be French, in a way that I don't really know what it means to be Dutch or Swedish or Portuguese. I get intuitions of the latter when I spend time immersed there, but does this count? Can being European be anything else than confronting and engaging with the bits of Europe one is not? Isn't it more ambitious for the inhabitants of this small continent to entrench togetherness among distinct peoples than to try to be one? Such meanderings led me to the idea of demoicracy.

STAIR: What, then, is the relationship between demoicracy and the nation-state? Should we see the retention of "the nation" in demoicracy as a preservation and celebration of national difference? Or does it reflect a more pessimistic view about feasibility, an acknowledgement that you can't unify Europe in any strict sociological sense?

KN: I struggle with this question. The idea of demoicracy is rather simple: a union of peoples who govern together but not as one. To rally against "methodological nationalism"—that is, the tendency of social sciences to analyse all political forms, such as the EU, through the prism of the nation-state—should not lead us to dismiss the national form altogether. On the contrary, history tells us that the EU was created to transform the nation-state, not to transcend it.

Yes, there are those who come to demoicracy from a realist analytical perspective, because they believe that the concept reflects the world we're in, a world where our sense of national belonging matters, and where people engage in politics nationally even though the EU continues to centralize competences. But why do you call this a "pessimistic view"? Max Weber would argue that to be a legitimate polity the EU needs to conform to people's preferences. If it manages to do so, this is a good thing, not just a constraint. Isn't an EU that matches its sociological reality more desirable?

Nevertheless, you are right to imply that there is more to demoicracy than the acknowledgement of sociological reality. It is about the normative belief that the differences that matter are more than cultural or linguistic, which is what people usually have in mind when they pay lip-service to "unity in diversity". Rather, the EU ought to better acknowledge the diversity of national political realities and social fabrics that compose it: the varieties of state-society relations, social contracts, bargains between business and trade unions, political traditions and, of course, histories.

And you need to correct the belief in the desirability and legitimacy of difference with something deeper: mutual engagement, mutual respect, mutual knowledge, other-regardingness. The idea of demoicracy is not about essentializing national identity, or reinforcing an exclusivist sense of belonging, as sovereignists would have it. Demoicracy is not a celebration of differences *per se*, because this can easily become a call to mutual ignorance and segregation. It is far from being a Eurosceptic vision, yet its ambition is to offer a story about Europe that can resonate with and address Eurosceptic concerns.

I've always said that other-regardingness and mutual engagement are much more demanding than supranationality, because under a purely supranational ethos you only have to think of yourself as European or a world citizen from time to time. In a European demoicracy, however, if you're French you have to continually engage with what the Germans are thinking—and the Portuguese and the Latvians and so on. A demoicracy like the EU must ultimately aspire to the *radical mutual opening* of its peoples, not just gazing at other political communities from afar and being vaguely interested in them, but giving them voice in your own polity and seeking voice in their polity. You trying to understand their polity and them yours. Deep transformative mutual recognition presupposes tolerance but it is also more than this. Charles Taylor, Nancy Fraser, Axel Honneth, and Paul Ricoeur have all written beautifully on recognition,[4] whether one agrees with their particular conceptions or not. Yet there is still a lot of thinking to be done on the relationships between the different levels at which recognition is or should be instantiated—between individuals, between groups, between nations, and in different realms. This is a tall order, though, because we're not just talking about any old respect for difference, but rather a highly demanding kind that may be too hard for our short and flawed lives.

STAIR: We want to ask about the state of Europe in relation to demoicracy now.[5] In your work, you describe three streams of thinking about the EU: the sovereigntist, the supranational, and demoicracy as "the third way." Since the Eurozone debt crisis, has there been any shift in people's thinking in favour of one or other stream, both on the ground and in the corridors of power?

KN: We should begin from the premise that while the EU is a demoicracy in the making, it is a very imperfect one with various pathologies and flaws. Above all, it is subject to contradictory pulls, to forces of fusion and fission, and these translate ideologically into the pulls of sovereigntism and supranationalism that you refer to. Paradoxically, the

crisis tends to have reinforced the former on the ground and the latter in the corridors of power. The tendency of European elites, for whom the answer is always more competences at the EU level, has cut against heightened concerns for local self-determination among the citizenry. Then, of course, there are the many shades of Euroscepticism that are taking advantage of these popular sentiments—witness their surge in the 2014 European Parliament elections. Perhaps we will come to see hard-core sovereigntists in the corridors of power in the EU who will treat it as a normal polity, not questioning its existence but its policies.

So where does demoicracy fit in this picture? Some might argue that the EU is a demoicracy without demoicrats, that everyone fits ideologically in one of the other two camps, even if the EU operates as a third way. I disagree: I think that today, more than ever, the premises and prescriptions associated with demoicracy conform to the preferences of majorities in Europe who want their governments to cooperate better to address the debt crisis, but fear that dictates from above may hollow out their national democracies.

Like most crises, the Eurozone crisis has rendered visible structural flaws that were already there. There are, of course, pathologies that plague all democracies. Witness the capture of democracy by money and corporate interests in the United States. Or the growing authority of non-majoritarian agencies and institutions established for the admirable reason of protecting against special interests, yet which themselves become unaccountable and anti-democratic.

But the EU has unique flaws partly because transforming representative democracy to meet the challenges of transnationalism is such a tall order. The combination of indirect legitimacy through the consent of member states governments in the European Council and supposed direct democracy through the European parliament is perceived as less than the sum of its parts. Demoicracy is about the *kratos*, the governing together, but with the aim of letting each part do the work of internalizing externalities, and being accountable to individual *demoi* for that. But the Euro crisis has not only magnified the so-called "democratic deficit".[6] I would argue it has transformed its nature from one about democratic complexity—where people ask who is accountable for what in a complex multilevel system—to one of democratic pre-emption—where people witness the bypassing of democratic channels altogether. This is why we are now truly in need of demoicratization.

One of the biggest gaps between attitudes on the ground and in the corridors of power relates to direct democracy: the people's voice. There was a silver lining before the crisis, in that to compensate for concerns about democracy, bureaucrats, officials, and politicians tried to make

the EU more participatory in Brussels and more accountable at home through referenda. The failed constitution was the first turning point when, after the French and Dutch "noes" in 2005 and the Irish "no" eighteen months later, the European elite turned unashamedly Brechtian: If you're not happy with the vote of the people, just re-elect the people. The Irish were asked to revote, the French and Dutch told to shut up, and the Constitution reinvented as the Lisbon Treaty. I was in favour of a "yes" but very critical of the ensuing obfuscation; I called for democratic atonement on the part of the EU.[7]

Instead, the crisis has led to a radicalization of what Joseph Weiler has called "political messianism", the missionary's zeal to explain.[8] If the people are not with you, it's because the people got it wrong and don't understand the mission. And because the end justifies the means, the people's will can be bypassed. More than ever the corridors of Brussels are awash with fears of dangerous referenda; this is why we will not get a Treaty revision any time soon. But what elites don't understand is that the European people simply want to retain control over their lives.

So the Eurozone crisis found the EU in a vulnerable state, with the institutional makeup of a demoicracy—albeit imperfect—but not its ethos. Although differentiated integration is in the spirit of demoicracy, fragmentation and mutual ascription are not. And when it comes to the governance solutions adopted to fix the Eurozone's woes, they have tended towards excessive centralization on the part of the messianic elite, in spite of a lack of public support. Their reflexive response is to transfer the paraphernalia of the state to the EU, including a ministry of finance with some level of capacity to force macroeconomic recipes on individual member states. This leads to a circular logic: the call for the creation of a fiscal union, which calls for a banking union, which calls for a political union, which in turn calls for a stronger economic union. To sustain the EU's demoicratic ethos, however, would instead require internalizing EU-compatible behaviours within member states, with common funds as backstops.

Part of the problem with these developments is that the EU has reverted to the logic of direct reciprocity and tit-for-tat, which it had put aside at its foundation and replaced with a logic of shared commitments enforced through rule of law mechanisms. Now, for the first time so blatantly in the EU, we are institutionalizing a logic of conditionality as a method of external governance, which in turn encourages the centralization of asymmetric power. But, of course, it's creditor states that control the centre in order to control debtors, and also to control *potential* debtors—that is, any members of the Eurozone that might be deemed at

risk. So the question is: How far has this conditionality logic captured the logic of polity building and, in doing so, put demoicracy at risk?

STAIR: What role does conflict play in the dynamics of demoicratization? Must the demoicratic polity strive for consensus in the process of establishing procedural legitimacy, or is conflict valued as something that can transform the polity?

KN: Demoicratization does chime with agonistics, as my friend Chantal Mouffe argues in her latest book.[9] But is political conflict necessarily contradictory with the search for consensus? The radical pluralism that we need in the EU can actually better accommodate conflict by empowering "reasonable" veto players, rather than traditional majoritarian procedures which subsume conflict through procedures. Demoicracy means that the EU should not make decisions against the majorities of a majority of EU countries simply because they happen to have smaller populations. It starts with the premise that in certain settings you can't address conflicts with majoritarian votes, whereas supranationalists tend to imagine improvements in European democracy on majoritarian terms, such as electing a European president. If a demoicracy resembles a territorialized version of a consociational polity, this means accepting that you can't always satisfy the demands of Habermasian deliberative reason-giving, that there may be conflict between underlying primary beliefs, and that to create a polity among polities means accepting the transformative role of conflict.

STAIR: One worry here is whether the reconciliation of conflict and consensus is so easy in reality. If we have a highly contested issue, such as intergenerational justice, the underlying values may be so deeply entrenched that reaching consensus on a European level is too hard, even impossible. We need to ask, then, is an orientation towards consensus the best way to ensure the legitimacy of the outcomes of decisions? After all, what agonists are committed to is valuing conflict, even when the outcome of this political process does not correspond to their views. Consensus is not something agonists aim for—and this could be a strength of demoicratic politics too, because it leaves room for disagreement. It leaves room for the very real possibility that many decisions on a European level will be opposed to nationally entrenched values and policies.

KN: I agree. In fact, there are many ways to leave room for disagreement. You can't embrace the need for consensus if you don't at the same time believe that Europeans need to know how to agree to disagree,

rather than pretend to agree as they often do. And, in turn, it is easier to agree to disagree if you emphasize subsidiarity—that is, not shifting competences to the EU level—and, perhaps more importantly, proportionality, where the EU acts only to achieve its objectives. So, even when there is partial EU competence, if there is no consensus, we ought to let member states deal with the issue. It is the beauty of the lowest common denominator, providing as much leeway to the constituent units as possible, whether these are national, regional, or city-based democracies. At the same time, the demoicratic emphasis on the constituent *demoi*, rather than only their governments, implies that the EU needs to bring oppositions back in—at the national but also the supranational level. And if that is the case, we may have increasingly fluid dividing lines. To use your example, surely there is not a single national view on what intergenerational justice means.

To some extent, demoicracy is a second-degree concept. It is not just that we mutually recognize our differences, but that we do this *in different ways*. I think this point comes out very clearly in a forthcoming *Journal of European Public Policy* special issue on demoicracy, edited by Francis Cheneval, Sandra Lavenex, and Frank Schimmelfennig, which contains excellent contributions and for which I wrote an epilogue.[10] Demoicratization will differ according to the different ways in which national democracies frame their relationship with the transnational whole. There are different ways of accepting differences, of internalizing a demoicratic ethos. So, in thinking about this, demoicratization needs to be a very open theory. There are some basic ideas—pluralism, mutual openness, mutual recognition, non-domination—that are non-negotiable as part of demoicratic theory. But beyond that, this is a vision that can develop in many different ways, both academically and more intuitively in an applied sense.

STAIR: A worry here is that when you agree to disagree, you might end up favouring the status quo. Therefore a key feature of agonistic theory is an orientation towards the progressive transformation of society. So we should ask, can the demoicratic model be progressive enough? If there's an orientation towards the lowest possible agreement, is it still possible to participate in progressive transformation?

KN: Progressive transformation comes through many paths. For example, advocates of experimentalism[11] would argue that actors for change are always *somewhere*, not everywhere or anywhere, and they need spaces where they can foster the conditions for change. In this light, a

demoicratic ethos is not only about protecting spaces for local democracies that are open, but allowing these to relate differently to the whole. But the experimentalist framework might be too mild here, because it eschews questions of relative power. Politics is about contestation, resistance, and "subterranean politics".[12] With its distributive impact, a demoicratic lens on the Eurozone crisis raises many questions. For instance, are the fault lines of solidarity changing? In other words, shouldn't a German worker close to the minimum wage feel closer to a Greek worker who lost his job during the liquidity crunch than to a German CEO? If this is the case, although the politics still play out in Germany or Greece, these localized struggles for recognition become increasingly connected among themselves.

On the other hand, demoicratization is about sustainability too. If we were speaking ten years ago, I might have said that, in the constitutional realm, the status quo is not a bad thing: the EU ought to remain on its demoicratic Rubicon and retain the kind of equilibrium that allows for open spaces for transformative politics. But the question is: How do we sustain this polity against those who want to get off the Rubicon?

This is why I defend an idea of "sustainable integration",[13] which is interesting from the progressive standpoint, because sustainability carries a double connotation of endurance *and* transformation. As Giuseppe Tomasi di Lampedusa famously says in *Il Gattopardo* [*The Leopard*], "For everything to remain the same, everything has to change." While everyone cares about sustainability—sustainable development, sustainable cities, sustainable security—our societies have not yet found good ways of translating this amorphous ethos into a new kind of politics, which take into account the future generations you alluded to earlier. Short-termism reigns supreme in both markets and politics. Conflicts are now about degrees of preference for the future, discount rates, and exposure to risk. So perhaps the EU, after spending half a century managing space, should spend the next phase managing *time*. Because if the EU is to be relevant to the 30 million unemployed youth in its midst, protesting against a system that seems to steal their future, it needs to adopt an ethos of sustainable integration.

STAIR: So what is the relationship of demoicracy to social movements, to transnational, trans-European communities that arise through online social networks, popular protest, and so on? Are these among the demoi that demoicracy seeks to recognize and foster?

KN: There is room for disagreement here among demoicracy theorists. Samantha Besson, for instance, has argued that there are trans-territorial *demoi*, that the consumers of Europe, say, can be regarded as a people-across-borders. But in my view, although social movements are not polities themselves, they can transform polities, often more radically than territorially bound groups. Indeed, they play a critical role in inducing the kind of radical openness that is the hallmark of an accomplished demoicratic polity. We did not have to wait for the French Revolution to see social movements cross polities: they pollinate, they help each other, they inspire each other, they empower each other, and they empower the powerless. There are localized sparks that spread, literally at the speed of light in the age the internet.

So, yes, these are trans-European communities that a demoicracy ought to recognize and foster. But why characterize them as *demoi*? For me and scholars like [Francis] Cheneval, demoicracy starts with territorially based *demoi*, where overlapping consensuses have already formed, where conflicts have played out and trade-offs been made, even though these deals are uneasy, difficult, partial, and perpetually contested. On this view, a "people" encompasses individuals who deal with each other in many different political currencies, and who accept to be bound by a majority of its members.

But if social movements are not *demoi*, nor are they *the* European demos. Every time there are transnational protests in Europe, pundits say, "It's the born-again people of Europe." For instance, the pan-European trade union strikes against austerity in 2012, or earlier with the anti-Iraq war demonstrations. As Derrida and Habermas wrote at the time in 2003, this born-again European demos was supposed to ground a unified Europe.[14] Yet they instrumentalize these social movements into something they are not. They are transnational movements of solidarity and protest; there are no banners in those ranks for "European institutional reform"! On the contrary, people protesting side by side in their different languages seem to me a great emblem for demoicratization, the togetherness of Europeans without a European people.

STAIR: This touches on the relationship between demoicracy and secessionist movements, such as Scotland, Belgium, the Basque Region, and Catalonia. Are these struggles for national autonomy consistent with the prescriptive dimension of demoicratic theory, something that ought to be encouraged or facilitated? Or is it more that demoicratic theory can help us to understand these inclinations, to see them as coherent and rational?

KN: As you are well aware, this takes us to the very root problem of democratic theory: What is "the original people"? The problem, in other words, is that we can't go all the way down and delineate the boundary of the people who decide that they're the people.

There have been many answers to this question—procedural answers, essentialist answers—that we don't need to rehearse here. But the presumption of demoicracy, I think, ought to be that if there are grounds for a people to believe that they can and want to exist autonomously as a polity, and if they can agree on a democratic and peaceful procedure to make this happen, then the EU should respect this and allow for new member states to be counted and take on the requisite rights and obligations. This is true for Scotland and Catalonia. Demoicratic theory doesn't exactly give you a recipe for when it is legitimate to give that right of secession, but there is a presumption that there should be a right to decide for those involved. This normative presumption can also be bolstered by an empirical understanding of the grounds for such demands, to the extent that demoicratic theory is particularly concerned with "looser consent" in the operation of the polity, the idea that no identifiable group—which may mean a country—ought to be permanently or structurally disenfranchised in the EU. If a region within a state comes to see that its preferences are never represented in Brussels by its nominal champion—namely, the member state to which it belongs—then its people might conclude that only by forming their own unit can they truly become EU citizens.

STAIR: Finally, what is the relationship between demoicracy and hard power, in the classical sense of military power and police power? After all, from the Weberian perspective, the legitimate exercise of violence is an essential feature of the state. In so far as demoicracy involves a reconception of state thinking, does it entail a different relationship to hard power?

KN: Hard power never disappears, but it can be tamed in international relations. This is the primary purpose of the EU itself: to make its use unthinkable within the EU and unpalatable outside it. During the great internal EU debate over the Iraq war, I wrote a piece entitled, "The Power of the Superpowerless,"[15] where superpowerlessness refers to the fact that the EU is not a state, and therefore ought not to aspire to superpower status, but should instead seek to become a different kind of actor in the world. As a not-state, the EU should never aspire to the monopoly of the legitimate exercise of violence, in my view, neither internally or externally. This is the flip side of its demoicratic condition.

Indeed, part of the normative motivation for wanting the EU to exist as a demoicracy is that oneness breeds othering—turning peasants into Frenchmen requires Germans and Brits on the other side of the border—and othering leads to violence. In contrast, a demoicratic ideal is about perfecting a differentiated yet porous polity, where Europe does not need some enemy to exit, where European and non-European others are not somehow ontologically different. As a not-state, therefore, the EU does not always need to hang on to the "one voice" mantra, as if diplomatic success ought to be measured by the extent to which its states can reach a unified stance. Unity may or may not be desirable—it depends on the context and, crucially, the relevant power in that context. Market power may require unity, whereas normative power may be enhanced by showing off Europe's value pluralism. Think of the recognition of Kosovo, for instance. Power as influence comes in many forms and bullying others is often not the most effective.

Still, we live in a Hobbesian world. The demoicratic ideal tends to go hand in hand with notions of civilian powerhood precisely because we cannot ignore the presence of security dilemmas in today's world. The build-up of military capacity, even defensively, affects others' perceptions, who may then act responsively. Should one avoid creating this perception in the first place? How does this affect one's vulnerability? These kinds of judgements need to be reassessed continuously as circumstances, neighbours, technologies, and ideologies evolve. We can only make probabilistic bets. If you announce yourself to the world as an entity that is plural and demoicratic, then hopefully the world takes you as such and you're less vulnerable. If you demonstrate that you can mediate conflict internally, you can act more credibly as a mediator externally—and so on. We may be a Kantian island in a Hobbesian world, as Robert Kagan once argued.[16] But, contrary to his analysis, we are not Kantian because we are weak, because we fund welfare states instead of soldiers. We are weak because we are Kantian, because we choose to be a Kantian polity. The power game is not zero-sum if you can change the relevant currency of power in the world.

But there is another kind of imperialism that demoicracy could fall into, this persistent idea of Europe as an *avant-garde* that could serve as a model for the rest of the world, as a universal model of democracy beyond the state. Of course, this kind of "EU-niversalism" could just be seen as the civilizing mission of the nineteenth century in new clothes, where

Europe can decide that it deserves more agency than others, and should offer its standards to non-Europeans with sticks and carrots to boot.[17]

So how does a demoicratic polity engage externally without being imperialist? By really holding on to its plurality. This is very difficult, of course, and European officials often don't know how to do it. Think of our ridiculous and dangerous tug-of-war with Russia about Ukraine. We should respect the right of states not to have to choose between two hegemonic neighbourhoods. If we can do that, then maybe, just maybe, we can recover the ultimate power, which we risk losing if we abandon our demoicratic ethos: the power of attraction. ∎

Kalypso Nicolaïdis is Professor of International Relations, Director of the Centre for International Studies at Oxford University and a fellow at St Antony's College. More can be found on her website: http://www.sant.ox.ac.uk/people/knicolaidis/.

Notes

[1] The concept of demoicracy was introduced in Kalypso Nicolaïdis, "We the Peoples of Europe", *Foreign Affairs* 83, no. 6 (2004): 97–110. Her most thorough formulation is: "The Idea of European Demoicracy," in *Philosophical Foundations of European Union Law*, ed. Julie Dickson and Pavlos Eleftheriadis (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012): 247–74.

[2] Kwame Anthony Appiah, *The Ethics of Identity* (Princeton, NJ; Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2005).

[3] Kalypso Nicolaïdis, "The New Constitution as European Demoi-cracy?" *Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy* 7, no. 1 (2004): 76–93.

[4] Charles Taylor, "The Politics of Recognition", in *Multiculturalism*, ed. Amy Gutmann (Princeton, NJ; Oxford: Princeton University Press, 1994); Nancy Fraser and Axel Honneth, *Redistribution or Recognition? A Political-Philosophical Exchange* (London; New York: Verso, 2003); and Paul Ricoeur, *The Course of Recognition*, trans. David Pellauer (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007).

[5] Kalypso Nicolaïdis, "European Demoicracy and Its Crisis," *Journal of Common Market Studies* 51, no. 2 (2013): 351–69.

[6] For example, see T. Burns and S. Andersen, "The European Union and the Erosion of Parliamentary Democracy: A Study of Post-Parliamentary Governance," in *The European Union: How Democratic Is It?* (London: SAGE, 1996): 227–51; Tapio Raunio, "Always One Step Behind? National Legislatures and the European Union," *Government and Opposition* 34, no. 2 (April 1, 1999): 180–202; and Andreas Follesdal and Simon Hix, *Why There Is a Democratic Deficit in the EU: A Response to Majone and Moravcsik*, European Governance Papers (EUROGON, 2005).

[7] Kalypso Nicolaïdis, "Our Democratic Atonement: Why We Need an Agora Europe", The People's Project? New European Treaty and the Prospects for Future Negotiations (Brussels: European Policy Centre, 2007).

[8] J. H. H. Weiler, "The Political and Legal Culture of European Integration: An Exploratory Essay," *International Journal of Constitutional Law* 9, no. 3-4 (October 1, 2011): 678-94.

[9] Chantal Mouffe, *Agonistics: Thinking the World Politically* (London; New York: Verso, 2013).

[10] Kalypso Nicolaïdis, "Epilogue: The Challenge of European Demoi-cratization," *Journal of European Public Policy*, forthcoming (2014): 1-9.

[11] Charles F. Sabel and Jonathan Zeitlin, "Experimentalism in the EU: Common Ground and Persistent Differences," *Regulation and Governance* 6 (2012): 410-26.

[12] Mary Kaldor, Sabine Selchow, Sean Deel, and Tamsin Murray-Leach, *The "Bubbling up" of Subterranean Politics in Europe*, Civil Society and Human Security Research Unit (London: London School of Economics, July 2012).

[13] Kalypso Nicolaïdis, "The ICMS Annual Review Lecture: Sustainable Integration: Towards EU 2.0?," *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* 48 (September 1, 2010): 21-54.

[14] Jürgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida, "February 15, or What Binds Europeans Together: A Plea for a Common Foreign Policy, Beginning in the Core of Europe," *Constellations* 10, no. 3 (September 1, 2003): 291-97.

[15] Kalypso Nicolaïdis, "The Power of the Superpowerless," in *Beyond Paradise and Power: Europe, America, and the Future of a Troubled Partnership*, ed. Tod Lindberg (New York; London: Routledge, 2004).

[16] Robert Kagan, "Power and Weakness," *Policy Review* 113 (June 2002): 3-28.

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