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The EuroMed beyond Civilisational Paradigms

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Pas tout à fait la même, pas tout à fait une autre. The Mediterranean is both Europe's mirror and its extension, too close to ignore, too far to embrace. It is the cradle of its "civilisation" and its demographic future yet also today's poor southern neighbour and the source of its discontents. It is One with it and yet the Other – Arab, Muslim – at its doorstep. The Mediterranean is a space of shared histories and shared presents of intense mingling and intense conflict. For some, it is a beautiful idea, for others a very bad headache. Politically and institutionally it simply does not exist. Since its inception, the European Union has sought to define its relations with this ill-defined space, the former colonial terrain of its most powerful member states. A decade ago, freed from the constraints of the Cold War, its politicians and bureaucrats came up with a new variant, a new idea, that of the "Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP)." Fearing the winds of globalisation and feeling the pull of EU attraction, states of the southern Mediterranean, while part of other local geopolitical constructs, the Maghreb, the Mashrek, the Middle East and of course "the Arab world," lent themselves to the idea.

This book has taken us through a journey from then to now, from Brussels to Ankara, Jerusalem and Casablanca. The authors analyse how achievements have fallen short of expectations and ask what has gone wrong. Nevertheless they do not fall prey to fashionable doom and instead seem to generally share a cautious trust in the philosophy of it all, in the assumptions, visions and decisions that have driven the process forward. This may be because these authors generally share a belief that change in the world is not only a product of material forces and calculated interests. Instead, these factors can be moulded and channelled through the power of ideas and the way in which people think about themselves and the overlapping communities they belong to. A regional reality in the Mediterranean can be collectively constructed even if those formally in charge lack the will, the capacity or the imagination to do so. In the end, the Euro-Med may still largely be a promise, but one comes away from this book with the urge to continue to believe in it.

One of the great strengths of the book is to bring to bear conceptually as well as descriptively the fundamental ideational shifts of the last few years. As set out by Adler and Crawford and reflected in the title of the book and their introduction, the recent past provides us with highly pertinent analytical keys. For one, the world of international relations has come increasingly to recognise the importance of culture and identity-formation as underpinning patterns of cooperation and conflict. If the Mediterranean has come to represent the privileged ground for a global "Clash of Civilisations" (Huntington, 1996), we should turn this representation on its head and see the Euro-Med project as a springboard for a countervailing

“convergence of civilisations.” Absent convergence of norms and values, we should assume that the EMP is unlikely to succeed. At the same time, the EU has changed and so has its self-perception as a “different kind of power” in the world. In 1995, the EMP was represented as part of its development policy; today we can interpret it as an expression of the EU’s normative power and in that sense a response to the aforementioned Clash of Civilisations. And yet, a decade after the inception of the EMP, the cleavage between the Northern and Southern shores of *Mare Nostrum*, that between its Western and Arab-Muslim worlds is deeper than ever before. And the civilisational rhetoric has hardened (Corm, 2002). It is right to analyze the EMP not simply as a functional project, but also through the twin lens of power and of culture. But we must go a step further.

Why has a project with such auspicious beginnings, such worthy intentions, “failed to develop peace-making practices” (Peters), increasingly exhibited “inconsistencies and dilemmas” (Haddadi; Solingen and Ozyurt) and proven unable to provide a framework for the negotiation of a security partnership (Attinà)? Authors in this volume give us numerous clues to the contradictions that have characterized the Barcelona Process since its inception and the current challenges facing it. Above all, instead of seeing structural realities – the economic, political, social, cultural gap between Europe and the Arab world – progressively addressed through EMP institutions, geopolitical realities and developments have intruded to heighten these gaps and asymmetries. Moreover, Europe’s self-perception as a regional power increasingly colludes with its effort to protect itself against the fundamentalist threat under the growing political sway of right wing politics. The Arab regimes’ continued objective to avoid social-political destabilisation through external legitimacy while minimizing structural reform has generally been abated; and the necessity for all actors to take into account the growing presence of the US, its actions, initiatives and representations in the post 9/11 era, have further marginalized the EMP (see also Philippart, 2003).

We cannot do justice in this concluding chapter to the rich and multi-faceted material provided by the contributors to illustrate these points and many others. Instead, inspired by some of their insights, we add our own voice to the debate by presenting a critical stance around three arguments. First, are the shortfalls of the EMP simply due to conjuncture or more fundamental? We believe that the answer must be found in the original balancing act performed at the launching of the process between, on the one hand, what unavoidably continued to be an EU foreign policy, shaped and steered by EU institutions, and on the other hand, the appeal to a new era of Community building in the region, combining the logic of alternative multilateralism *à la* OSCE with that of deeper integration and an identity-based discourse. In short, Euro-Med *vs.* EuroMed.

This balancing act as we see it has evolved into an increasing tension between a *problematique* in terms of power and a *problematique* in terms of identity and culture, a tension perhaps overlooked in this volume. If the EMP’s current deadlock reflects deepening local and regional cleavages, is its representation as an exercise of the EU’s normative power the key to overcoming such cleavages? How can the countries of the South Mediterranean *own* a project increasingly characterised as one element in Europe’s new bid for global power, all be it of a kinder, gentler type? To be sure, the creation of security communities and the sense of mutual trust that they involve is not incompatible with asymmetries of power (Adler, 1997; Adler and Barnett, 1998). But in order to entertain the possibility of community-building or region-building in an area so thin in transnational institutions and habits of cooperation other factors must be brought to bear.

This is what we explore in our second argument, where we question the relevance of the civilisational paradigm altogether. Indeed, from an EU-centred perspective, the EMP can be understood as a privileged *interface* between Europe and the Arab-Muslim world, aimed at facilitating the “dialogue” or the “convergence” between civilisations; or it can be seen as an *integrative* partnership, with a clear emphasis on the development of shared norms, the norms and values that the EU itself is supposed to embody and export to the rest of the world. Both stories largely assume away the project of building a Mediterranean region in favour of a “Wider Europe”. On one side, by consolidating its own margins the EU risks solidifying a civilisational fracture which becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy; on the other, it subsumes its periphery within its own project depriving the Euro-Mediterranean idea of its specificity and autonomy.

We suggest ways of moving beyond this alternative in part III which seeks to draw the main prescriptive implications from the book. We call for a *post-colonial agenda* for the Mediterranean as neither a Utopia nor an alternative to the EMP, but rather as a return to its original multilateral spirit and as its translation into a community building project of the kind that we might likely “see in our lifetime,” contradicting Adler and Crawford’s pessimistic (or realistic?) forecast. This we believe can only be achieved by “bringing the Mediterranean back in” and recentering the EuroMed institutions away from the EU of Brussels, by coopting the states of the region into a generalised exercise of recognition, and by empowering civil societies *internally* through the transnational practices and procedures envisioned in the third basket. Only in this way can the idea of a non-territorialized Euro-Med region be given true substance.

I. An increasingly EU-Centred Process

That the EMP is an EU creation is not controversial and amply illustrated in the preceding pages. First and foremost, this book is the story of a highly ambitious and original EU project and an analysis of the potential for the EU to act as an agent of change outside its borders. In fact the EMP has evolved in a decade into an increasingly EU-centred enterprise as a result of developments both within and outside the EU. We start by arguing that this evolution has only confirmed a tension that existed from the very inception of the EMP - EU foreign policy *vs.* Community building – and go on to show why the tension has heightened and today needs to be addressed explicitly.

But it is also fair to recognize with Adler and Crawford that the two initial ways of framing the EMP - EU foreign policy *vs.* regional security partnership - were “not incompatible,” since at that stage, the notion of “partnership” or “special” or “strategic” partnership started to be used by the EU in other contexts (Russia, Turkey ...) to simply connote a privileged status in the pecking order of the EU’s external relations. It is only if one is to consider the prospect for the EuroMediterranean process to evolve into a more ambitious region-building exercise – the long term and visionary agenda of this book – that one must ask again where the tension lies, why it has evolved the way it has, and whether in particular the idea that the EU acts as a normative power genuinely points to ways of addressing the tension. In Adler and Crawford’s apt formula: “The Barcelona Process is caught between the language of post-colonialism and the behaviour of neo-colonialism.” Where shall the two meet?

EU Foreign Policy vs. Community Building: “Partnership” as the Missing Link?

In its original institutional translation, the tension at stake could be viewed as a simple reflection of the dual nature of the project, indeed a *creative* tension, between the notion of the Barcelona process “as part of the EU growing and more proactive Middle East policy,” and the notion of the process as an attempt to extend the EU’s own internal logic to its neighbours short of accession by building with them a new kind of “regional security partnership” (Adler and Crawford). Whether the latter was to represent an intermediary step towards the building of a “EuroMed Community” distinct altogether from the EU itself may have been implicit in the discourse surrounding the EMP but accounts will vary as to how far down that road policy-makers ever intended to go.

It is not surprising then that at the two ends of the spectrum, as it were, we can recognize two alternative and mutually exclusive interpretations of the project, “hegemony/ domination” and “associalization/ inclusion,” as Attinà puts it in this volume. Under the first interpretation, according to Attinà, the goal is to make “the Mediterranean a politically, socially and culturally stabilized system with the ultimate goal of building a steady European hegemony on the region.” Under the second, there is “no room for deliberate construction of unequal relations between the partners.” Rather, “the Barcelona Process is, at the same time, a gap-reducing process between the societies and states of the two shores of the Mediterranean, an inclusion process of the Med-partners in the neo-liberal global system (Tovias, in this volume), and a mutual socialization process of all the partner countries to the same practices.” As a tension between ideal types, this one is between the EMP as foreign EU policy (combining instruments of its development policies and its incipient foreign and security policy) and as genuine autonomous region building project, the EMP as a top-down or bottom-up process, and indeed between Mediterranean integration in itself as an expression of EU hegemony in the region or as an autonomous cultural reality.

But ideal types are reserved for us intellectuals. In the political world we encounter slogans and practices – and the EMP is a *process*. In fact, several discourses and corresponding sets of practices have coexisted in the EMP’s design and implementation.

As pictured in figure 1, and in contrast to a process purely defined as EU foreign policy and to the so called Global Mediterranean Policy of the previous decade, the EMP represented an evolution in two directions –at least in theory. On one hand it heralded a *multilateralisation* of relationship between participants, as reflected in its institutional set up. On the other hand, it opened up the door for the introduction of practices leading to *deeper integration*, from a special trade status with the EU to the security charter. The issue that concerns us is one of emphasis between these dimensions as well as asking how far the EMP has moved along each. In the longer run, both logics would need to be combined – the overcoming of the EU-centred quality of the process, and the deepening of integration between EU members and non-members in order to move closer to a genuine *EuroMed Community*. Shifting from purely functional regional cooperation to “region-building” which involves a common sense of belonging is an incremental process and the actual practices we observe are combination of the four categories identified here. At the same time, the EMP as foreign policy and as community building remain opposite ideal types.

Figure 1: Dilemmas and tensions in the EMP

Mode of relationship	EU-centred relations vs....	Multilateral relations
Depth of integration		
Cooperation vs....	EU regional foreign policy <i>Euro-Med: "Creating a separate Mediterranean region"</i> GMP/70s-Mercosur	"Partnership" as regional multilateralism <i>Euro-Med as a Mediterranean OSCE with formal equality between members</i>
Deeper integration	"Partnership" as regional mentoring <i>Euro-Med as part of Euro-neighbourhood (sub-regional integration as precondition)</i> Pre-Enlargement → Balkans Pact Non-Enlargement → Wider Europe	Community building or Region-building <i>EuroMed: Constructing a EuroMediterranean Community together</i>

In order to explain why in effect there is a structural need to combine various approaches to the EMP we must first come back to basic geographical intuitions and dilemmas. The EMP differs from any other theatre where European power is exercised because it alone combines the property of neither being a separate region with which the EU connects more or less closely (like Mercosur or Asean), nor a region destined to be integrated to the EU itself and encouraged to build horizontal ties as a pre-requisite to EU accession (like the Visegrad group or the Balkans). As Bicchi puts it in her chapter, the EMP is grounded in a fundamental geographical, and therefore symbolic, ambiguity stemming directly from the EU's enlargement to Spain, Greece and Portugal in the preceding decade. With this enlargement, she states, the Northern border of the "Mediterranean region" that the EMP is intended to create was left unspecified. Was the EU trying to create a region *together* with the Mediterranean ... or was it in fact trying to promote the creation of a Mediterranean region *separated* from the EC? The first option is counter-intuitive since the EU is made of a majority of non-Mediterranean members, while the second is unrealistic since both Northern and Southern Mediterranean states do not primarily define themselves as Mediterranean (the former being "European", the latter being predominantly "Muslim" or "Arab"). And if the separate region was to be only the Southern Mediterranean states, how could they form alone a Mediterranean region?

In spite, or perhaps because, of this ambiguity, the EMP borrows from both geographical frames in its own idiosyncratic way, which in turn are translated into different connotations of the terms "partnership" and a different emphasis on how exactly the EMP is supposed to differ from its predecessor EU policies as represented in figure 1.

On one hand, *regional multilateralism* is about building a *EuroMed* region together (incorporating but not defined by the EU), and thus the idea of “partnership” is meant to describe an equal, or at least formally equal relationship between members and non-members of the EU, in a grouping comprising the 27 countries of the EU and the Mediterranean taken together. In this sense, the EMP is inspired by the Helsinki process and the OSCE it gave birth to - originally an asymmetric process seeking to foster internal reform on one side of the Cold War divide, which progressively evolved into an association among formally equal states. Indeed, the originality of the EMP process lies in its ability to bring together countries of the South and North in a dialogue about a shared political space. This representation is the normative underpinning for the building of a “regional security partnership” - Adler and Crawford’s intermediary step towards genuine community building - based on mutual respect and therefore mutual trust: the Euro-Med is a post-colonial discourse.

On the other hand, *regional mentoring* is about encouraging South-South collaboration through the Euro-Med, and thus the idea of “partnership” is above all an expression of EU pragmatism, a neighbourhood version of the EU’s general propensity to offer itself as an anchor for region building outside its shores, whereby it is easier and more productive for the EU to deal with groups of countries rather than individual countries, whether with the ultimate aim of integration in the EU itself (the Visegrad group in the 1990s, Southeast Europe today), or whether simply with the aim of building privileged relationships that may ultimately enhance the EU’s influence in global politics (EU-Mercosur or EU-Asean agreements). In this sense, the EMP may claim to be a multilateral process based on equal partners, but in fact it remains centred on the EU itself, designed and financed by the EU which also conceives the method, the objectives and the different steps of the process: the Euro-Med is a neo-colonial practice wrapped in a post-colonial discourse.

Where then does the balance actually lie? It is difficult to deny that at its core, the Euro-Med process is the EU-Med 12, that is an *EU-centred highly asymmetric cooperative relationship* between the EU on one hand and the Southern shore of the Mediterranean on the other, referred to characteristically in EU parlance as the “Mediterranean non member countries” (MNMC) or Med 12. It brings together a powerful regional grouping and singular countries which do not act collectively as shapers of the rules that will apply. To be sure, as several chapters point out including the introduction, there are some great similarities with the OSCE when it comes to the overall framework (comprehensive, indivisible, cooperative) as well as particular practices (trade & development, security, migration, democracy promotion policies, civil societies involvement) which taken together are supposed to contribute to the building of a security community partnership. But as Federica Bicchì argues, the OSCE analogy in the end gives us little analytical mileage, since if it was accurate, the EMP would be *the* institutional framework promoting community building. “Instead” she argues, “it is the EU which maintains the agency in the case of the EMP. Instead of having socialisation to we-feeling within the main agential institution, socialisation is meant to occur outside it. As a consequence, it is possible that a logic of ‘us/them’ remains at work.” For Bicchì, the most accurate depiction of the EMP is the complex combination of multilateral, bilateral and unilateral dimensions at play within this overall framework.

To be sure, the differences between the OSCE and the EMP may not be mainly a product of European hegemonic design but above all of the difference between European and Arab security cultures as argued by Attinà who notes how "building regional security through cooperative means creates strong suspicions in governments attached to national military power and

the traditional view of state strategic secrecy.” Moreover, Arab leaders will continue to resist human and political measures of enhancing regional security, considering them “as true violation of the Arab political order.” As Attinà argues, Arab countries, despite the Arab League, never practiced any multilateral institution management of regional security problems, as Europeans did during the last century on the basis of liberal idealism and pragmatic realism. “For this reason,” he concludes, “the decision to sign the Barcelona Declaration as the fundamental agreement of the regional security partnership building process, and also the decision to negotiate the signature of the first operative agreement, i.e. the Charter for Stability and Peace, did not yet make out the expected effect of a working regional partnership.”

This last point also speaks to the second dimension, namely the depth of Mediterranean integration as an EU-induced dynamic. Here, as stressed by Gillespie, with such a young and on-going process, one must not only look at evidence but also at potential. And in this sense, authors are keen to identify trends rather than outcomes. One main theme in this book is to stress the role of socialization as one such determinant of long term trends - both as a vector for the EU’s approach to integration and as a compensation mechanism for the skewed character of the process. There is no doubt that regular exchanges contribute to the socialisation of individuals into a broader collective process. But Solingen and Ozyurt argue that “differences among both southern Mediterranean and EU states caution against a simple categorization of the EU as persuader, and southern Mediterranean states as persuadees,” and call instead to pay attention to domestic distributional perspectives. Different domestic actors take different stands and may find themselves on different sides of the divide. At the same time, these authors believe, initial values and preferences may have been so far apart “that any efforts at socialization are extremely difficult if not doomed.”

It is instructive in this context to place EU fostering of horizontal relations between Southern countries in a broader perspective. The EU has long provided both incentives and templates for the building of regions in the rest of the world, acting as a relatively benign “patron/mentor” in its relations to the South (Bretherton and Vogler, 1999). But as a matter of foreign policy, the EU has not initiated or shaped regional integration processes themselves. In the EMP case, the EU is dealing with countries that possess strong common characteristics, but which lack cohesion and any real (sub-) regional inclusive momentum. The use of EU leverage in order to foster cooperation between Mediterranean non-member countries resembles the regional cooperation clauses in association agreements with Balkan countries. The recent decision by the EU to finally allow MNMCs to present the *cumul* of their respective value added through intra-regional trade for the purpose of its rules of origin may provide an added incentive for regional economic integration and represents an interesting example of such externally induced economic integration.

But in the Balkan case, functional cooperation has been accompanied by a collective attempt to reshape a sub-regional identity, the shift from the negative “Balkan” to the positive “Southeast Europe”. Crucially this exercise in modernised identity building may have been provoked by a collective desire to “court” the EU, but it was engineered from the region itself. From the EU’s viewpoint this ideological substratum is instrumental and destined to be subsumed under the EU banner. The very notion of “Wider Europe” articulated in Brussels headquarters in the run up to enlargement has been an attempt to apply this pre-accession logic to non-accession countries and thus unsurprisingly conveys through its very label the idea of a centre-periphery relationship.

In the end, we see here at play the traditional trade-off between efficiency and legitimacy. Increased multilateralism would buy the latter but it would also mean that greater deference would be given to demands by the EU's partners of non-interference in their internal affairs. On the other hand, the EU's controlling stake in the EMP process, in terms of conception, organization and financing, while giving rise to accusations of neo-colonialism, also allows for greater mobilisation of resources, and the kind of conditionality that is a pre-requisite in community-building exercises.

Potency, Dilemmas, and Limits of the EU's Normative Power

One may read a number of contributions in this volume as supporting the assumption that taking the EU as a "normative power" provides a response to the effectiveness/legitimacy dilemma, making the EU's assertion of its influence more palatable and legitimate, and distinct from that of the United States. But how far does normative power really take us?

It is true that Europeans have a problem with power. They care about it but are unable or unwilling to project it bluntly. The US may or may not be a reluctant superpower but the EU is certainly a reluctant power *tout court*. This is why analysts and politicians have come up with various labels for the Union, reflecting this ambivalence, mitigating the bluntness of the assertion: civilian power of course (Whitman, 1998), as well as quiet power, middle power, emancipatory power, post-national power and now normative power. The labels are not simply exultations of Joseph Nye's soft as opposed to hard power. Nor are they lofty concepts to accommodate the psychology of weakness as Robert Kagan would have it (Kagan, 2002). Rather European unease with power is part and parcel of a compelling narrative still in the making: that of a Union of nation-states slowly and painfully constructing together the instrument of their collective post-colonial atonement. This is at least one way of telling the story, about a power tamed to serve collective rather than individual state interest.

And indeed, this mode of self understanding in European circles is not new (Hill, 1990). When thirty years ago, Duchêne heralded the EC's "civilian form of influence and action," he not only referred to its economic rather than military strength, or to the democratic credentials of its member states, but also and more importantly to its experience in inter-state cooperation, an experience that could presumably be exported to other parts of the world. This is a kind of power that could *only* be wielded by a group of states exhibiting the quality of their own interaction.

It was of course tempting then and still is today to dismiss the idea of civilian power as an oxymoron based on myth (peace through trade) and colonial nostalgia, as well as born of frustration at Europe's inability to become a third superpower during the Cold War. Yet the idea that the EU can "lead by example" and project its relevance worldwide has been astonishingly resilient to global changes, such as the end of the Cold War and globalisation. And it has remained resilient even in an era when the EU has become significantly militarised, for military means may sometimes be needed to achieve civilian ends, to implement civilian ideals, and to create the potential for the emergence of zones of peace and stability.

The more recent formulation of normative power (Manners, 2002) echoes that of civilian power in an era where interference in the domestic affairs of others has itself become a less contested norm in international relations. But normative power reflects a more substantive ambition, beyond the exporting of habits and methods of cooperation between states, and norms of external behaviour. Rather, the projection of normative power implies first and foremost a

commitment to taming the capacity of states to do harm within and not only outside their borders, and an urge to export a substantive political agenda (e.g. abolishment of the death penalty). With a normative version of civilian power we appeal to an idea of the EU itself as a model that “relies on the social construction of collective identities” as described by the editors of this volume, and that is increasingly willing to give itself the tools to export such construction beyond Europe’s Southern shores (Nicolaidis K and Howse, 2002).

As the mainstream narrative of this book makes clear, this concept reflects and promotes the centrality of the EU as a regional power. The EU’s use of its normative power consists in the mobilisation of instruments to affect the convergence of norms determining domestic conditions that ought in turn to be more propitious to stability in the region. But the logic is first and foremost that there are EU and non-EU members, that the community might be inclusive but that the EU is the one that defines normative appropriateness. It is fair to ask then under what conditions this other kind of logic of power can favour the emergence of a sense of “we-ness”. If legitimacy is, in Ruggie’s words, the fusion of power and purpose, the key of course is to ask what purpose this other kind of power is meant to serve.

Fundamentally, normative power can only be applied credibly under a key condition: consistency between internal policies and external prescriptions and actions. Thus for instance, the inclusion of democracy-promotion in the design of the EMP occurred not only in spite of the resistance of most of governments in the partner countries, but also in spite of the reigning scepticism, especially among Southern members of the Union, regarding the impact of democracy promotion on the stability of these regimes and therefore of the stability of the region. Nevertheless, at least initially, the democratic peace argument won the day in the design of the EMP simply because this is the narrative at the core of the EU construct itself, and one increasingly applied to its relations with the rest of the world. In other words, the strong conviction that European democracies will not go to war with each other rests on the notion that shared democratic values is the fundamental prerequisite at the heart of the political bargains underpinning the Union and on the engineering of a sophisticated set of institutions to manage EU economic and political interdependence. A genuine security community in the EuroMed can only be built on democratic building blocks.

And yet, we should not be surprised by the fundamental tension between democracy and security in the EMP context, as analysed by both Gillespie and Haddadi. Power is about order, which in turn relies on political stability. Debates on democratic transitions, however, have highlighted the short term conflicts and instability that comes with such transitions. In the region, this instability is compounded by the fear that elected Muslim groups will lock the (democratic) door behind them. The Algerian dilemma is the black hole of normative power: democracy, but at what price?

Moreover, as Gillespie’s investigation of democracy promotion through the EMP demonstrates in vivid detail, when normative power aims at changing deep seated patterns of governance, framing the one way imposition of certain norms as an exercise in “partnership” raises major dilemmas of disempowerment in partner societies (for a comparative perspective, see Young, 2001). While, one may argue that normative power is not neo-colonial if it is meant to empower local actors, it may in fact rob them of their autonomy in defining the substance of empowerment; for example, activists do not share with Europeans the same appreciation of pluralism and point to a European secular bias. “Democracy promotion” says Gillespie, “has a subtext in the Mediterranean of undermining the Islamic identities of societies,” as evidenced by the exclusion of even moderate Islamist groups from its support lists. As a result, civil society

groups may have painstakingly managed to converge over time towards EU standards, only to remain excluded from its initiatives.

The EU's failure to apply consistently over time principles of democracy promotion is due in part to the lack of agreement between member states over the desirable tradeoffs they are willing to make among different goals and the values underpinning these goals (e.g. political reform *vs.* stability or poverty reduction). But the failure is also due to the contradiction inherent in the idea of normative power itself, between exporting a given set of procedural norms and allowing for the emergence of new political spaces in partner countries, which are necessary for a long-term convergence with the EU. The EU's great ambivalence when faced with current Turkish reforms is a case in point.

Thus, the dilemma of normative power reflects the predicament that leaders in the Southern states themselves face when dealing with political and economical reforms. In Solingen and Ozyurt's words, "they either phase-in this multifaceted process of change or run the risk of being themselves phased-out by it." It is hard to foresee the unravelling of this dilemma. The first option has a second-order dilemma folded into it: leaders seem deadlocked between "democratic efficiency" arguments (democratization can facilitate economic reform and help build new political coalitions to overcome opponents of economic reform) and "authoritarian advantage" models, illustrated by China and the East Asian tigers. Since the configuration of incentives guiding such calculations is impossible to predict and therefore to steer, the EU is more often than not reactive rather than proactive.

The consistency imperative also plays out the other way around. In other words, what to make of a discourse seeking direct involvement of NGOs from the South, unmitigated by the state (at least in theory), when the modes of political integration of migrant populations from North Africa within the EU often contradict this principle? It would also be hard to argue that in the economic field, EU decision makers have felt much constrained by the imperative of internal/external consistency. More often than not, as analyzed by Toviás, liberal economic principles stop at the boundary of the EU. And of course, the capacity to control and manage the flow of people, and to agree on the principles to govern this practice, is not only a fundamental expression of the power of the EU as a political actor on the world stage, but it is also one of the core *raison d'être* of the EMP itself. The entry of the divided island of Cyprus into the Union has now created a space where the two imperatives clash: free movement of EU citizens within the Union *vs.* hard external boundaries. The two imperatives, however, do not need to clash in practice. They simply illustrate the fact that the discourse of normative powerhood must reckon with its being at heart an instrument of EU foreign policy rather than a shared basis for living together among neighbours.

The Intrusion of "Events": Toward a Consolidation of the North-South Boundaries?

Notwithstanding the above, it would have been possible to view the EMP as a fertile ground for experimenting with an instrumental version of normative power, whereby the structural asymmetries that it expresses would be counterbalanced by the steering of the process into a genuinely multilateral regional institution like the OSCE. This experiment could have helped purchase greater legitimacy and could have started to combine the two logics of partnership discussed above. Instead, the region moved in the direction of an increasingly EU-centred and

dualistic EMP, which not only highlights normative power dilemmas, but also the influence of current events. Along with the other contributors to this volume we must take stock of “the intrusion of events” that has affected the region and the world in the intervening decade.

For one, the EU itself has fundamentally changed since 1995. The turn of the century has become a time for consolidation, and a time for redrawing the EU's collective contract in the form of a Constitution, which, although not bold in its substantive content, still is highly significant symbolically. A Constitution defines a political space, a political community in the making and presupposes exclusionary boundaries. At the same time, with the prospect of the most far reaching enlargement in the Union's history, the EU has all but become synonymous with Europe. The dominant perception that this enlargement has at last made the continent whole also makes it possible for the first time in EU history to envision a “limit” to its territorial reach. As a corollary, the notion of Wider Europe has arisen, which conveys the idea that the contagious effect of European integration cannot quite stop here, that the European project must continue to be expansionary, and that relations with those outside the EU are to be represented as concentric rather than overlapping circles. Europe is once again the centre of *a* world, its continental world.

Yet, and this is the second critical development, Europe can less than ever claim to be the centre of *the* world, a world order shaken to its core by the aftermath of September 11 (Jünemann, 2004). The ultimate victory of terrorists is to have brought back to centre-stage the vision of a world split between forces of good and evil, where great powers must be called to adjudicate. European leaders, therefore, had little choice but to follow the US regional security strategy, which mirrors Al Qaida's ideology.

To be sure, as both Gillespie and Haddadi analyze in detail, September 11 at least temporarily brought ‘securitization’ ostensibly to the fore of the EMP at the expense of the democracy agenda, muting criticisms of undemocratic regime in the region and freezing support for reform in prevailing state-society relations. The on-going fight of authoritarian regimes against “Islamic fundamentalism” has successfully been recycled as local wars on terrorism, thus erasing even on the part of the most open-minded European governments the distinction between opposition political movements. While British and Americans had initially counterbalanced France's support for the Algerian government clampdown against fundamentalist opponents, they all stood united behind it after 9/11. At the same time, Arab governments supported by their public opinions expressed increased resentment at Europe's passivity in the face of Israel's version of the “war on terror” and its incapacity to counter the marginalisation of the Palestinian authority. The frame of “the West vs. Islam” came to override even the timid prior attempts at jointly managed change be it in North Africa or in the Middle East. And when the US set forth its vision for a “Greater Middle East,” the EMP - after all a much more consensual, albeit EU-centred precedent - did not figure in the picture. Yet the EMP framework is of great potential relevance to any peace deal in the region. As Solingen and Ozyurt conclude, “whether this microcosm can be nested in the 'triple logic' that underlies the macro Mediterranean framework remains uncertain. The viability of the EMP may partially hang on this balance.”

More generally, support for regime change in Iraq, may make it “harder to reconcile pro-democracy work with the concept of partnership” (Gillespie) but, conversely, the watering down of the democracy agenda elsewhere in the region to pluralist elite participation in international schemes does not in itself constitute a notable response to the US strategy.

To be sure, notwithstanding Silvio Berlusconi's declaration on “the superiority of Western civilisation”, Europe's leaders on the whole sought to resist the extreme version of a dualistic discourse. But there is no denying about the spill-over effects in Europe of this era of

new wars, notably in the media and in other public fora, thus incrementally justifying a closure *vis a vis* Southern Mediterranean peoples.

Finally, these geopolitical developments have only served to entrench a long term evolution within Europe itself towards identity closure (*repli identitaire*), reflected in part in the rightwing shifts of national electorates. Exclusionary discourses and practices toward the “other side”, both in the geographical and cultural sense, spill over from domestic to regional politics. Take, for example, the 2002 territorial dispute between Spain and Morocco, whose subtext were immigration issues, the unexpected side effects in the Muslim world of France’s “veil affair,” and the campaign against Turkey’s accession to the EU, which was led not only by most right wing parties, but also by many on the left. It is indeed the “place of Islam” in Europe that is at stake here, and even if Europeans think of themselves as more familiar with the Arab-Muslim cultural realities than their American counterparts, the logic of clash produces the same kind of effects on both side of the Atlantic.

Yet, if the US is now everywhere, has more than ever become the power of reference around the Mediterranean, this may paradoxically constitute an opening for the exercise of Europe’s other kind of power, one called for by many in the region as an alternative if not a counterweight. This alternative, however, would require a commitment on the part of Europe to firmly bind itself, i.e. its peoples, to its Southern neighbours while all three factors – consolidation of the EU space, the war on terror, and domestic sociological shifts – combine to consolidate the North-South boundary in the region. Indeed, the Euro-Med project is fundamentally affected by this new state of affairs, and looks now very different at the eve of the 21st century than it did in 1995. The EU’s ambition to build an alternative policy to the US’s interventionism finds its translation, but also its limit, in the idea and the practices of “normative power”.

This section has shown that the relationship between application of normative power and the building of we-ness and community is not unproblematic. The cultural *problematique*, thus, must counterbalance the power logic of a region where security concerns have become paramount. This was the message of the Valencia summit, which in the wake of 9/11, emphasized political and cultural cooperation. Normative power can define a community’s contours, but it cannot alone define its content. There are of course always more or less powerful agents in any community, starting with the EU itself. But the very notion of regional community cannot be credible without at least a formal fiction of symmetry between its members. A community cannot be founded on the division between subject and object of power: this is partly what the acrimonious negotiations at the founding of the EC in 1957 were about, namely the extent to which the new arrangements were to institutionalise non-hegemonic politics in Europe through the formal equality between member states. We do not want to argue that constructing a Mediterranean region ought to abstract from power asymmetries altogether. That would be naive and even dangerous. Instead we call for a greater articulation and distinction between the benign practice of power by the EU, on the one hand, and the practice of community building founded on appeals to common belonging and the sharing of identities, on the other. It is to the latter that we now turn to.

II. Identifying a “Euro Mediterranean” Region

Who is this *homo EuroMed* in the making? We have argued that the EMP is increasingly Euro-centred. Does this mean that a dualist paradigm of the region is taking root – the EU *vs.* its partners – or does it mean that “who is us?” in the EuroMed context is in the process of being subsumed within a broader, more integrated wider European region? In either case is it even relevant to try to draw the contours of a “we” in the context of what is above all a diplomatic exercise? We believe so, if one considers with Adler and Crawford that “the Barcelona Process focused too much on form and procedure and too little on content”, and that its members need “to endow the concept of partnership with shared content, meaning, and to spend material, political and symbolic capital to develop shared understandings about the purposes of Mediterranean partnership.”

In this spirit, we take the creation of a “Euro-Mediterranean Foundation for a dialogue of cultures and civilisations” as emblematic. Here is after all the first properly Euro-Med institution, created not to manage economic aid or security cooperation, but at the softest end of the spectrum: culture. Its avowed goal, “to promote a culture of peace and to achieve mutual understanding, bring peoples closer, remove the threats to peace and strengthen exchanges among civilisations” (EuroMed report n° 59, EC, May 2003), can be taken as a sign of heightened awareness on the EU's behalf of the necessity to bring some “identity content” to the Euro-Med project, by facilitating contacts at the civil society level. It would be naive to believe that such Foundation can itself create “we-ness” in the region. Nevertheless, it serves to reflect and amplify the various presuppositions of the partners involved and the undercurrents shared among intellectuals and activists coopted in its operations. Thus, it is worth noting the ambiguities and biases present at the creation. What kind of political and material autonomy should be given to this new transversal institution? What conception of a “Euro-Mediterranean region” does it put forward? Indeed, even if the “guiding principles for the dialogue between cultures and civilisations” recall the stereotyped “common history”, it rather puts the emphasis on the objective to better understand “the other” so that, instead of changing it, we learn peacefully to co-exist with it, in a world where our differences are better recognised and, therefore, respected. Such an “us *vs.* them” rhetoric, in fact, already emerges in the dichotomist concept of a “dialogue of civilisations”, which contains the idea of two sides, namely us, the West, and “the other”, the Arab-Muslim world.

“The *'dialogue of civilisations,'*” one reads in a recent highly incisive report to the European Commission, “derives from the polemical, not to say warmongering, concept of the *'clash of civilisations'*, and while it may be intended as a counterblast, it unfortunately shares the same logic in spite of itself by giving credence to the idea that the whole question is thrashed out between 'blocs' distinguished by quasi-ontological differences” (EuroMed report n° 68, EC, December 2003).¹ In order to go beyond this civilisational paradigm, we ought to give substance to the idea of a de-territorialized Mediterranean identity underpinning the concrete attempts to bolster the human networks partaking in a Euro-Med cultural community.

¹ This report was drafted by a high-level advisory group, established in 2003 by Romano Prodi, comprised mostly of intellectuals from the region.

“Wider Europe” vs. “Mare Nostrum”

We come back to our initial theme: the discourse that permeates the EuroMed project has consistently oscillated between two logics, dualist and monist. The first logic acknowledges the wide cultural differences between the Northern and the Southern shores of the Mediterranean, and takes the EMP as an institutional bridge over this sea, allowing for the creation of an “area of peace and stability”. The second logic, in order to blur the unequal dimension of the relationship, and therefore create the conditions for building a more deeply integrated security community, insists on the importance of a shared destiny among the Euro-Mediterranean partners. Perhaps more than the symbolic and historical space of the EU itself, the Mediterranean can rely on cultural artefacts and practices to underpin, at least superficially, such a discourse. At the same time, realities on the ground, such as the status of women, state-society relations, and the social and political role of religion never fail to provide grounds for the dualist logic. Essentialist understandings of identity and sense of common belonging are bound to falter on the altar of modern socio-political realities (Bayart, 1996; Wintle, 1996).

Still the initial question is crucial in terms of political project. Should the Mediterranean be considered as a demarcation line, an interface between two cultural spheres, Europe and the Arab-Muslim world – in other words the “managed periphery” of a “Wider Europe”? Or should it be revisited as “Mare Nostrum” sending out its ripples to an ever expanding circle of 27, now 36 countries? This is an impossible choice between colonial nostalgia and integrative utopia.

Nevertheless, as this book sets out to demonstrate, the kind of identity issues relevant here are not mainly about stabilized representations, but about how long term political processes themselves, be they nation-building or region-building, can help reshape or even create collective identity, or rather identity-frames, making sense of people’s secondary attachments. The very idea of a “Euro-Med region” has the potential to serve as a new geographic frame –and more implicitly an identity frame – for the relationships between Europe and the MNMCs, and, as such, an ideological tool of normative power. This innovative concept has the potential to suggest that the various countries involved reconfigure their geopolitical environment, and therefore their definition of their “significant others”. While unsurprisingly the concept has had little impact on most EU countries, has it led the MNMCs (for whom the relationship with EU countries is more central) to revise their perceptions of “significant others”, and therefore, as stated by Peters in this volume, “of their own identity and self definition”? If it is true as Peters continues that, “in this respect, it was assumed that the Southern Mediterranean states would invest in the ‘Euro-Mediterranean region’ and would regard it as their natural geopolitical space”, has such a shift actually started to occur? And if so, is this compatible with the interface paradigm dominant in many EU circles?

Part of the answer provided in this volume lies in analyzing the compatibility of this new transnational framework with each country's perception of its “place in the region”. The more incompatible, the lesser the integrative potential of the EMP; the more fragile and internally contested its national identity, the less prone a given nation to accept “identity manipulation” from the outside. Such a scheme of resistance to the superposed concept of “Euro-Med region” is remarkably illustrated by Del Sarto’s analysis of the serious dilemma faced by Israel: “The option of moving towards a different regional order exacerbates Israel’s domestic identity conflicts, which, in turn, put a strain on engaging consistently in Euro-Mediterranean region-building. On the other hand, postponing crucial policy decisions increases societal cohesion, at least among Israel’s Jewish majority, yet without solving Israel’s crucial identity questions”. In addition to the collapse of the peace process that has brought back the vision of a nation struggling for its

existence in a hostile environment, this identity crisis reinforces “Israel’s particularistic self-definition, and accentuates Israel’s cognitive boundaries between ‘the Jewish State’ and ‘the other’.” Promoting regional integration becomes meaningless when the dominant geopolitical self-perception in Israel is that of Ehud Barak’s “villa in the jungle”.

Resistance is of course reciprocal. Israel’s participation in the EMP represents for the Arab partners a serious obstacle to the building of an integrated region, at least as long as Israel seeks to guarantee its own security through the unilateral use of force. The fact that Israel is viewed as a European graft on an Arab-Muslim root, a renewed experience of colonisation, heightens Arab suspicion of European intentions in the region and its capacity to convey an alternative message to that of US.

Moreover, the EMP frame is also resisted as an attempt to divide the Arab world by excluding non-Mediterranean Arab countries. The gap between the strong and longstanding rhetoric of Arab unity and the absence of any real regional or sub-regional inclusion among countries of the Maghreb or the Mashrek (see Calleya in this volume) simply underscores these countries’ weakness when it comes to negotiating with the EU. In this sense, the expressed fears of a rekindled neo-colonial relationship through the EMP are less the result of Europe’s attempt to counterbalance the US exercise of power through exercising its own, than of the Arab’s divisions and dependency towards Europe.

In short, we must recognise that the EMP unavoidably creates new exclusionary boundaries: *vis a vis* the EU for an aspiring member like Turkey (see Solingen and Ozyurt in this volume) or for a self perceived Western ally like Israel; *vis a vis* Europe’s “new neighbourhood” for non-Mediterranean Arab countries, which are socially and culturally linked to their neighbours, like Iraq or Mauritania. The fact that these boundaries are changing over time (as with Malta and Cyprus swapping the “non member” for the “member” status) paradoxically weakens the idea of an inclusive Euro-Med region. If tomorrow the EU allows Turkey to join the club, following the inclusion of all the Balkan states, the MNMCs shall be reduced to Arab states – with the problematic exception of Israel – and the *face a face* between the Northern and the Southern shores of the Mediterranean can come to freeze the perception of divide between civilisational worlds.

Can an inclusive boundary counterbalance these exclusionary spillovers? As argued earlier, the notion of normative power can be inclusive, but it is instrumental – it can not in itself define the project except through the restricted notion of exporting norms. If it fails to take into account the way normative power interferes with identity questions that are intrinsic to the units or nations of the region, the EMP could end up exacerbating rather than mediating regional divisions. When a political process questions fundamental assumptions of national self-definition, its promoters can not simply ask: “what do we have in common?” Rather they also need to ask whether the members’ divergent national projects share specific identity features, and how these features can be exploited, less as a means to an illusive sense of shared identity than as the shared experiential basis for engaging in common projects for the future.

There are disparate but intertwined societies brought both together and apart by recent historical events, not least through the relatively recent process of superposition of exclusive modern nation states over dense interpersonal networks without political translation. If the *Mare Nostrum* is about shared identities and overlapping communities, it is also about the sharing of similar traumatic experience of state building, and processes of homogenization, which leave open wounds that can only be healed through genuine engagement in mutual recognition. If

anything, the recent failure of the referendum on Cyprus reunification has shown that all-out deployment of EU normative power in this context is far from sufficient.

Back to History: Divisive Memories, Shared Experiences

In any discussion of community or region building, the recourse to history is not a panacea and cannot substitute for modern day understanding of patterns of political and sociological convergence. Nevertheless, the return to history allows recognizing the multiple, complex and diverse origins of Mediterranean – and even more broadly European – communities and the divisions between them. The MNMCs, such as the Balkan countries, share similar nation-building experiences, and a Mediterranean version of the process of homogenisation and exclusion, which European states went through in the 19th century, and in which they played a crucial catalytic role (Nicolaidis, D. 1992). While this process went on mostly during the first half of the 20th century, it is still on-going in regions where the co-existence of communities remains problematic (ex-Yugoslavia in the 1990s, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the Cyprus division after 1974, etc.).

As a result, even more so than in Europe, today's most meaningful identity reference for a large majority of people in the region is their national identity. The nation state remains the natural frame for the social and political life of most individuals living in either old or recent states. The multiculturalism of proto-national times is gone, and trans-national community building can not simply rest on *souvenirs*. Since, as it is commonly recognized, national identities are the product of conflicts about the same recurrent issue – drawing a line between the ins and the outs, the citizens and the aliens – national “imagined communities” have cultivated the collective memory of these tragic splits, albeit while denying their dark side. Each collective memory tells its own national tale, cherishing irreducible identity references that have evolved according to changing national realities.

If the main purpose of a “dialogue between cultures and civilizations” is to unearth the roots of the many conflicts around the Mediterranean, the partners must engage in a grand exercise of revisiting the past and the divisive memories therein. This has to be done in a way that helps reconfigure each community's identity in reference to its “significant others”, whereby instead of creating new transnational identities, collectivities learn to incorporate each other's identities. Indeed, this goal of founding a community on the basis of shared identities, rather than the construction of a common identity ought to characterise the EU project itself (Nicolaidis, K. 2004). The possible emergence of a single shared European identity is perhaps even more of a Utopia than that of Mediterranean one. Instead, and in both cases, a Community can only be progressively built through the mutual confrontation and accommodation of separate but intertwined identities.

The collective appropriation of memories, as the antidote to the instrumental use of a cold, stereotyped but legitimising past, can help people recognise the similarities between all the different national tales around the Mediterranean, and therefore close the gap between the national myths on which modern states were built. We could venture that greater awareness of the heterogeneity of their national community, would, in the long run, increase the self-confidence of these populations and strengthen the often fragile legitimacy of their state. In addition, the generalized recognition that exclusionary processes have long been a very common phenomenon, linked to the construction of modern nation states, would in turn greatly facilitate

the official acknowledgement of past “crimes” committed by or on behalf of the state, as well as by communities against one another. This process in turn could lead to the rediscovery of transnational or “twin” communities across boundaries, thus helping to create – or maybe recreate – a sense of shared experience, which is crucial to the kind of compatibility that ultimately underpins security communities. Why then is it so difficult to engage in such a process of recollection and therefore reconciliation?

The irony for the EMP is that the historical references that could underpin a sense of shared experience are *impossible references*: the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the colonization of the Arab world by the European powers. While intimately connected with the creation of modern nation states in the region, these references can not be openly used in a political context (Nicolaidis, D. 1997; see also Corm, 1989). Indeed, it is against these two phenomena that nation states were built, both concretely and symbolically, around the Mediterranean. How can a Serb recognize the fact that he still belongs, at the dawn of the 21st Century, to an Ottoman universe? How can it be sustainable for a Tunisian or a Syrian to accept the idea that the Turks and moreover the French have actually created the country called Tunisia or Syria? Mediterranean peoples need to learn that if they confront similar problems and perhaps share similar dreams today, this is to a great extent the result of a common past. This past does not date back to Phoenician or Arab trade, the mythical era of *Mare Nostrum* and its lingua franca, but to the recent past of the Ottoman era and the colonial era. In return, the European ex-colonial powers need to acknowledge more explicitly the fact that present relations with their Southern neighbors are conditioned by their colonial heritage. This includes both the continued effects of the structural changes introduced during colonial times and decolonization and the transformation of their own societies as a consequence of the immigration flow coming from the Mediterranean basin. Rebuilding ties among the people of the EuroMediterranean space requires uncovering this repressed knowledge and turning the subsequent emerging representation of the past into leverage for change in the present. We will come back in closing to concrete ideas on how to pursue such an agenda.

In the end, the two shores of the Mediterranean will understand each other all the better to the extent that their so-called partnership is about mutual enrichment from the confrontation of differences predicated on a sense of core compatibility, a sense that respective historical experiences make it possible to *listen* to one another. The detour through the history and memories of others is the key for each community to rediscover its own complexity and multiple heritages. Lack of recognition often results in social or political violence. Conversely, recognition of these multicultural compounds nested in the national DNA, of each community’s singularity, of shared experiences and of one’s responsibility in the struggle of others with their own self-identification, all represent steps toward the building of a pluralistic security community. Europeans bear a particular responsibility to engage on such a journey. If they want to appear credible in their quest for regional integration, they must systematically favor positive linkages to threats and generous use of symbols and gestures of recognition.

Beyond the Civilisational Rhetoric

It is not fortuitous that the strongest case made in this book for “sharing a civilisation” is made on behalf of Turkey. Heper reminds us of the way Atatürk had resolved the question of “Westernization” and the dilemma faced by the peoples of the Muslim world: either adopt the norms of the West/Europe in contradiction with their own traditional values, or turn their back to

modernization and preserving their identity. The founder of modern Turkey argued that all nations had contributed to what he called “*contemporary civilisation*” at one point or another, and thus made modernisation acceptable to its people. Inspired by Atatürk’s third way, Heper advocates a “cross-cultural” rather than “universalistic” strategy to bring people to “think that they have similar legacies with the people that up to now they have thought of as ‘the other’.” There is indeed a lot to learn from Turkey’s experience “between East and West” (its own version of the Mediterranean North-South divide). This is true not only for other Mediterranean Muslim countries, but also for a Europe seeking to mould “reluctant” Southern neighbours through the use of “normative power”. As they witness the fascinating bid by the only moderate Muslim government in the region to create a new political space in Turkey where experiment in the blending of modernity and Islam can take place, EU norm-setters and blueprint drafters must learn to learn from their neighbours.

Civilisation rhetoric, even when softened by the idea of a dialogue between the West and Islam, reinforces perceptions of a divide that fails to acknowledge the fact that today’s societies in the North and in the South are profoundly intermingled and that acculturation and convergence is not a one-way phenomenon. South Mediterranean societies may have been transformed by Western ways of life and values through linked structural processes such as urbanization and the creation of metropolis, mass education and middle class formation. At the same time, Mediterranean culture, from music, dance and architecture to *cuisine* and fashion, has deeply penetrated Northern Europe, gaining legitimacy, which was hard to imagine a few decades ago. And of course, immigration has profoundly modified social behaviors in European societies. As the recent EuroMed report argues:

“It is precisely when ‘civilizations’ are so much in contact with each other that they start to blend, and that the potential difference between them becomes problematic. This is not, then, so much a process of one civilisation forging ahead and the other lagging behind, but rather internal upheavals within each one, which, if they are on a large enough scale or last long enough, rapidly start to create a new area of civilisation, a process which repeats itself in an ongoing cycle. Nowhere is there more of a difference between ‘civilisations’ than within these areas. As soon as one leaves behind the ideological register of general categorisations, one discovers the profusion of differences, distinctions and oppositions of which every society is made up.”

In this sense, the double process of penetration and influence, from North to South and from South to North, has already given a certain coherence to the EuroMediterranean region, understood not as a material space but as a new dimension of the European construction with its own proper dynamic. Throughout the region, as in Italo Calvino’s *Invisible Cities*, interpersonal networks, cultural exchanges and comparative advantages come to draw crisscrossing lines while erasing definitive frontier between “us” and “them”. Thus, seen from Europe, “they” are not just outside neighbors; they have become “neighbors inside”.

From this perspective, to present the EU’s actions to promote change in the MNMCs as an effort to export universal values is akin to the civilizing mission legitimately perceived as neo-imperialist. Whatever the will of Europeans not to fall into a US-style hierarchical approach to cultural realities in the world, their respective concept of “universalism” is in fact quite identical. As much as the notion of “civilisation”, it is therefore the notion of “universalism” that, following Edward Said’s footsteps, should be questioned altogether. Universalism shouldn’t be conceived as an absolute human ideal that communities or peoples have yet to reach, but as emerging through horizontal relationship between peoples and their interdependent writing of their

respective narratives. Universalism thus understood becomes a means for transgressing existing boundaries and dominant power relations, since, based on this reading, power relations transcend geo-strategic realities and depend instead on the movement of people, on the transnational nature of beliefs, and on the de-territorialisation of conflicts (Said, 1993; see also Hentsch, 1988, and Bessis, 2001).

III. Towards a Post-Colonial Agenda?

The many prescriptive insights offered by this book could be summed up as variations on the theme of post-colonialism. A post-colonial agenda for the EuroMed process may be taken as an ambiguous reference, recognizing the colonial roots of the relationships involved and the deep structures inherited from colonialism as well as the need for all sides to invent and re-invent ways of building a regional reality together which may eventually transcend this inheritance. This of course is not easy. The EU, on its side, is caught between accusations of neo-colonialism and perceptions of ineffectiveness as it lacks the full panoply of instruments for action available to its member states. Meanwhile, most partner countries' governments preside over systems that are structurally the product of colonial times and cannot claim to represent their people. At the same time, the EU's current enlargement to the former satellite states of the Soviet Union contains the promise of a renewed approach on the part of countries which themselves are highly sensitive to the travails of hegemony. In short, a post-colonial agenda constitutes a call for taking seriously both the positive and negative potentials implied by the notion of normative power.

In this concluding part, we sketch out a few of the basic tenets for a post-colonial agenda along three dimensions: the relationship between the EuroMed region and the EU; the relationship between states and communities between and across the EuroMed and EU; and the meaning of the EuroMed experiment for the EU itself and for global politics.

Bringing the Mediterranean Back In: Shared Ownership, Empowerment and Ethics of Responsibility

At the heart of the colonial relationship lie patterns of dependence and domination both between the metropolis and its periphery and within the colonial territory itself. It is against this colonial paradigm that the Euro-Med process was initially symbolically designed on the principles of regional multilateralism and formal equality between states. Yet, it is hard to deny that the relationship established therein between the two shores of the Mediterranean is still one between object and subject. Thus, long-term Community building in the region requires not only creatively putting the original principle of multilateralism into practice but beyond, adding new dimensions to the EuroMed integration process, while at the same time taking into account the reasons to circumscribe such integration to post-colonial parameters. We see at least three complementary principles in this regard:

First, the need to respond to the repeated demands among those involved in the EMP for *shared ownership*, which is echoed in this book, can be translated into practice through greater *institutional autonomy* for the EMP, and through effective recentering away from Brussels. There are good reasons for running the EMP from Brussels. This is where the money and other "hard" resources emanate from and where mechanisms of accountability have been hounded. The EMP

in any case is a contract between democratic and non-democratic states which bribes the latter for accepting some interference in their affairs through the exercise of EU financial and normative power. In short, the principle of formal equality between partners cannot radically mitigate structural power asymmetries. But it can be progressively translated into a shift from the EMP as an EU “policy” to the EMP as a partially *autonomous* reality from EU itself, both institutionally and in terms of missions. This would involve moving its centre of gravity away from Brussels and, instead, creating joint institutional fora to be located on and around the Mediterranean Sea. To date, the Euro-Mediterranean Foundation is the only such forum, perhaps because policy makers think of culture as an innocuous subject. In the short term, it might be conceivable to decentralize implementing agencies in particular that have to do with the Mediterranean itself, from sustainable development to tourism.

To what extent can and should we envisage in the longer run such recentering from decentralised implementation to formulation of policies will depend on the maturation of the EMP more generally and on the domestic political agenda supporting it. Why not envisage the creation of a *Euro-Mediterranean Parliament*, whose original mission might not be strictly legislative but rather the promotion of democratic practices throughout the Euro-Mediterranean area? Eventually, the EMP should be supported by a jointly staffed secretariat and involve the greater participation in the running of meetings and decision making procedures of state administrations from the South. Why not then adopt for the EMP the same principle of *rotating presidency* which served the EU so well? In the EU context, the holding of the presidency on a periodical basis may have been the greatest contributor to the *Europeanization* of national administrations. This practice, which is characterized by dynamic learning-by-doing and *baptism of fire*, not only forces national bureaucracies to internalise the administrative cultures of their counterpart for the sake of successful bargaining, but also creates enormous incentives for the greater transparency of their own proceedings and better connections among their own disparate involvement with the EU. Obviously, the likely dynamic effects of a rotating presidency would very well be different in the EuroMed context of authoritarian regimes with little scope for autonomy for different parts of the state apparatus and for individual entrepreneurship. Nevertheless, it is conceivable that at least similar effects of “healthy” bureaucratic competition may deliver incremental increases in transparency and accountability in the South, which, albeit insufficient to qualify a regime as democratic nevertheless constitute essential components of democratic reform. As for EU member states such rotation specific to the EuroMed would mean that their presidency would not be hostage to other EU developments and would also contribute to focussing their efforts on the region. If socialization of domestic bureaucratic elites constitutes a basic avenue for political change in the region, a rotating Euro-Med presidency could have significant effect. Nothing could better symbolize the idea of shared ownership.

Obviously, even in such a de-centred context, this will remain a relationship between a Northern “tightly coupled pluralistic community” and atomized and dependant Southern countries. Building a sense of “we-ness” does not require actually equal “wes”. But it does require transcending distinctions between subject and object of power conveyed by the trappings of EU foreign policy making. An autonomous management of EuroMed institutions, with an internally defined agenda, would make explicit that such an agenda serves the priorities of the EuroMed rather than the EU *per se*. This approach would obviously raise a number of questions: what would an autonomous institutional set up actually look like? Given the financial implications, which authority would have ultimate control? What kind of relationship would exist between the different decision-making levels? What would be the conditions for the access to the

facilities offered by these EMP institutions? How would its efficiency be assessed and personnel renewal ensured? Finally, while there is little doubt that governments from the South would be happy with more control, should we assume that they also want more responsibility? If there are indeed fundamental structural limits to the reliance on authoritarian regimes for transnational community building, how should they be addressed?

If transnational integration is indeed to take place, we need to include a second principle for a post-national agenda, which underscores the necessity for greater autonomy of the social sphere *vis a vis* the state. This principle is to make *empowerment* of groups and individuals the benchmark of EMP action, a principle which moreover represents a reversal of colonial patterns of subjugation of societies. The example of the EU itself demonstrates how community building is not only about formal institutions. One of the earliest neo-functional insights about European integration was to underscore how *informal* integration, alongside formal inter-state integration, serves to support and deepen integration. This is achieved by linking people across borders who share specific objectives in the context of integration and who learn to work together in order to promote these objectives. To be sure, the earlier implications drawn from this argument – that these trans-border links would lead to transfer of loyalties to the supranational level and spill-over effects from one area of integration to the other – largely failed to materialize. And the EU is far from having become an integrated polity – a point to which we will come back below. Nevertheless, there is little doubt that EU integration and the costs of adjustments that it has required over the years on the part of different groups in society would not have been sustainable absent the trans-border mobilization of groups (from women to unions, minorities, human rights campaigners or consumer groups) whose relative domestic influence could be enhanced through EU action.

It could be argued that this logic is less relevant to the EMP, to the extent that it relies on the channelling of civil society demands through their respective states much more than directly through supranational institutions. At the same time, precisely the lack of democratic legitimacy of the state, combined with generalized suspicion of externally imposed schemes, makes a bottom up approach to trans-nationalism all the more necessary in the EMP context. This implies starting with, and giving greater prominence to, the so-called third basket, which deals with culture and civil society, singling it out for the kind of increased autonomy from the EU advocated above and magnifying its synergies with other areas. In short, it is not impossible to imagine that, as opposed to the EU, in the EMP context the *horizontal* opening of societies to each other may precede rather than be made possible by the *vertical* liberalizing of state-society relations.

That the cultural sphere should not remain the “*minor dimension*” of the Barcelona process, has definitely been brought home in the aftermath of 9/11, which has greatly politicized “culture” by making it an appendix of the clash – or indeed the dialogue – of civilization. This in any case was conveyed by the Valencia Summit six months after 9/11 through the inclusion of a new justice and home affairs component in the third ‘basket’ – thus promising to further ensure that political and cultural issues are dealt with in conjunction, both as part of a long term region-building project (Gillespie in this volume). Shouldn’t this logic be pushed even further? In the words of the EU high-level group, we should “allow the dialogue between peoples and cultures to inform the whole of Euro-Mediterranean relations and to give it that special quality which can humanise the impact of globalisation and the play of international relations within it.” As Adler and Crawford conclude “only Mediterranean people will determine in practice the meanings and content of their regional endeavour.” Already, dense social networks exist in the Mediterranean which can be mobilized, including in the economic realm, where one of the core issues is to help

in the connected development of Southern metropolis as hubs for the managed inclusion of these economies within the global economy. At the popular level, such transnational empowerment could be enhanced and symbolized by the support for the multiplication of EuroMed agora offering an open, transparent, and publicised arena for meetings connecting civil societies and politicians from the region, which would start publicizing this common framework.

Empowerment, in short, is not only about what the EU should do. It is also about how the populations across these states can empower each other. Ultimately, the value of such empowerment will be measured by the extent to which it is translated into the emergence of a Mediterranean citizenship (in the socio-political rather than legal sense), where citizenship is understood as being grounded in, and a means of, generating the key values of belonging, rights and participation (Bellamy, 2004). All these values suggest hard won equality between citizens unlike between colonised subjects: equality in identification with the collective space, equal entitlement to expressions of solidarity from the collectivities, and perhaps most importantly, at least in theory equal influence over the making of laws. The day citizens from participating states become aware of this equality benchmark *among* their society and start protesting about it can be counted as the turning point when such a citizenship has started to emerge. In the meanwhile, the European Commission can take small steps to create the beginning of such a competitive dynamic. Gillespie, for instance, describes the proposal that, in order to reinforce sub-state involvement, Commission delegations in partner countries organize workshops with civil society. But since this activity may not find favour with most national authorities, it will in itself help differentiate further the behaviour of North African governments in terms of their readiness to expand the political involvement of civil society domestically and transnationally – as reflected in part by the National Action Plans negotiated with neighbouring countries.

The adoption of these complementary principles of autonomy and empowerment in tandem, however, should not imply that the role of states will, or should, not remain central to this process. In fact, the viability of these principles is predicated on the promotion of a third principle, namely *the ethics of responsibility* to guide the actions of the EU and of states in this turbulent region. For one, an ethics of responsibility calls for a distinction between community-building, on one hand, and other EU practices that continue to explicitly exhibit – and for good reasons – subject/object relationships, on the other hand. Why not allow the EU a greater margin of manoeuvre to implement a differentiated amount of pressures and incentives across partner states instead of making such application of power hostage to the long term community-building project? Otherwise, contradictory pulls will continue to endanger any prospects for the former. As Gillespie for instance argues, “negative conditionality should be used only exceptionally (...) to signal to the populations of Mediterranean Partner countries that the EU is prepared to take a stand in defence of democratic values.” At the same time, he concedes that conditionality in general is likely to increase as the ‘wider Europe’ programme is developed.

Such a distinction between the EU and EMP spheres should, in turn, enhance the capacity of EU member states to act on their own in the region, when bilateral action and a state-to-state logic might be called for, rather than using the Barcelona process as a pretext for inaction. In short, genuine region building on one side could enhance the leverage of both the EU and member states towards the MNMCs. In addition, power must be exercised by member states in parallel and in concert with the EU. The EU cannot substitute for national diplomacy, especially on the part of countries like France, Britain, Greece and Italy. To be sure, it may be most desirable to see these countries act and speak in the region “in the name of the EU,” lending their own ties to EU normative powerhood, but such obligations of diplomatic mutuality ought to

remain fluid in the current political context. The EU should practice in its foreign policy realm what it advocates for others, that is, to learn to live with its internal differences and exploit its member states' comparative advantages (Nicolaidis, 2004b, and Nicolaidis 2004c). Often, individual member states can go much further in the purely political dimension of the relationship: France must continue to have its "Arab policy" while Sweden can be relied upon to lend all its weight to multilateral projects such as the Foundation.

Beyond Territory: a Community of overlapping communities

In the end, we believe, it is unlikely that a regional identity could be consciously constructed through political and institutional means alone but these can help create conditions under which other factors can emerge as constitutive. It is hard to imagine the construction of a region "from scratch". But the Mediterranean does not start from scratch. It exists in the imagination of many and represents for them in and of itself a source of shared meanings that needs to be tapped (Pace, 2003). It seems crucial however, if we ask about these shared meanings, to escape once and for all the trappings of the nation-state construct. Indeed, while there are fascinating debates on the determinant grounds for the construction of national identities – essentialist vs. functionalist, historical or political, etc. – one thing is certain: the sense of belonging in nation-states is rooted in territory. We believe that the promise of the EuroMediterranean idea lies precisely in this proposition: the construction of a non-territorialized region.

The EuroMed should not aspire to be yet another "bounded identity community," whose limits need to be defined as today's EU. Rather, it should be a process and an idea that, from the bottom-up, contribute in creating we-ness in an area of the world referred to as the EuroMediterranean region, but whose reality radiates well beyond the shores of this sea itself. Such a perspective is embedded in a broader call to move beyond territory in our understanding of international relations, not in the name of some unstoppable phenomenon of globalisation, but simply because there are many types of boundaries that matter, but which cannot simply be super-imposed (Ruggie, 1993). As Adler and Crawford state, referring to Calleya, "the new literature on regionalism no longer conceptualizes regions in terms of geographical contiguity, but rather in terms of purposeful social, political, cultural, and economic interaction among states which often (but not always) inhabit the same geographical space." This is especially true for the Mediterranean, where there exist many informal contacts between people that share the Mediterranean as a common reference but not necessarily as a living space. Region-building, if it is to escape the territorial logic, must be based on elements other than the state, such as informal networks of cooperation, value dialogue, and transnational networks of information and communication. They link together groups and individuals, who, while living in different social-political environments, have something to share. We advocated above partially taking the cultural realm out of state hands precisely because, in the Mediterranean context, the cultural realm has the greatest potential for taking us beyond the territorial logic and for creating a new kind of institutionalised community, polycentric and boundless.

Relying on the cultural foundation of the Mediterranean space, in other words, using the Mediterranean as a common reference on which to build a collective project is far from equivalent to the construction of a "Mediterranean identity", inevitably exclusive of the non-Mediterranean. Indeed, how could people from all the EU member states, from Dublin to Krakow, be engaged in the building of a EuroMediterranean region on the basis of a territorially defined identity? Instead, the shared motivation for this project must lie in the sense that the

EuroMed area is one where identities have long been intertwined and increasing mutually shaped. All European countries have become or are becoming Mediterranean through immigration, whose effects are magnified by historical links. The tradition of Germany or Great Britain's involvement in the Mediterranean for instance, is quite old in both cases, and countries like the Netherlands or Denmark are increasingly becoming multicultural and "Mediterranized". Of course, not all EU member states need to feel as concerned or as involved in the EMP process. And yet, precisely because North-Eastern EU members hold the least territorial vision of the Euro-Med, they may be best able to give real substance to the non-EU centred nature of the *EuroMed*. Thus, while recentering means for Italy moving institutions from Brussels to Naples, for a Swede it means moving them from Brussels to Alexandria. And beyond, Warsaw may better be attuned to the universal nature of the Mediterranean challenge, precisely because it sees it as one of political transition grounded in cultural foundations that transcend a particular space.

One way to make this view operational is to head Calleya's call in this volume for the EU to support regional sub-groupings in the region, simply because they draw on a different kind of "identity geographies" in the EuroMed landscape, including superposition of the East/West and the North/South axes. Furthermore, as pointed out by Gillespie, these sub-groupings do not even need to be grounded on a territorial basis, as shown by the "Agadir initiative" between Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt and Jordan (2001) or, more recently, by the free trade agreement between Morocco and Turkey (April 2004).

Although these coming together concern the economic sphere, they are obviously guided by resemblances in the social and/or political evolution of participating countries. Sociologically, internal divisions inside each country are much deeper than international ones. In this case, it is easier to find actual or potential "go-betweens" among the educated upper middle class of either the Northern or Southern countries, who partake in the same values and ways of life and are willing to also share in their differences. A Turk from the Egean Sea shore has probably more affinities with an Italian from the *Mezzogiorno* than with another Turk from East Anatolia. The latter may feel less comfortable in his new neighbourhood, after immigrating to Hamburg, than a fellow national from Istanbul, who is travelling to Munich for business. Such trans-national patterns of identification constitute the building blocks in the progressive consolidation of a Mediterranean region.

Perhaps most importantly, this transnational cultural approach to "community building" is the most promising response to the Europe/Muslim-Arab world dichotomist frame. First, it exhibits the value of multiple but overlapping cultures, transnational groups, and transient peoples. Second, bringing people together by means of the empowerment of disadvantaged groups or individuals, rather than on the basis of their national identity, acts as a counterpoint to the North/South reality of structural inequality. Take for instance, the Sephardic Jews living in Israel. While early supporters of Likud policies in the regional context, their domestic status as a socially and economically dominated group and their continued attachment to their "Oriental" homelands and cultures, gives them an important potential role in bringing together people across states who have much to share in terms of past experiences, ways of life or even ways of referring to tradition and religion. In the same vein, immigration networks, especially from the second generation, already help to reduce the cultural gap between their country of origin and their host country and could be empowered to do so more broadly and systematically. Descendants of refugees who have been victims of expulsions or ethnic cleansings, whether Greeks from Asia Minor or Turks from Macedonia, Muslim Bosnians from Banja Luka or Serbs from Osijek, Palestinians from Jaffa or Jews from Iraq, must be encouraged to revisit the way they perceive

“the other” by confronting their mutual memories and experiences, thus potentially becoming new “go-betweens” in their local micro-cosmos. Needless to say, Balkan countries (not yet part of the EMP) ought to be brought in as soon as possible in this “community building” process.

Concretely, the newly created Foundation on the dialogue of cultures is well placed to support practices promoting this kind of collective learning processes. As the first and only institution to have been created as part of the EMP process, it is poised to serve as a regional catalyst for a movement of multi-faceted recognition of overlapping identities in the region, both through the empowerment of civil society actors and through state channels. Indeed the principle of *mutuality* or *mutual recognition*, which interprets and gives concrete expression to the search for compatibility among our differences, is crucial to the legitimacy of the entire learning process.

One possible early initiative that could be taken by the Foundation in this spirit could be called “the project on shared memories” – an initiative that would consist in uncovering current expressions of the past as reflections of communities’ shared roots, in particular, through the gathering of individual and collective testimonies from those who experienced the schisms and conflicts that accompanied the consolidation of nations in the region. Such testimonies would constitute the basis for analyzing similar historical realities across nations and therefore for highlighting the existence of transnational Mediterranean identities. These testimonies could then be broadcasted to the populations of these regions, along with the shaping and diffusion of a new discourse on the part of academics, intellectuals, school teachers, and artists, who then could start giving substance to the emerging notion that Mediterranean people are linked by shared traumas, fractures, and denials, and that they may be able to transcend them by confronting them together.

We must stress, however, that we do not see such a *travail de mémoire* to be promoted through the EuroMed framework, as bypassing the state, on the contrary. States in the region have a crucial role to play here as agents of recognition, that is by giving official recognition to the hardships inflicted on dominated communities by dominating states and communities. In many cases, symbolic acts and institutions at the state level give visibility and legitimacy to sub-state interactions. Such considerations are crucial if a regional process of mutual recognition is to be translated into political capital for the sake of further integration in EMP functional fields, such as security, economics, and the environment. Recognition by governments that sub-national communities may also be part of transnational communities will in turn go a long way to support the notion that these communities matter in the relationship between Europe and the Mediterranean as a whole. In both spaces, transversal identity pattern overlap with national identities and other infra- or supra-national identities.

In sum, the relationship goes both ways: the consolidation of dense networks among transnational cultural communities gives substance to state-to-state and region-to-region relationships, and, in turn, the involvement of states in the “management of meaning” gives *gravitas* to the process itself. Indeed, the spirit of mutual recognition ought not only to pervade the process of dealing with history and culture, but also, as Gillespie argues in the context of democracy promotion, ought to migrate to the issues of “values” underpinning political reform. Shared historical narrative can in turn help make visible the shared aspirations of the people doing the sharing and help replace political values – such as liberalism, pluralism and even democracy – in a proper comparative historical context for the societies concerned, while blending them with local cultural realities. In Gillespie’s words: “liberalism should be promoted to the extent of pursuing a joint commitment to effective pluralist structures, not as a preordained and comprehensive set of common values around which Euro-Mediterranean convergence must

take place. In practical terms this would involve a common search for types of political reform and institutional structures capable of embracing both religious and secular liberal values.” Short of such a blending of values, democracy will continue to be robbed of more democrats in the region (Salamé, 1994). Why should Mediterranean societies still living under authoritarian regime not go through the same growing pains of modernity as other societies before them, with the inevitable regressions and patterns of resistance? Why should the external institutions meant to nurture this spirit of modernity and to empower local groups that defend it, not reflect these groups’ very own reckoning with religion, history and politics?

Back to Europe: the Mediterranean as a laboratory

What then does this all mean for the EU itself? Part of our message here has been that the EuroMed must be seen not as an extension of the EU model to its neighbourhood but rather as an alternative, albeit overlapping, “community building” project. If, as Bicchi puts it, “the attempt at conceptualising the Mediterranean as a region flows from member states having conceptualised themselves as a region within the EU,” such an attempt is unlikely to succeed. Instead the EU must accept that it is not necessarily the laboratory for the Mediterranean region and that the EuroMed pertains to a different logic.

Is that the whole story? Such a statement assumes that whether or not the EU is itself an unabated product of the territorial logic, its essential character is uncontested. Debates over a new Constitution and the prospect of referenda, continued scepticism over the EU’s democratic credentials, and the collective soul searching provoked by the “Turkey question” all show us the contrary, that the EU has been struggling with the challenge of how to give substance to its political community. One may actually argue that in essence, the EU is an association of the peoples of Europe, a *demoi-cracy* in the making, a federal union of nation states, rather than a federal state (Nicolaidis, 2004a). The principles of constitutional tolerance and mutual recognition between states are at the heart of the European project (Nicolaidis and Howse, 2001).

Of course, a significant fraction of public and elite opinion in the EU is far from having embraced such a vision. Alternative statist paradigms of integration, embraced by sovereignists or supranationalists – are in fact dominant. But the new Constitution in many ways is a step in the self representation as *demoi-cracy*. From it we ought to infer that the EU is an exercise in the sharing of identities rather than in the merger into a single European identity. Such an exercise of course should be open to the world and socialize Europeans into recognizing “the other” whether fellow European or non-European. It should lead to accept the principle of mutual inclusiveness in each other’s policy, not only *vis a vis* other Europeans, such as the EU practices today, but also *vis a vis* partners, such as those from the EuroMed. We are far from living in such a world.

In the meanwhile, and simply to provoke further thinking, we may for once try to inverse the EU’s self-aggrandising proposition of serving as a model for the rest of the world. What if the EuroMed process could one day, in some subtle way, serve as a laboratory for the EU, a laboratory for new forms of mutual recognition of in deep conflict prone settings? What if it could be a laboratory for the honing of overlapping identities binding together groups and individuals? And beyond Europe and the EU, what if one day, the EuroMed experience came to inspire a different, truly universal, kind of international politics?

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The reader will forgive us for concluding on a very concrete note, an idea close to our heart and inspired by the very first meeting of the contributors to this project in San Francisco. Why not literally *construct* a capital for the Mediterranean region that would host its meetings, serve as the focal point for its cultural events and serve as a visible symbolic embodiment of the idea of a future EuroMed community? Why not situate it *in* the Mediterranean itself, but neither in Malta nor in Cyprus since, with EU accession, the two islands have now forfeited their “in-between” status? In fact, why not free the capital from territory altogether and make it a ship of course? And why not share this ship among the many overlapping communities of the region by having it journey around the Mediterranean, anchoring every six months in a new harbour? Why not make it the expression of the human and social roots of this region by having it attract every time it departs from its temporary anchor a great *pan-EuroMed* festival exhibiting the arts and folklores of all the peoples and communities that would recognize themselves in it? And why not in between these twice-yearly events, have it serve as a European agora, both for some of the numerous official or para-official meetings which support the EMP and for more spontaneous citizen events. Its name? *Mare Nostrum* of course.

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