the Middle East becomes more important as a source of oil. For example, due to higher production costs outside the Middle East, it could stop being commercially viable for many companies outside the Gulf to produce crude oil. This, in turn, would mean that more of the oil that is consumed would actually come from the Middle East.

In conclusion, much has been written about the world’s energy resources, but only a few books have been able to link energy realities to geopolitics. *Windfall* provides an important corrective to conventional wisdom on foreign and energy policies—and shows how the US can take full advantage of the new energy landscape. Thus O’Sullivan shows that by looking at both foreign policy and energy markets, businesses will make better investment decisions and policy-makers will make better strategic decisions.

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**Europe**


The prospect of Brexit has already spawned a number of instant books by academics as well as journalists. Most will probably prove ephemeral. However, the two books under review are much better than most and are, mercifully, jargon-free and unpretentious. *Brexit and British politics*, written by Geoffrey Evans, a psephologist, and Anand Menon, a political scientist, charts the impact of the 2016 referendum and the 2017 general election. Its conclusion is that, while the election seemed to restore the two-party system in the United Kingdom, that system is now based less on class and more on education and age. Moreover, a new electoral cleavage has developed which is dividing cultural liberals from cultural conservatives. This cleavage was clearly in evidence during the referendum and runs through both of the major parties. Around 58 per cent of Conservatives voted for Brexit, despite the business and financial community—which forms the backbone of the party—being strongly opposed to it. The Labour Party was in favour of Britain remaining in European Union, but many of its working-class supporters were not and thus around 37 per cent of its voters supported Brexit.

‘The referendum’, Evans and Menon conclude, has ‘opened the divisions in British society like bleeding sores’ (p. 115). It has divided families and friends, sometimes very seriously. In fact, a survey by the relationship charity Relate found that one-fifth of their 300 counsellors had worked with clients arguing over Brexit’ (p. 115). These findings are of course of more than parochial interest, since the cleavage between cultural liberals and cultural conservatives is almost certainly replicated in other advanced democracies.

*Brexit and beyond* seeks to analyse Brexit from an EU as well as from a British perspective. For Brexit is not just a problem for the UK, but ‘the latest in a long line of existential crises’ to have beset the EU (p. 2). The 28 chapters seek to chart the consequences for the EU, the eurozone, the EU’s democracy and legitimacy as well as for the member states most affected—Germany, France and Ireland. No common view emerges; although the contributors are in general sceptical of the value of referendums—wrongly, in my view—most believe that Brexit will damage both Britain and the EU, and all agree that the EU is in trouble. Most of the chapters are of high quality and repay detailed reflection.

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But why did the UK make the decision for Brexit? Andrew Glencross argues that it is too simplistic to conclude that it was simply a rejection of neo-liberalism, a viewpoint which serves only to confirm ‘the comforting premise of social-democracy: the belief that politics trumps economics and that the inequities of capitalism can be corrected eventually once voters have had enough of market-driven solutions’ (p. 24). ‘Dissatisfaction with Europe is not’, Glencross believes, ‘reducible to an accounting exercise’ and nor can voters be frightened into accepting that the EU is ‘their inescapable destiny’ (p. 24). Instead, as Luuk van Middelaar insists, ‘identity politics trump economic interest’ (p. 82) and the gradual integration of the EU combined with the financial crisis of 2008 has given an enormous stimulus to the forces of nationalism and protectionism.

Brexit is not, of course, the only crisis faced by the EU. For instance, Neill Nugent outlines ‘four main headline crises: the Eurozone, migration, governance crises, and the crisis of rising Euroscepticism’ (p. 55). Brexit was an instance of the fourth crisis: a popular revolt against an establishment that had—so it was believed—stopped listening to the people. Of course, there have been similar revolts in many, if not most, of the other member states of the EU. Brexit, therefore, is merely—in Chris Bickerton’s words—‘the tip of the populist iceberg’ (p. 132). The other three crises were vital contributing factors towards Brexit. The eurozone crisis showed that the common currency was leading to economic disruption rather than convergence, while the democratic deficit has long been a favourite trope of Eurosceptic opinion. Most of all perhaps, migration—confused in Britain with free movement—gave concrete substance to the view that EU membership had undermined British sovereignty since it prevented parliament from limiting EU immigration. Indeed, the refugee crisis seemed to show that the EU’s Schengen system is unable to secure control of its internal and its external borders.

Donald Tusk has argued that Brexit should be a wake-up call for the EU, which needs to take a ‘long hard look at itself and listen to the British warning signal’. A few of the contributors to Brexit and beyond believe that this long hard look will prompt further integration. But few of the member states seem prepared to sacrifice any more of their sovereignty. Germany has no appetite for fiscal union—Wolfgang Schäuble, the former Federal Minister of Finance, has in fact said that integration has gone ‘too far’—and Poland clearly has no desire to join the euro. The truth is that the EU has become economically, politically and culturally too diverse for a further drive towards ever closer union to be feasible. The EU, therefore, will almost certainly remain, for the foreseeable future, an association of states committed, as the European federalist Andrew Duff has lamented, to ‘never closer union’.

The EU will probably follow Tusk’s advice that what Europeans want is not ‘more Europe’, but ‘better Europe’. Glyn Morgan and Philippe van Parijs emphasize the EU’s lack of either an economic error-correcting mechanism such as the market or an institutional one such as is built into most national parliamentary systems; and Morgan quotes the physicist, David Deutsch, who insists that ‘preserving the institutions of error correction is more important than any policy’ (p. 38).

Brexit and beyond is a stimulating and thought-provoking symposium. But it does not ask the most tantalizing question of all: could the EU ever transform itself into the kind of organization that Britain would not have wished to leave?

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