Who has never tasted Kir Royal, an elixir that combines Champagne and the French liquor Cassis de Dijon?¹ The European law story told in this chapter, starts from the shocking fact that until 1979 not a soul had been allowed to experience the joys of Kir on German soil. It is a story that has been told countless times, although differently by lawyers and political scientists. For Euro-Kir not only comes in differently shaped bottles (Court decisions, Council-EP decisions, Commission communication and single country regulations), it also comes in shades of red. Political scientists tend to see the bottles, legal scholars the subtle variation in shades. The former focus on the balance between free movement and local safeguards, market integration and regulation, the European economic constitution and state autonomy— and in between, many degrees of equivalence and subtle assessments of proportionality.² Political science, on the other hand, asks about the before and after, the role of politics in legal judgments and vice versa—the why and the so what? Of course, the ‘so what’ feeds back into the ‘why’ as the European Court of Justice (ECJ) considers the plausible institutional alternatives to its own decisions, and the ways in which the jurisprudence can be translated into laws. This conversation between lawyers and political scientists is what Miguel Maduro and Loïc Azulai sought to capture in their 2010 book. This current volume in turn brings together historians of law who can best capture the dance between these two worlds as

¹ This chapter is an updated version (2016) of a prior publication (2010) including new material on the single market jurisprudence, the European arrest warrant, the European Asylum Policy and TTIP. See “Kir Forever? The Journey of a Political Scientist in the landscape of recognition”, in Maduro and Azulai, eds, The Past and Future of EU Law: The Classics of EU Law Revisited on the 50th Anniversary of the Rome Treaty Hart Publishing, 2010. I would like to thank Rachna Kapur for her invaluable input on this updated version as well as the editors of this volume for their comments.

² Since the first version of this chapter was written, Christine Janssens published an impressive review of the jurisprudence which starts by citing Kir Forever. See Janssens, C. The Principle of Mutual Recognition in EU law, OUP, 2013.
analyzed by Joseph H. Weiler in 1991.³

In this chapter I ask: how did a judgment about a liquor end up changing the European constitutional order? And after almost four decades, have the expectations created by the groundbreaking 1979 ECJ ruling been fulfilled?

My recounting of the legacy of *Cassis de Dijon* seen through an impressionist account of its ripple effects in the political sphere puts perhaps more emphasis on the legacy than the genesis of the case.¹ But I hope that my use of a personal venture points as a heuristic can provide an interesting variation for legal scholars and historians concerned as the editors of this volume are with the embedded-ness of Europe’s jurisprudential saga. I proceed one decade at a time, with my own journey in the landscape of mutual recognition, moving from the Single Market to Justice and refugees, to transatlantic affairs: *Cassis in Action* (1980s), *Cassis Fever* (1990s), *Cassis on Trial* (2000s); *Cassis Stress Tests* (2010s) and *Cassis across the Seas* (2015). I conclude with some reflections on European democratic politics.

*Cassis in Action* (1980s): Founding Myth, Conspiracy and Revolution

We are in 1989. Is it too grand to believe that mutual recognition will be the future not only of regional integration but also of multilateralism?⁵ When I recently asked Lord Cockfield, Commissioner for the internal market, what he considered the greatest achievement of his career, he answered without a beat: to have exported *Cassis* from the European Court of Justice and goods to the single market Europe 1992 program. Indeed, there are many like him in the Commission who seem to believe that without *Cassis* and the aura of legitimacy it lent to their ‘new approach’, they would not have been able to pull through the legal coup spelled out in Cockfield’s White Paper as endorsed by Member States through Delors’ Single Act only three years ago. An EU without *Cassis* may have had to endure a loss of several points of GDP growth, otherwise known as the ‘cost of non-Europe’.⁶

Well, that might be true, but the *Cassis* story as it is told in the shadow of the Europe 1992 project rests on a number of widely held myths which end up obscuring the true import of this famous case.

First myth, the *Cassis* judgment itself is not quite what the pan-*Cassis* rhetoric would lead us to believe. True the facts of the case seem strikingly straightforward: the blackcurrant liqueur produced in France as Crème de cassis had been banned from Germany because it contained 15% to 20% alcohol by volume, and German law stipulated that products sold as fruit liqueur had to contain at least 25% alcohol by volume - leading the German Ministry of Finance to advise Rewe that it could not market Cassis in Germany. The ECJ not only held that this could be considered “a measure having an effect equivalent to a quantitative restriction on imports” of the type banned by Article 30, but it also took it upon itself to spell out its thinking in more general terms, what would come to be

⁴ Case120/78 Rewe Zentral AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein [1979] ECR 649.
⁶ 1988 Checchini Report on the “cost of non-Europe” as an incentive for the completion of the single market.
referred to as a principle of equivalence: “There is therefore no valid reason why, provided that they have been lawfully produced and marketed in one of the member states, alcoholic beverages should not be introduced into any other member state.” Nowhere in the judgment does it call this a duty of mutual recognition. But the message is clear.\footnote{Clear except for a complication at the outset with regard to the notion of equivalence. As the attentive reader will note, equivalence in the legal lexicon refers to two different things. On one hand “equivalent effect” between a regulatory measure X, and a quantitative measure Y (both presumably taken in the host state); and “(functional) equivalence” between that measure X (in the host state) and measures Y (in the home state) that underpin the “lawfully produced and marketed”. The two equivalences are not of course equivalent, but it is a finding of the first that leads to an assessment of the second.}

What the pan-Cassis rhetoric forgets to say however, is that Cassis was not only about casting the net of Article 34 TFEU more widely (after all, this had been done earlier in Dassonville), but most importantly, it was about widening the Article 36 TFEU holes in the net through which fishy state regulations would be able to escape the rigors of liberalization. Indeed, the judgment started by explaining very clearly that “obstacles to movement within the Community resulting from disparities between the national laws …. must be accepted in so far as those provisions may be recognized as being necessary in order to satisfy mandatory requirements relating in particular to the effectiveness of fiscal supervision, the protection of public health, the fairness of commercial transactions and the defence of the consumer.” In short, an open-ended list of ‘mandatory requirements’ covering the public interest would have to be examined before considering home rules as equivalent to host rules and therefore host rules as equivalent to quotas. It was only because the (German) requirements relating to the minimum alcohol content of alcoholic beverages did not “serve a purpose which is in the general interest” (lowering alcohol consumption), that it was OK to bypass them. Here is the reasoning: 1) non discriminatory (or “indistinctly applicable”) measures can favour domestic traders over importers; 2) This does not imply that they are obstacle free movement; 3) they can be justified if they satisfied mandatory requirements; 4) to assess that we need a Rule of Reason whereby the court performs a proportionality exercise to determine whether the effects of the national legislation on the free movement of goods is justified in light of that legislation’s stated goals.

This leads us to the second myth. Cockfield’s white paper peddles the myth that Cassis ‘introduced’ mutual recognition in the EC legal landscape. Well, of course lawyers know that the real radical breakthrough came in 1972 with Dassonville, in which the court had to decide once again what was meant by the Treaty of Rome’s summary statement “Quantitative restrictions on imports and all measures having equivalent effect shall, without prejudice to the following provisions, be prohibited between Member States” (Article 30). At the time, it boldly struck down a Belgian provision (requiring that imported goods bearing a designation of origin be accompanied by a certificate of origin) with a sweeping approach: “all measures with an equivalent effect to quotas” were to be struck down! This was already and much more radically than Cassis in terms of results, an obligation of recognition. But it did not enunciate mutual recognition, and was in fact set aside as too bold. In this sense, Cassis was not a continuation but a break from Dassonville, which sought to impose an obstacles-based approach to national regulation, whereby all national rules are potentially subject to an assessment of illegality.
More to the point, mutual recognition can be found in the Treaty of Rome itself, referring to the mutual recognition of diploma, a task finally tackled seriously this year with the general system directive. Indeed, the whole philosophy was defended with great passion by Ralph Dahrendorf, who was able to make limited progress in applying mutual recognition in the professions when he became Commissioner in 1974.

Third myth, the gap is even wider between the pan-Cassis rhetoric and the actual ECJ jurisprudence of the last ten years when reviewing MEQRs (Measures equivalent to a quantitative restriction) under Article 34 and then Article 56 TFEU for services. Take one of my favorites, the Woodworking machines decision.\(^8\) French workers will not have the privilege of using those automated German machines built for their better-trained counterparts across the Rhine. Simply put, the characteristics of the machines themselves combined with the respective training systems are simply not equivalent. This is wise if the judges do not relish the prospect of receiving a finger in the mail! As for services, not a modicum of liberalization has survived the tests of mandatory requirements and the rule of reason. Even in the insurance decision three years ago,\(^9\) the judges felt that recognition could be applied to non-mass risk but shied away from doing it themselves. Of course, they know that even businesses cannot always read the fine print in their insurance contracts. Indeed, the Court has stepped back from the recognition abyss even in the beverage and foods department, as with cheese additives (Nisin) banned by the Dutch.\(^10\) No matter that most Europeans, indeed most human beings, while they delight in very different tastes, find the same poisons poisonous. Even then, different publics, consumers, societies might accept different levels of risk. And when the Court did strike with a duty of recognition—it did often enough to ensure the free movement of beer, butter, oil and pasta—not everyone was happy.\(^11\) ‘Ah, I cannot recognize as pasta anything which comes so gluey out of the pot,’ a well-loved Italian ECJ judge confided in me the other day. Ultimate recognition lies in the eye of the beholder—or in this case in his stomach. After all, the ECJ is involved in a continual reshaping of the legal-constitutional landscape to keep the law abreast with social change.

Since 1986, the media coverage of the EC and the single market has increased by orders of magnitude, along with the mentions of Cassis in the popular press, but no one seems to have noticed these discrepancies. Why? How did we get here?

A first part of the answer lies with the strategic triangular relation between the Commission, the ECJ and the national court that was taking shape in the 1970s.\(^12\) Indeed, as the story goes, the 1974 oil crisis led states to resort to various kinds of hidden or regulatory protectionism and Germany, in particular, had been very resistant to the bypass of its national laws in the name of free trade.\(^13\) Thus it was becoming increasingly clear that attempts at Euro-wide harmonization of product and services standards were a losing battle. As a result, the idea of mutual recognition instead of market regulation through Community law was becoming increasingly attractive. By 1978-79 the Commission was fishing around for a case like Cassis, and when it found it, it worked.

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\(^8\) ECJ, Case 188/84 Type approval for woodworking machines [1986] ECR 419
\(^9\) Judgment of the Court of 4 December 1986, Commission v Germany, Case 205/84
\(^10\) ECJ Case 53/80, ECR 409
\(^11\) See inter alia the so called “Beer purity law” case, Case 178/84,
\(^12\) See John Temple Lang chapter in this volume
closely with the plaintiffs to bring this case forward, with some confidence that the ECJ would oblige when faced with such an egregious German protection.14

No wonder, then, that as soon as the Court issued its verdict, the Commission was ready in turn to issue a communication on its implications beyond alcoholic products, suggesting a detailed game plan that would generalize the judgment to most regulated goods, including through an information and consultation procedure between national regulators and legislators.15 From our 1989 venture point, in the space of ten years this crucial 1979 Commission communication seems to have been all but forgotten. As a providential single market genius, Lord Cockfield has “(re) discovered” the Cassis judgment. We can legitimately infer that the initial conspiracy worked including as a conspiracy of silence—myths cannot afford to lose their innocence.

To be sure the Court had been engaged since the 1960s in an incremental “constitutionalisation of the treaties” which gave Cassis its full import.16 It is because of direct effect of the Treaties that the Court was able to force the import of the French liquor on German soil without the need to wait for legislation. And the Commission’s legal services had been working hand in hand with the Court to give effect to the principle on the ground. But it is also true that the 1979 communication would not have led to the single market program without two crucial intervening factors, namely growing lobbying for the “Cassis approach” on the part of the businesses and importers, and the push towards market liberalization by the likes of the British government led by Margaret Thatcher.

To be sure, the Court’s cautious jurisprudence, even after Cassis, is not surprising: the Court is in the business of putting forward principles, testing how acceptable they might be politically, and passing the buck to the political process when it comes to generalizing them. Its power lies with its blueprints, not with binding pronouncement and judicial fiat. The question then is not why the Court has shied away from extending ‘recognition of equivalence’ to a wide array of cases beyond Cassis, but how were Cockfield and his friends able to use Cassis in spite of the subsequent record, as if this was a matter of choosing a new bottle and not of exploring shades of red.

The reason is simple. Like all enterprises calling for individual sacrifice in the name of a collective, the new single market program required its galvanizing founding myth. Cassis happily obliged. The court provided single market warriors with a single formula, a motto easy to understand—all ... products lawfully produced and marketed ... must be recognized as equivalent. Freedom has always been a good rallying cry, no matter the full story about “mandatory requirements”, “public interest” and “the rule of reason”. Founding myths are about agreeing on what to forget.

In short, taken together, the Commission’s 1979 communication and 1986 White Paper


16 See Bill Davies and Ann Boerger chapter in this volume
simply took the ECJ Cassis decision to its ultimate logic in both scope and depth:

1) **Scope:** Generalizing it in three directions: from alcoholic products to all products, from underlying standards to the authorities entitled to authorize or stamp them, and crucially, from goods to services.

2) **Depth:** Turning this judicial principle of ‘recognition of equivalence’ into a legislative-political principle of ‘mutual recognition’. When turned into a political principle, Cassis obviously continues to imply an assessment of equivalence between home and host countries’ rules, but the word “equivalence”, and thus the strictly legal constraint, is removed. Recognition becomes a political judgment, which does not necessarily need to be made on a careful case-by-case basis, but can be predicated on a host of other factors like trust, solidarity, proximity, political mood, linkage politics, paternalism . . .

Brilliant! Why did Member States buy this? Apparently a majority of them did not even like the Cassis judgment in the first place, let alone this dual extension as engineered by the Commission. Whether designed in advance or improvised step by step, strategy there is. More visibly and strategically than Dassonville, Cassis introduces (or “uncovered” depending on your legal school of thought) constitutional limits to state intervention beyond the bounds of “intended discrimination”. Europe 1992 then sets these limits into legislative stone through majority voting!

Political scientists have it all wrong when they say that mutual recognition was one of several options available out there, and that with Cassis the Court provided a new focal point for legislators. False. In fact, there are no other options. The question is not which but whether. In most instances of regulated goods or services, mutual recognition is the only game in town for effective free movement short of harmonization: if national treatment - in other words host country standards- impedes free movement, the only alternative is home country standards. And when it comes to the need to do away with host country certification (as opposed to the underlying standards), even harmonization is not an alternative to mutual recognition—unless of course the EU was to be one regulatory authority doing certification at the center, a goal neither desirable nor feasible.\(^\text{17}\)

They also have it wrong when they explain the turn to mutual recognition as a choice for the ‘easy option,’ easier than harmonization. To be sure, it might take longer to come up with a common standard on the height of lights in the back of trucks (this is the classic story of the 1970s stalemate) but once it is done, citizens live with a regulation to which their government of the day as well as their favorite lobby contributed. Under mutual recognition, citizens must live with regulations adopted in other polities, polities in which they have no say. In democratic terms such horizontal transfer of sovereignty is a much more radical option than a vertical one.

And of course if we move from static to a dynamic analysis, the picture is even starker. How will national regulators, their political master and their market clients react to this new state of affairs? Will such competition between rules rather than products only significantly affect the ways rules are designed in the first place? How will regulators and legislators reconcile the contradictory pulls between competitiveness or cost effects of

high standards – which could lead to a race to the bottom - and their reputational effects – which could lead to a race to the top? Clearly, every mutual recognition deal seems to be predicated on opposite predictions about such effects on the part of politicians. The Thatchers of this world believe that it will help them export deregulation. The Mitterrands and Kohls tend to believe that it will induce re-regulation. Analysts of regulatory competition are starting to build models, which argue the usual: it depends.

Whatever the case may be, it seems as though the myth has become a self-fulfilling prophecy. The hype seems warranted, as Cassis has truly proved to spell the start of a revolution in European affairs. Thanks to the supranational conspiracy uniting the Court, the Commission, and big business, it has set off a revolution in decision makers’ thinking about market integration that simply cannot be stopped. Yet, my prediction today in 1989 for what it is worth is that such radical horizontal transfer of sovereignty between states is highly conflictual and will not happen without serious resistance.18

Cassis Fever (1990s): The Era of Managed Mutual Recognition

We are in 1999. In the last 10 years, old questions have been clarified while new ones have arisen. Clearly, the progress made towards a single market in services through the White Paper directives owes a lot to the adoption of mutual recognition as a guiding core principle. And there has been no blatant ‘race to the bottom’, and even in so cases a ‘race to the top.’ It has become clear, in other words, that mutual recognition does not necessarily mean deregulation.

But resistance there has been! Indeed, when I asked in 1989 why did the Member States buy it, I identified the wrong ‘it’. What Member States have imported from the Court’s Cassis jurisprudence has had little to do with the mere extension of the Cassis formula (“all products…must be recognized as equivalent”) to other products and services, an outcome which we can call ‘pure recognition’ (considering the labeling requirement as de facto not a costly adaptation). Instead, Member States see the costs of pure recognition as simply too high. They have therefore taken in the entire Cassis judgment as well as the rest of the “rule of reason” jurisprudence with all its caveats and “yes, buts” and translated it in law. This process of translation is fascinating. Instead of ‘pure’ recognition, they have adopted a highly politicized version of recognition involving complex sets of rules and procedures that may serve precisely to reduce, if not eliminate, the open-endedness of mutual recognition. This I have called managed mutual recognition.

I came to the concept of managed mutual recognition from analyzing not only single market directives in services but also the attempts by the EU to export Cassis beyond its borders. As an outcome, managed mutual recognition can be contrasted with ‘pure’ mutual recognition in the same sense as managed trade can be contrasted with absolute free trade. Pure mutual recognition implies the granting of fully unconditional and open-ended rights of access (or of action) to private market agents in their dealings with the consumer protected in the host state. This would be considered the result of a free trade contract between states. In contrast, managed mutual recognition introduces conditionality in the contract. Accordingly, the four main dimensions along which mutual recognition can be managed or fine-tuned are:

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1) Prior conditions for equivalence, from de facto convergence, to minimal harmonisation to inter-institutional agreements;

2) Varying degrees of automaticity of access (for example, residual host country requirements for lawyers such as entry exams or training period in the host state);

3) Scope of activities or features covered by recognition (say company risk but not mass risks in insurance).

4) Ex post guarantees or safeguards, including mutual monitoring and ultimately provisions for reversibility.

On this basis, managed mutual recognition can be viewed in a static or a dynamic manner. Statically, variation along each of these dimensions can be seen to indicate how far parties have travelled down the road to full recognition. Dynamically, the management of mutual recognition can be viewed as a process, involving trade-offs between these dimensions that may change over time. In short, with managed mutual recognition, the burden of co-operation is shifted in time from ex ante to ex post costs, so that liberalization can appear to occur immediately, while it will need to be managed to be sustainable. I have come to believe that a better understanding of these trade-offs and their dynamic adaptation over time is key to reaching agreements on mutual recognition in the first place.

Clearly then, ‘managed’ mutual recognition belongs to the political, not the judicial sphere. Nevertheless, it deeply bears the marks of the Court’s footprints. Even when deciding not to strike down a given state regulation as an obstacle to free movement, the shapes the alternatives. What are the building blocks of this translation exercise?

1) Prior conditions: First, it is the Court which traces the frontier, or what I call the “equivalence threshold”, beyond which it cannot decree recognition by judicial fiat and beyond which political decisions will be necessary in order to ensure free movement on the basis of a home country rule. The Court also makes clear that such political action might not necessarily be harmonization or centralized regulation.

2) Automaticity of access: When it finds in favor of recognition, the Court does not necessarily decree unconditional access. Instead it often limits automaticity through its favorite condition; adequate labeling. The common-sensical principle of proportionality leads the judge to strike down the application of some blunt host state standard only to turn around and suggest another “more proportional one”. The legislator in turn has a wider palette at its disposal to limit automaticity and has the luxury to lay out what such ‘residual host country controls’ (or residual national treatment) may look like.

3) Scope of application: The ECJ judges my find that they need to draw the line. For some product or service they can play the game of proportionality and for some they can’t: host country control will have to stay until the legislator intervenes. Such careful delineation of scope can inspire the legislator either through sequencing (we apply mutual recognition first to where the ECJ said it was more warranted), or through outright separating where recognition will apply and where it won’t.

4) Ex-post safeguards: Even after mutual recognition is imposed through a court judgment, the court can always revisit similar cases and find that home country regulation is no longer satisfactory (‘equivalent’) to assuage the concerns of the host country. On this count, the legislator does not have to leave it to chance. Built-in mutual monitoring, or mutual spying, is the name of the game.
While it is important to analyze the role of the rulings of the ECJ in the European story of mutual recognition, and how the conversation between the ECJ and domestic Courts played out through preliminary references, it is also true that all the Court could do when it came to designing this more sophisticated understanding of the principle was to provide a roadmap for politicians and technical experts later crafting legislation. Only by migrating from the judicial to the legislative arena is it possible to spell out the full panoply of instruments for the management of recognition. For instance, the distinction made in the first, second and third generation insurance directives between types of consumers that could or could not withstand the logic of mutual recognition was an instance of political translation of the Court’s jurisprudence. The Court had not imposed judicial recognition but pointed to the possibility of using this distinction to reduce the initial scope of recognition and introduce it in a progressive manner; or take the 1996 directive on the posting of workers—the line drawn between home and host country jurisdiction is a direct reading of the jurisprudence. If and when the political arena generates a demand for effective liberalization, the Commission takes the politicians at their word, in fact ‘upping the ante’ by proposing a radical generalization of the Court’s approach to complete the single market, which is after all what the political masters are asking for. But during the properly political process of bargaining, a winning coalition of Member States succeeds in watering down the extent of horizontal transfer of sovereignty in order to make liberalization politically acceptable.

Indeed, the Court is all the more relevant when we understand the legacy of Cassis as that of managed recognition. When generalized through the legislative process, most of the ECJ jurisprudence post-Cassis translates as managed recognition, not pure recognition, whereby recognition is not an alternative to national treatment and harmonization but an overarching principle, which retains residual host country control (eg. national treatment) and residual harmonization.

XX Cut till end of this part?

This political backdrop of the 1990s in turn sheds light on the subsequent Court jurisprudence governing Article 34 TFEU on Measures equivalent to quantitative restrictions (MEQRs). The debate has continued over whether the Court should apply a lenient non-discrimination test or a more constraining balancing test to national measures. To be sure, even when apparently restricting decisions to an anti-discrimination test, the Court always weighs costs against benefits and balances between the desirability of centralization versus decentralization, deregulation versus sustained regulation. Such balancing tests might lean towards a decentralized approach (as opposed to harmonization) and yet determine that national treatment (or a pure anti-discrimination test) does not suffice to ensure free trade; the judges might point to the need for sustained regulation in a given sector but assess a home country approach to be sufficient, if the necessary safeguards are taken. In both cases, the Court may call for mutual recognition through legislation while stopping short of its judicial imposition. In other words, since negotiators have taken these matters in hand, the ECJ does not set out the limits of mutual recognition but the limits of its own role in bringing it about.

19 Supra fn 10.

20 See Maduro, 1998 We the Court, Donald H. Regan, ‘The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause’, 84 Michigan Law Review 1091 (1986); This reasoning is often compared to the US dormant commerce clause but while this one is mainly concerned with protectionism in the proportionality balancing the ECJ managed to insert a multiplicity of other interests and of course mandatory interests. For a fascinating comparative overview See Egan, Michelle. Single Markets: Economic Integration in Europe and the United States. OUP Oxford, 2014.
Maduro argues that Member States should be able to make different policy judgments. What we should not permit is that they ignore out-of-state interests in the making of those judgments. Others like Regan argue that the same result can be obtained from a fair representation of all domestic interests, as proxies for the under-represented interests from the outside. Whatever the benchmark, however, this normative view calls for a certain approach to recognition in the spirit of Cassis: a recognition managed by state regulators themselves but policed by the Commission, the Court, consumers and services providers alike.

Keck and Mithouard, a 1993 judgment duly considered as Cassis’ heir in the vast jurisprudence on MEQRs, is illustrative of such a deferential approach.21 Fourteen years after Cassis and the same year as the alleged “completion” of the Single Market, the Court felt it necessary to remind everyone that traders were not to abuse Cassis and invoke article 34 of the TFEU on the drop of a hat in order to challenge any national rule whose effect was to limit their commercial freedom. In Keck, the defendant wanted to be exempt from a French law prohibiting resale at a loss, or the resale of unaltered products at prices lower than the actual purchase price. Intent on “clarifying” its position, the Court stated that (non-discriminatory) measures creating an equal burden for nationals from the country in question would not be caught by the wide net of liberalisation through recognition of equivalence – clearly no resale-at-loss rules in the home country were not the same as the existence of such rules in the host country! Even if Keck only concerned the marketing of product - the so-called “selling arrangement” exception- the case was critical in narrowing Cassis to “product requirements” and rebalancing it away from the most extreme implications of Dassonville.22

Throughout the 90s, managed mutual recognition has become the name of the game in the field of services, whether through residual host country control (professions), reduced scope (finance) or ex-post monitoring (media). In the field of goods, it has led not only to the new approach and agreement on minimal standards as prior condition, but also to the global approach whereby certification bodies throughout Europe can sustain recognition without undue fear of lowered standards thanks to an extensive process of mutual monitoring—mutual spying, as I like to say. In spite of these collaborative networks between certifiers, recognition has been far from automatic in many instances.

This is a forciorti true when mutual recognition has been exported beyond the EU through mutual recognition agreements (MRAs) signed with countries like Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Israel, the US or Switzerland. Even though in this external realm recognition is restricted it to certification (through the certification of Conformity Assessment Bodies), rather than recognition of the underlying standards, it has been highly “managed”. It should come as no surprise that the negotiations over the EU-US MRAs, signed in 1999, were particularly tough, for instance stopping short of denying the FDA (Federal Drugs Agency) its right of residual control over pharmaceuticals even if only at the last stages of the approval process.23 And transatlantic MRAs have simply

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23 See Egan and Nicolaidis, "Regional Policy Externality and Market Governance: Why Recognize Foreign Standards?" in Journal Of European Public Policy, August 2001
floundered when it comes to services.

At the global (WTO) level, under TBT (technical barriers to trade) and GATS (the services agreement) recognition is optional and conditional, not subject to MFN, and has been cumbersome to apply. Non-discriminatory mutual recognition could appear as an oxymoron to the non-legally trained eye. Perhaps in order to counter the natural inertia of regulators and their resistance to any trade-induced assault on their autonomy, the OECD trade directorate—which has appointed me as their ‘mutual recognition expert’—has launched a multi-year program on the promotion of trade-friendly regulatory reform around the world. Fascinating to see attempts at the liberalization of professional services meet resistance to horizontal approaches, precisely because each believes their particularities require a specific approach to managing recognition, from fiddling with acceptable titles to the need for additional training, adaptation periods and the like. Yet, what is a ‘trade-friendly’ regulatory reform if not one where modes and avenues for recognizing foreign standards and actors are embedded in the very process of drafting law?

Cassis on Trial (2000s): Polish Plumbers, Italian Motorists, and Swedish Jet Skiers

We are in 2009. This time around Cassis has truly been invoked in vain. If the recourse to mutual recognition has long been wrongly considered by scholars of law and politics as a ‘path of least resistance’, we can no longer doubt its highly contentious character. Twenty years after Lord Cockfield, another liberal Commissioner, Fritz Bolkestein considered the export of mutual recognition to the realm of all services trade worthy of a personal crusade. But contrast to 20 years ago, mutual recognition has not been hailed as the magic bullet but has been put on trial along with Polish plumbers and Polish butchers seeking temporary work in France and Germany, or Baltic workers in Scandinavian countries. To the extent that they are ‘posted workers’ they do need to comply with host state laws (under the posted workers directive of 1996) but it is not clear what happens if they fall outside this kind of status as with the infamous Laval case enforcing the application of home rules which has given mutual recognition a very bad name with workers.

To be sure, the public hysteria and PR disaster spurred by the Commission’s “Frankenstein” directive can be attributed to many factors, including the propensity of some trade unions to play up their members’ fears of globalization and unfair competition in order to resist the perfidious “neo-liberal” recognition principle. Moreover, the radical enlargement of the EU may well have lowered the ‘mutual recognition tolerance threshold’ while at the same time increasing the social, economic and regulatory diversity of the Union. The problem of course is that many workers from these new Member States are eager to take advantage of the EU’s free movement rules work under home country state of mind and work habits as well as home rules, leading to face to face social dumping whereby workers operating under different constraints

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25 In the Laval judgment, the ECJ states that a Latvian company, Laval, which posted workers to Sweden, is not required to adhere to the collective agreement within the Swedish construction industry.
nevertheless interact within the same work environment.\textsuperscript{26}

But given these factors, the Commission made a crucial mistake: to depart from its experience with managed mutual recognition discussed above and to press for a radical form of recognition across the board. It should have been clear by now to Brussels law drafters that a blanket application of home country jurisdiction is not faithful to the \textit{Cassis} spirit. Under the Court’s jurisprudence, recognition was a conditional process and did not have the either-or character of the country-of-origin principle. In fact, the final draft that emerged from the European Parliament’s negotiations amounts to endorsing the Court’s jurisprudence, prescribing the usual proportionality and necessity tests for host country rules—a glass half full for advocates of a cautious and progressive approach to liberalization, but half empty for those who believed that, 50 years after the Treaty of Rome, political actors could afford to take a bolder step than judges. To a highly disgruntled EU legal community, the simple elimination of the principle of “mutual recognition” by the European Parliament appeared as a public pillorying of \textit{Cassis}. And yet, and at least, by issuing a clear political endorsement of the Court’s \textit{Cassis} jurisprudence, the services directive succeeded in bringing EU services consumers closer than ever to the \textit{Kir} fans of yesteryear.

While the ball was in the political court this decade, the ECJ Court continued to scrutinize both services regulations and MEQRs throughout the 2000s.

On the services side, it has made clear that the very existence of national restrictions were not in question, only their added value in regulatory terms and the extent to which they create “additional administrative and economic burdens.”\textsuperscript{27} So for instance, a requirement for social security documents from the home state to be translated into the host state language amounts to a wrongful denial of recognition but not the translation of a promotional text into the languages spoken where the service is sold.

On the products side, perhaps most prominently in this decade, the Court dealt with differences in national “rules on use” of certain products which in effect may amount to non recognition of home rules if these rules are left to the host country’s discretion.\textsuperscript{28} In \textit{Commission v. Portugal}, a company was allowed to market tinted window film in Portugal but national rules barred consumers from affixing it to the wind screens alongside the passenger seats in motor vehicles, a restriction justified by the aim of combating crime and ensuring road safety. The Court followed the Commission in its view that Portugal had not produced any evidence to show that the measure was either necessary or proportionate to the objectives pursued. And to be fair, Portugal was in the process of relaxing the rule anyway.

In contrast, in \textit{Italy vs Commission}, an Italian highway code came under attack that made it unlawful for motorcycles to tow trailers, essentially prohibiting the use of such types of trailers. This time, the Court came back to \textit{Keck} and first asked the Member States to give their opinion on whether the same idea (eg that host country rules on selling arrangements were in principle outside the scope of the prohibition of MEQRs) should

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\textsuperscript{26} Kalypso Nicolaidis and Suzanne Schmidt (2007) “Mutual recognition 'on trial': the long road to services liberalization”, w/ Susanne Schmidt \textit{Journal of European Public Policy}, 14:5, 717-734, August.

\textsuperscript{27} Paid leave fund (C-490/04) [2007] E.C.R. I-6095 at [68].

be extended to rules on the actual use of products. Many countries opined: a bit of ring fencing off regulatory sovereignty was not a bad thing in these difficult political times. The ECJ disagreed. In this particular case, it held that the restriction on the use of motorcycle trailers did fall under the broad net of Article 34 TFEU because consumers, knowing that they are not permitted to use their motorcycle with a trailer specially designed for it would have no interest in buying such a trailer (just like tinted film in Portugal). But this time around (unlike Portugal) the restriction was justified on the grounds of road safety. A bemused commentator quipped that it might be more effective for safety’s sake to inform motorists in Rome that those pretty red, yellow and green lights are not just decorative but seek to convey some driving instruction!

Finally in Mickelsson, Sweden’s rule laying down that jet-skis could only be used on "general navigable waterways" came under scrutiny since he latter are relatively few and very busy with commercial traffic thus basically outlawing the actual use of jet-skis. As with the Italian case, the ECJ refused to go against the Swedish coast guard service which had charged the plaintiffs for violating the Swedish Jet Ski regulations, finding the ban could be justified in the light of the aim of protecting the environment. Moreover, it was for the national court to make this determination, a classic deferential move by the ECJ.

So here again – as with the rest of the decade’s decisions - we are back to Casis’ two pronged approach: a broad net catches most national measures as liable for Court scrutiny, but a broad allowances are carved out to allow them. In all three cases, the Commission was not asked have to prove exactly why and how it was that, as a result of the host state rules, products from other Member States end up with a disadvantage, only that national measures were liable to have this effect. And while the burden of proof is born by the host state which must give an objective justification, it does not seem overly onerous. The Court tends to oblige.

Nevertheless, legal scholars do not seem satisfied by the consistency of the Court’s jurisprudence noting that “in the overwhelming majority of free movement judgments, the Court is working on a legal instinct, on a pragmatic sense of logic, maybe even on something as amorphous as a gut-feeling.” In other words, “we are approaching the unhappy position where, just as in the pre-Keck era, national courts are understandably baffled as to exactly what is expected of them when faced by speculative claims that national measures infringe Art [34].”

And yet, to the (admittedly superficial) political scientist, there seems to be a method to this madness. First, as the Court never tires of explaining, the Treaty aims at an internal market across states in which conditions are similar to those of a single market where operators can move freely, not at a market without any rules at all. Second, this implies that “mutual recognition” is always conditional on some protection afforded by the home state’s regulations that can be recognized in the first place. If there is nothing to be recognized in the first place there is no point in the aim of “avoiding a dual burden.” The regulatory “discount” granted to the exporter can be full or partial depending on the extent to which the aims of the host Member State’s legislation and controls have already been achieved by those applied in the home state. Proportionality assessment is applied

29 N. Nic Shuibhne, ann. to C-76/05 in (2008) 45 C.M.L. Rev. 771, 783.
to the host states’ measures. Third, in the absence of such home regulation, the requirements of the host State apply without such a “discount” and we are back to national treatment. With each step, the devil is in the detail and in particular who bears the burden of proof between the host state justifying its measure or the exporter justifying its complaint. Makes sense.

Nota

There are nevertheless conceptual debates that do matter. One in particular concerns the meaning of concepts themselves ("recognition" vs "equivalence" vs "country of origin") and the problem of translation from the judicial to legislative meaning and from the realm of law to that of politics. As we saw with the “polish plumber” saga, these matter beyond the rarefied (albeit fascinating) debate within the legal profession.

First, the political prominence of the services directive raises the question: what is the relationship between mutual recognition and the country of origin principle? In the run up to the 2005 French referendum on the Constitutional treaty, simply to utter support for the principle ‘du pays d’origine’ in Paris’ streets or highbrow intellectual circles alike was enough to have one excommunicated to the burning hell of heartless neo-liberalism. Trust me, I was there. Indeed, pollsters reckon that this principle, perceived as synonymous with social dumping and race to the bottom, was in part responsible for the no vote the by the French electorate. And yet of course the principle had been around for a while when it was made infamous by the “polish plumber” saga. In the field of finance, it was referred to as “single european passport” whereby banks came to be under the sole supervision of their home country. In terms of legal doctrine, it can be argued that the two do belong to different logics: country of origin is a conflict rule attributing competences a priori, while with mutual recognition the competence stays with the host state but the later is obliged to be “other-regarding” in the extent to which it applies its own regulations. This is precisely the point of “mutuality” – host states are all asked to compare their regulations rather than engage in a positive attribution of competence to the member state of origin. And yet, the amalgam is understandable in terms of results, since the country of origin principle is simply the equivalent of “pure” mutual recognition whereby regulatory authority is wholly transferred to the home state, irrespective of that state’s regulation. At least in order to continue to understand the public acceptability of mutual recognition, it matters to ask what is the ultimate locus of sovereignty.

Second, what is the relationship between mutual recognition and the principle of equivalence? Cassis is grounded on the idea that how a liquor is lawfully produced and marketed in one of the member state can be assumed to be equivalent to that of the importing state. Equivalence is decreed by virtue of EU membership. Can we say then that mutual recognition is simply the logical consequence of the principle of equivalence? This has been a hotly debated question in legal scholarship but is of course also highly political. If it was the case that the judges, and especially ECJ judges, were prone to impose mutual recognition in spite of lack of equivalence, they ought to be criticised as ayatollahs of free movement or free trade. If on the other hand, they failed to find in favour of mutual recognition, in spite of equivalence between national rules, they could be attacked as betraying the spirit of free movement. Now of course, whether or not such and such national rules are actually equivalent is itself a matter of controversy. But the issue here is

32 For an excellent discussion see Christine Janssens, op.cit.
33 Ibid, p 39
not whether rules are properly and rightly found equivalent between two or more member states but whether the *equivalence test* in and of itself is a necessary part and prerequisite of an assessment pertaining to mutual recognition.

It is hard to find any judgment that is not, at least implicitly, grounded on an assessment of equivalence. And when it comes to legislative translation then, it can be argued that the member states engage in an overall assessment of equivalence as a prior to agreeing on the contours of managed mutual recognition. What varies across judgements as well as laws is what we could call the equivalence threshold or mutual recognition threshold. The term “equivalence” is of course rather ambiguous in common parlance. What is clear, however, is that it does not refer to sameness or even similarity. It has instead a functional connotation - “achieving the same function” - which is why the exercise has been referred as *functional parallelism.* Functional equivalence amounts to arguing that there exists alternative means to fulfil the same ends –eg less restrictive of trade. A state must recognise regulations that provide equivalent guarantees but the duty stops at recognising rules enacted to pursue different objectives. When Weiler bemoans that “the court preaches the rhetoric of mutual recognition but practices functional parallelism,” he is ascribing a more ambitious meaning for mutual recognition, akin to some degree of recognition of the validity of these different objectives rather than of their equivalence – something we can refer to as a kind of blind trust. And indeed, politicians can get into that mode too, recognising their respective systems instead of differences in ends, but that is unlikely. In fact, there are always tyrannical small differences and whether we refer to them as ends or means is itself often a matter of convention. In the end, some German consumers will be misled by the labelling on Kir. The ECJ decides on a case-by-case basis whether we can live with the difference in question. And lawmakers can do so more boldly.

Finally, there seems to be some confusion among legal scholars as to the referent of “equivalence”. Thus for instance, Janssen argues that in the area of public health care, “instead of imposing a duty of mutual recognition in cases of equivalence [ie a duty to reimburse people for public health services accessed abroad] the ECJ appears to draw the opposite conclusion – that is that the duty arises if an equivalent treatment cannot be obtained in the patient’s country.” But is the Court really that inconsistent? In fact, there is no inconsistency if we understand “equivalence” to refer not to the specific national measures/treatment but to the system within which they are embedded and which each member state seeks to protect according to its own notion of public interest. In this perspective, we need to understand the context in a different way: the host state is as always that of the consumer/patient/citizen and the one asked to do the recognizing. The fact that the patient physically moves to the state of the service provider does not change the fact that the latter is the home state of this provider. The state asked to pay for the service is in effect the virtual host of the service provider which is subcontracted to provide a specific medical act. The equivalence in question then can be understood as “equivalent to the host state providing the health service” and such equivalence is the case only if there is no redundancy (or equivalence) with a similar service in the state which will ultimately pay for the service. In the end, a multilateral system of mutual recognition seems more likely than a rules-based system.

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35 Ibid.

36 Janssen, op.cit. p 36
recognition is only sustainable if it respects the integrity of each state legal, regulatory and welfare system.

Cassis Stress Tests (2010s): Trust, Criminals and Refugees

We are in 2015. In the summer of 2015, European publics were suddenly invited to the very visible and tragic human side of the recognition saga. Refugees from Syria and elsewhere were risking their lives in despair to knock at Europe’s door, but no one seemed to know if this door was the only point of entry, or the first of many. If Greek officials grant a refugee stamp to someone in Lesbos or Athens, will this stamp become a “single refugee passport”, recognized here, recognized everywhere in Europe? What happens to the principle of recognition when dealing with individuals moving around Europe for a purpose other than selling or buying goods and services? Liberal minded readers might not approve of lumping refugees with alleged criminals, since the point of international laws is precisely that refugees are not criminals! Yet for the purpose of this story, criminals and refugees belong to the same over-arching category of non-single market expressions of Cassis – from criminal justice to asylum law. Both categories raise the same question in terms of “equivalence”: is your human rights protection as good as mine? And if not, should I care?

European police and judicial bodies have long asked their political masters to help them better deal with the bad guys. Indeed, the principle of ne bis in idem, otherwise known as double jeopardy, contained in the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement in 1985 and which implies that a person ought not to be prosecuted more than once for the same act, opened the way for mutual recognition in criminal affairs. But it was not until October 1999 that the European Council decided at its Tempere Summit that ‘the principle of mutual recognition should become the cornerstone of judicial cooperation in both civil and criminal matters within the EU’. Twenty years after Cassis, what was proclaimed a ‘new’ strategy was in reality a complex exercise in translation from the single market to the justice realm.37

As a result, Schengen obligations have been interpreted as a duty of mutual recognition by the ECJ since 2001 whereby criminal authorities have been required to recognize each other’s criminal decisions and in effect each other’s criminal law provisions and prosecutorial policy.38 But it was the state of emergency that followed 9/11 that dramatically imposed recognition upon the transnational extradition regime. Within a few weeks of the Twin Towers’ collapse, EU leaders passed a framework decision on the European Arrest Warrant (EAW) whereby if a “home country” requests the arrest of someone who happens to be caught in another member state (a kind of involuntary “host country”), the warrant has to be recognized by the host (with caveats of course). Indeed, an EAW issued in one Member State is valid in all of them. And the warrant needs to be respected by the whole chain of criminal decision -from the police to national courts – involved in criminal matters (including financial matters and money laundering which were dealt with separately).

Unsurprisingly for Cassis-aficionados, the criminal justice world has had to face the same kind of challenges than custom officers in the good old days of Cassis-bans. What happens when the (“host”) state receiving the request is not truly confident in the

37 For a thorough appraisal see Janssens, op.cit
38 Gozentok and Brugge Cases. See Janssens, op.cit. p 134-166
requester’s criminal procedures? What if that state is asked to pursue or prosecute a 
criminal for a crime that does not even exist in its own laws? The core problem here is 
that the EAW was not adopted following a long period of mutual familiarization, 
convergence of national systems and ultimately trust building between national criminal 
justice agents. Instead, in the frenzy following 9/11, the rules of recognition pertaining to 
arrest warrants assumed trust rather then built it over time as had been the case for the 
single market.

What does the EU do in this case? Well, we do know what it has done with goods and 
services when having to accelerate the completion of the single market in spite of 
national regulators not being quite “ready”. In the absence of prior convergence, EU 
lawmakers fine tuned variants of managed mutual recognition, allowing for safeguards to 
make up for the wide judicial discrepancies at hand. First, the scope of the EAW has 
been circumscribed. The EAW allows the issuance of an arrest warrant on the basis of 
one of 32 outlined crimes leading to a dual EU criminal system: one for the bad guys 
where mutual recognition applies, and one for the even worse guys (e.g. murderers and 
rapists) where it does not. In addition, we have EU-level cooperation for major crimes 
affecting all Member States (such as terrorism, drug trafficking, human trafficking, and 
organized crime). Importantly, the host is not obliged to recognize the warrant 
automatically. Its authorities can assess whether the country requesting extradition truly 
appli es the “same acts” and, if not, invoke mandatory grounds for non-execution. 
Member States have used this right often– whether they have abused it of course a 
matter for Court judgment.

In light of the inevitable disputes that have ensued, the ECJ has initially been reluctant to 
give in to the “host state” that refuses to implement mutual recognition. Take for 
instance the Mantello case concerning the German authorities’ refusal to surrender a Mr 
Gaetano Mantello to the Italian judicial authorities who issued the arrest warrant.39 Yes, 
the Germans argued, he was a member of an organized cross-border narcotic trafficking 
ring between Italy and Germany, but he could not be sent back on the principle of ne bis 
in Idem. The ECJ did not agree, stating that it is the Member State in which the 
judgement is delivered that determines whether or not a person has been finally judged.40 
Nevertheless, five years later, the German Constitutional Court forcefully reiterated its 
right to protect Germany’s constitutional identity guaranteed by the Basic Law, asserting 
that the principle of individual guilt was simply “not open to European integration.” 41 It 
forcefully refused to comply with an Italian request to extradite an American sentenced 
in absentia 22 years earlier who under Italian law would not be able to provide new 
evidence in the appeals proceedings. The Court reasserted that “the principle of mutual 
trust does not apply without limits even according to Union law” and that “this trust is 
shaken if there are factual indications that the requirements that are absolutely essential 
for the protection of human dignity will not be met if the requested person is extradited.”

Negotiated extraterritoriality comes with its own challenges.42 Even while functional 
pressures call for transferring sovereignty away from host states in both realms of the

39 Mantello ECLI:EU:C:2010:683
40 See Mantello case for instance. Judge Sinisa Rodin, Useful Effect of the Framework Decision on the 
European Arrest Warrant, Page 12.
42 For a discussion see contributions in JEPP special issue on democratization, Journal of European Public 
single market and justice, their reluctance to do so may be heightened when protecting human rights rather than consumer rights and when the recognition in question involves the full foregoing of jurisdiction over the freedom of citizens. If a Polish engineer wants to get into Britain (host), Britain must recognize her home rule in order to let her in; if a British citizen has committed a crime in Poland, recognizing “home” rule (the home of the crime) means kicking her out of Britain, although she has not yet be proven guilty. Mutual recognition is liberal in the market realm, illiberal in the justice realm. To be sure, the ECJ restated in its Mantello judgment that the national courts are bound by the guarantees of European law and fundamental rights standards when exercising judicial control relating to the EAW. But whose standards are we talking about? Should the principle of mutual recognition mean extraterritoriality without safety net?

The EAW raises the fundamental question yet again: When are the costs of managing diversity through horizontal transfers of sovereignty and mutual recognition too high? The political answer seems obvious: when gains in integration are too small compared to their costs (in this case, the comfort level of European publics on the human rights front). This in turn rests on a second part of the answer: when socio-political-regulatory differences are too high – in other words, when there is no true equivalence. When the Commission criticizes Member States for their “abuse” of safeguards, their public opinions may ask: what other recourse is there if a judge mistrusts the standards of another EU country for issuing an arrest warrant?

We are on even more sensitive ground when it comes to refugees. It is one thing to trust other countries with their standards for healthy cheese, perhaps even for potential criminals, but should the same logic apply for the most vulnerable persons on European soil, namely asylum seekers? It is important to note that under the incomplete Common European Asylum System (CEAS) agreed as part of the 2009 Lisbon Treaty, member states recognise only negative asylum decisions, not positive ones. The Orban government says no to 90% of applications for asylum, the rest of Europe must bow. If it says yes, the refugee will not be recognized as such elsewhere in Europe and thus has to stay in Hungary. The European Asylum regime goes back to 1990 Dublin Convention (revisited in 2003 and 2013), which dealt with determining the state responsible in Europe for processing asylum application but unfortunately did not consider mutual recognition as part of the system. The 2013 Dublin III Regulation in turn establishes a hierarchy of criteria of responsibility for processing asylum claims leading to so called “Dublin returns” when refugees are sent back to their country of entry. As Cathryn Costello aptly concludes, “Member States use mutual recognition as a selective tool, to limit responsibility, rather than to share it.”

Presumably this would make it more difficult to recognize a positive asylum decision in the future. For example, if a person is denied asylum in one Member State and returns to another MS say two years later and receives asylum, she would not be given asylum recognition in all the other Member States. In the wake of the Syrian refugee crisis, some

44 Id., page 13.
46 Cathryn Costello, Dublin-case NS/ME: Finally, an End to Blind Trust Across the EU?, 2 A&M 83, 90 (2012)
Member States, Germany and the Czech Republic, decided to suspend application of the regulation in order to process asylum applications themselves. Conversely, Hungary and Poland announced their continued adherence to the Dublin regulation. Italy has called for a full amendment to the Dublin regulation by changing the competence to examine asylum applications from the Member States where the asylum seekers enter to the country where they would eventually like to end up. The Commission has called for a reevaluation of the Dublin system by mid-2016.

In the meanwhile, the ECJ has had to pronounce on the current system including regarding the exercise of what is colloquially known as the ‘sovereignty clause,’ which allows states to derogate from the point of entry allocation of responsibility system. In the ground breaking NS/ME case, the ECJ was asked whether (under this negative recognition premise) transfers of asylum seekers back to the original country of entrance can nevertheless be barred under the Dublin regulation if the standards for refugee protection in the state in question are not satisfactory. After all, under the Dublin Regulation all Member States are meant to operate under the assumption that they share the same asylum scheme and enforce similar conditions in their respective processing centers. Nevertheless, in this case and other subsequent ones, the ECJ ruled that Member States and national courts cannot transfer asylum seekers where they “cannot be unaware that systemic deficiencies in the asylum procedure and in the reception conditions of asylum seekers in that Member State amount to substantial grounds for believing that the asylum seeker would face a real risk of being subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 4 of the Charter.” While this ruling assumes that although mutual recognition is the core basis of the CEAS, we are yet again in the realm of “managed” mutual recognition whereby is right and proper for the Court not to require blind trust. Not only can a host Member State withhold the duty to recognize if the conditions found in the country of return exhibit “systemic deficiencies” but there is even a “duty not to return” under such conditions. Here again blind trust cannot trump fundamental rights. The principle of mutual confidence must remain an aspiration not an assumption.

In the absence of a single EU agency administering asylum decisions, something that Member States are not likely to agree to anytime soon, what is a ‘uniform status … valid throughout the Union’ if not a system of positive mutual recognition? We are again faced with a fundamental tension between functional need for applying mutual recognition in emergency situations and the fear among Member States of relinquish their sovereign prerogative to control the movement of people across borders.

Cassis across the Seas (2015): Exporting Mutual Recognition

Today- The negotiators involved in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) discussions which have taken place since the 2013 seem to have forgotten the lessons of the late 1990s, when the EU and the US tried to export mutual recognition to the transatlantic realm (see Cassis Fever, 1990s, above). The lead up to the MRAs agreed

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48 Id. at para. 94.
49 Costello, op. cit.
50 ibid
to in 1999 demonstrated how challenging mutual recognition could be between such different regulatory cultures and institutions.\textsuperscript{51}

This time around, mutual recognition is not stated as the core norm of the system but is implied under the broader umbrella of international regulatory cooperation. The Commission referred to mutual recognition for chemicals (to dismiss it), and in textile labelling (to embrace it). And it defends continued expansion of recognition of inspection in the case of, for example, medical devices or ...oysters. It is true that mega-regional trade agreements can take stock of the growth of international standard setting over the past couple of decades since the first generation MRAs. And yet, Europeans do understand that, short of full harmonisation, mutual recognition is the name of the game when we speak of “regulatory cooperation.” What else would a “regulatory cooperation body” be for, beyond exchanging information? When considering the trade hindering effect of regulatory duplication, US negotiators say they want a “negative list” approach (measures not listed are fair game), but being less familiar with the workings of mutual recognition than their EU counterparts, they seem to also try to impose their own regulatory approach in the process! Other government would do better, US negotiators argue, to adopt a US own style of over-arching regulatory oversight (such as notice-and-comment rulemaking) through the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA).\textsuperscript{52} There is a lot of talk about selecting best practices, experimental governance, mutual learning, global policy laboratory and the democratic accountability of these processes. But it would be foolish to rely on the convergence between, say, ex-ante vs ex-post approaches to regulating markets between EU and US types of capitalism. What else can the parties do but negotiate the contours about “managed mutual recognition”? Isn’t it a sign of the times that, in February 2016 the parties did come to an agreement to apply mutual recognition to clearing-houses for financial derivatives, reckoned to be worth $553 trillion worldwide?

\textit{Cassis in Spirit: Europe as a Democratic Politics}

What would EU law have been without \textit{Cassis}? Indeed, what would the EU be without \textit{Cassis}? In the late 1970s, at a time when the EC was ripe for a new approach that would deliver the completion of a market promised 20 years earlier, I believe there would have been another similar case, sooner or later. Perhaps the greatest irony today is that while questioned in the single market area, the spirit of \textit{Cassis} thrives elsewhere. For one, we are witnessing an extension of the principle of mutual recognition to the realm of justice and home affairs, in other words the acceptance by judges and police forces throughout Europe of each other’s procedures and judgments. To be sure, ‘wanted in one EU country, wanted everywhere in the EU’ does not sound as liberal as its \textit{Cassis} forbear and we do not yet have refugees ‘admitted here, admitted everywhere’. But the time will come. In the meanwhile we must live with the ‘rejected here, rejected everywhere’.

More generally, however, we are increasingly confronted with the democratic ramifications of mutual recognition. I have defined elsewhere the EU as a demoi-cracy in


\textsuperscript{52} See Nicola Op.cit.
the making – a union of peoples who govern together but not as one. The demoi-cratic credentials of recognition depend on the institutional foundations of mutual trust bolstered by mutual monitoring and on the belief that national adjustment is often more sustainable through changed incentive structures rather than bargaining over set preferences. To generalize, the demoi-cratic quality of the EU’s various integration methods not only hinges on their domestic democratic anchoring but also on the capacity of individual demoi to compensate for cross-national asymmetries of power when they decide. In a Union where mutual recognition has been adopted as a core operating principle we need to continue to ask how its reach and limits are designed and when should judge made law give way to politics.

Indeed, before the Eurozone crisis, an (idealized) European vision was becoming increasingly realistic which understood the enterprise as a one of intertwined polities, open to each other’s soft influences and hard laws, and bound together not by some overarching sense of common identity or peoplehood but by the daily practice of mutual recognition of identities, histories and social contracts. To live in such a European ‘democracy’ would mean living with our differences and seeking to harmonize if and only if such differences are illegitimate in the eyes of either one of the parties involved. It means continuing to explore the many meanings and ramifications of “other-regarding” legal processes, carefully refined over time by the European Court, its national counterparts, and EU legislators. Unfortunately, the Euro-crisis has demonstrated the limits of such naïve reliance on domestic legal and political philosophy capable of internalizing the concerns of others.

Recognition is a tough call on all sides of the political spectrum. The left fears social dumping when recognition means importing market rules; libertarians fear political dumping when recognition means importing, say, curbs on free speech. Even if these fears can be exploited, they must be assuaged through respecting the spirit of Cassis, that of managed mutual recognition. Ultimately, however, they must be transcended if we are to live in Europe and in the world as a community of others, in Weiler's inspired formula.


54 Nicolaidis ”Trusting the Poles? Constructing Europe through mutual recognition”, Journal of European Public Policy, 14:5, 682-698, August 2007